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Abstract 
 
Introduction 
This thesis looks at the pharmacist’s contribution to the capture of medication errors 
and preventing harm reaching patients. It has several components: an analysis of 
annual surveys of interventions made by pharmacists at a large teaching hospital, a re-
coding of these surveys to see how many interventions were the result of prescribing 
errors, and an experiment in A&E where the pharmacist drafted the first prescription 
chart. 
 
Methods 
One-week surveys of pharmacist interventions were regularly made at Southampton 
General Hospital between 1999 and 2009. These were analysed for trends, then 
recoded to identify the proportion that were caused by prescribing errors. In addition, 
a controlled trial was conducted to investigate the effects on prescribing error rate, of 
a pharmacist obtaining an accurate medication history in A&E, then transcribing the 
data onto the first inpatient prescription. 
 
Key findings 
In the period 1999-2001, the average number of interventions in each week long 
survey was 575 and during 2005-9 it was 973. This was a statistically significant 
increase. More interventions were recorded as serious in the latter period. 
 
The rate of interventions also increased from between one per every five and seven 
patients (31 to 45 prescribed items) to one per every one to two patients (8 to 20 
items). The severity of interventions also increased, with between one and five deaths 
avoided each week. Almost three quarters of pharmacists’ interventions (73.9%) were 
triggered by prescribing errors, giving an error rate of 644 prescribing errors per 
week, or 6.2 per 100 prescribed items. These data are in contrast to the Trust 
submitting 918 error reports per year to the NPSA, the majority of which were 
administration errors reported by nurses.  
 
 
i 
 Nearly a half (45.3%) of all prescribing errors occurred during the admission phase of 
the hospital episode. Two thirds (67.1%) of prescribing errors detected were errors of 
omission - things that had not been done. Prescribing errors of commission occurred 
mainly during the inpatient phase and errors of omission during the admission phase. 
A quarter of prescribing errors were planning errors. These were failures to follow 
guidelines, failures to review patients’ prescriptions, manage interactions, and adjust 
dosage in liver or renal failure or in response to TDM results. 
 
One fifth (21.7%) of the patients had events or symptoms that contributed to the 
admission that could be explained by the medicines they were consuming. Over half 
of these were potentially avoidable by better monitoring or product selection. 
 
A pharmacist working in A&E to obtain complete and accurate drug histories, then 
transcribing the data onto the first prescription, produced a trend to reduction in the 
generation of errors throughout the whole hospital episode. 
 
Conclusions  
Analysing pharmacist’s interventions is a useful method of investigation prescribing 
errors and ways to stop them happening. First prescriptions written by pharmacists 
should provide an effective means of reducing errors which may be promulgated 
throughout the hospital stay.  
 
 
 
ii 
 Contents 
Section         
 Page 
Abstract         i 
Contents         iii 
  
List of tables         xv  
List of figures         xix 
Declaration         xx 
Abbreviations commonly used in this thesis     xxi 
Acknowledgements        xxii 
Chapter 1 Introduction       1 
1.1            Industries with a safety culture    1 
1.1.1           Complex systems      3 
1.1.2            The role of practitioners     4 
1.1.3  Impact of the media      5 
1.1.4  Definitions       5 
1.1.4.1  Adverse Event (AE)      5 
1.1.4.2  Preventable adverse event (PAE)    6 
1.1.4.3  Preventable adverse drug events (PADEs)                    6 
1.1.4.4  Adverse drug event (ADE)     7 
1.1.4.5  Adverse drug reaction (ADR)     9 
1.1.5  Patient Safety       10 
1.1.6  The UK position      11 
 
 
iii 
1.1.7  The role of human beings     13 
1.2  Error theory       13 
1.2.1  Errors        13 
1.2.2  Theory of cognition and its relationship to errors  16 
1.2.3  Latent and active errors     17 
1.2.4  Coding error severity      18 
1.2.5  Concept models of errors     20 
1.2.5.1  Swiss cheese model      20 
1.2.5.2  Bow Tie model      21 
1.3  Detecting errors      22 
1.3.1  Analysing medical records     22 
1.3.2  Prescription chart review     22 
1.3.3  Self-reporting       23 
1.3.4  Detection by other prescribers    23 
1.3.5  Observation of practice     23 
1.3.6  Trigger signals      23 
1.3.7  Interviewing prescribers     23 
1.3.8  Electronic prescriptions that are cancelled within two hours 24 
1.3.9  Combination methods      24 
1.3.10  Failure Modes, Effect and Criticality Analysis  24 
1.3.11  Pharmacist interventions     27 
1.3.12  Voluntary adverse event reporting    27 
1.3.13  Observational studies      30 
1.3.14  Significant event audit     31 
1.4  The Medicines use process     32 
 
 
iv 
1.4.1  Overview of MUP      32 
1.4.2  Supply errors       33 
1.4.3  Errors in medicine preparation    34 
1.4.4  Errors in product identification    35 
1.4.5  Errors in administration     36 
1.5  Prescribing       38 
1.5.1  Prescribing errors      38 
1.5.2  Prescribing - Decision phase     39 
1.5.3  Prescribing – technical phase     39 
1.5.4  Types of prescribing error     41 
1.5.5  Off –label and unlicensed prescribing   42 
1.5.6  Reducing Prescribing errors     42 
1.6  Impact of technology on error avoiding strategies  43 
1.6.1  Electronic transfer of prescriptions    43 
1.6.2  Bar Coding       44 
1.6.3  Unit specific formularies     45 
1.7  Electronic prescribing      45 
1.7.1  Computerised physician order entry    45 
1.7.2  Adverse consequences of CPO    47 
1.7.3  Effect of electronic prescribing on administration errors 48 
1.7.4  Clinical decision support (CDS) and error   48 
1.7.4.1  CDS in patients with renal dysfunction   49 
1.7.4.2  CDS in other areas      50 
1.7.4.3  The ten commandments of CD    51 
1.7.5  Clinical Information systems (CISs)    52 
 
 
v 
1.8  Errors in critical care      53 
1.8.1  The critical care environment     53 
1.8.1.1  Strategies for prevention of errors in critical care  56 
1.9  Temporary secondary care loop    56 
1.9.1  Admission       57 
1.9.2  Inpatient activity      58 
1.9.3  Discharge       59 
1.9.4  Re-admission       60 
1.9.5  Medicines reconciliation     61 
1.9.6  Medication related admissions    62 
1.10  The developing role of the pharmacist in error prevention 63 
1.11  Southampton University Hospitals NHS Trust  65 
1.12  Research overview      65 
1.12.1  Research contextualisation     65 
1.12.2  Aims of this research      66 
1.12.3  Research objectives      67 
1.12.4  Chapter summary      67 
Chapter 2 Pharmacy activity surveys    69 
2.1  Introduction       69 
2.1.1  Patient access to hospitals     70 
2.1.2  Supply of Medicines      71 
2.1.3  Supply of Information     72 
2.1.3.1  The pharmacist as educator     73 
2.1.4  Risk management functions for pharmacists   74 
2.1.4.1  Risk management function in the dispensary   74 
 
 
vi 
2.1.4.2  Risk management function on the ward   75 
2.1.5  Surveys of pharmacist activity at SUHT   76 
2.1.6  LENARD       77 
2.2  Methods       78 
2.2.1  Point prevalence activity studies    78 
2.2.2  Drug History       79 
2.2.3  Items Supplied      79 
2.2.4  Monitored dosage systems     79 
2.2.5  Drugs requiring special monitoring    80 
2.2.6  Advanced Dispensing of Discharge Medication  80           
2.2.7  Therapeutic substitution     80 
2.2.8  Review of patient care     81 
2.2.9  Identification of newly prescribed items   81 
2.2.10  Pharmacist screening activity     81 
2.2.11  POD technicians (PODtechs)     82 
2.3  Results       82 
2.3.1  Results of activity point prevalence studies   82 
2.3.2  Detailed data from 2005     84 
2.4  Discussion       85 
2.4.1  Early years data      85 
2.4.2  Post-2000 data      87 
2.4.3  2005 detailed data      88 
2.4.3.1  Monitored dose systems     88 
2.4.3.2  Annotations       89 
2.4.3.3  Drugs requiring special monitoring    89 
 
 
vii 
2.4.3.4  Therapeutic drug level monitoring    90 
2.4.3.5  Prescriptions for discharge from hospital   90 
2.4.3.6  Advanced dispensing of discharge medicines scheme 91 
2.4.3.7  Patient counselling      91 
2.4.3.8  Pharmacist prescribing of parenteral nutrition  91 
2.4.3.9  Therapeutic substitution     92 
2.4.3.10 Overall observations      92 
2.4.4  Study limitations      93 
2.4.5  Suggestions for future work     93 
2.5  Conclusions       93 
Chapter 3 - Intervention studies     96 
3.1  Introduction       96 
3.1.1  Justification of intervention surveys    97 
3.2  Method       98 
3.2.1  Study setting       98 
3.2.2  Data collection      99 
3.2.3  Data coding       100 
3.2.3.1  Coding for severity or potential consequences  101 
3.2.3.2  Coding system for types of Intervention   103 
3.2.3.3  Financial motivation      107 
3.2.3.4  Outcome of intervention     108 
3.2.3.5  Severity rating scale validation    109 
3.2.3.6  Statistical techniques      109 
3.3  Results       110 
3.3.1  Numbers of interventions     110 
 
 
viii 
3.3.2  Severity or consequence coding    110 
3.3.2.1  Severity rating scale validation    110 
3.3.2.2  Distribution of severity scoring    111 
3.3.2.3  Further analysis of the serious interventions (4, 5 & 6) 112 
3.3.2.4  Detailed results for 2001 and 2007    113 
3.3.3  Trends in intervention types     114 
3.3.3.1  Trends in intervention types for 2001 and 2007  116 
3.3.4  Financial motivation      120 
3.3.5  Outcome of intervention     120 
3.4  Discussion       121 
3.4.1  Validation of the severity rating scale   121 
3.4.2  Number of interventions     122 
3.4.3  Severity scoring      122 
3.4.3.1  Score 1 Interventions      122 
3.4.3.2  Score 2 Interventions      124 
3.4.3.3  Score 3 Interventions      124 
3.4.3.4  Score 4, 5 and 6 interventions    126 
3.4.4  Type of intervention      128 
3.4.4.1  TTO/IP discrepancy or IP drug omission (type 8)  128 
3.4.4.2  Choice of Dose/frequency (type 10)    130 
3.4.4.3  Drug choice, or need for drug (type 9)   130 
3.4.4.4  Choice of form/strength/route (type 11)   133 
3.4.4.5  Documentation (Type 7)     134 
3.4.4.6  Drug interaction/ADR/SE (type 15)    135 
3.4.4.7  Drug duration (type 12)     136 
 
 
ix 
3.4.4.8  Pharmacokinetics/TDM (type 13)    136 
3.4.4.9  Drug admin/incompatibility/calc (type 14)   137 
3.4.4.10 Other drug information (type 17)    139 
3.4.4.11 Therapeutic substitution (type19)    139 
3.4.4.12 Drug supply/storage (type16)     140 
3.4.4.13 Nutrition (type 18)      140 
3.4.5  Comparison of 2001 and 2007    141 
3.4.6  Financial motivation (20-23)     142 
3.4.7  Outcome of intervention (24-28)    144 
3.4.8  Serious interventions      145 
3.4.9  Educating healthcare practitioners    147 
3.5  Conclusions       148 
Chapter 4 Medication error and adverse events detected     
in the A&E Department      151 
 
4.1  Introduction       151 
4.1.1  Key incident one      151 
4.1.2  Key incident two      152 
4.2  Aims of the study      154 
4.3  Objectives       154 
4.4  Method       155 
4.4.1  Main study       156 
4.4.1.1  Patient recruitment      156 
4.4.1.2  Inclusions       157 
4.4.1.3  Exclusions       157 
4.4.1.4  Randomisation      158 
4.4.1.5  Control arm of the study     159 
 
 
x 
4.4.1.6  Experimental arm of the study    160 
4.4.1.7  Study personnel      161 
4.4.1.8  Ethics        161 
4.4.1.9  Statistical calculations     162 
4.4.2  A&E Side-study Questionnaire    163 
4.4.2.1  Justification for the side-study    163 
4.5  Results       164 
4.5.1  Results from the side-study questionnaire   165 
4.5.2  Results from randomised study    174 
4.5.2.1  Recruitment to pilot study     174  
4.5.2.2  Patients with and without events    175 
4.5.2.3  Medication related admissions    177 
4.5.2.4  Events during the admission phase    180 
4.5.2.5  Events during the inpatient phase    183 
4.5.2.6  Events during the discharge phase    184 
4.5.2.7  Patients with multiple events     186 
4.5.2.8  All events within hospital processes    187 
4.6  Discussion       189 
4.6.1  Part 1 - side-study questionnaire    189 
4.6.2  Part 2- main study      192 
4.6.2.1  Randomisation & exclusion     192 
4.6.2.2  Objective A       193  
4.6.2.3   Objective B       195  
4.6.2.4  Objective C       197  
4.6.2.5  Objective D       197  
 
 
xi 
4.6.2.6  Objective E       199  
4.6.2.7  Objective F       200  
4.6.2.8  Objective G       202  
4.7  Study critique       204 
4.8  Suggestions for future research    204 
4.9  Conclusions       205 
4.9.1  Questionnaire sub-study     205 
4.9.2  Main Study       206 
Chapter 5 - Prescribing errors and interventions  209 
5.1  Introduction       209 
5.1.1  Nature and classification of prescribing errors  209 
5.1.2  Objectives of the study     211 
5.2  Method       211 
5.2.1  Method (part 1) 2007 Project     212 
5.2.2  Method (part 2) 2001-2009 Project    214 
5.3  Results       214 
5.3.1  Results for 2007 Project (part 1)    214 
5.3.1.1  Recalibration       215 
5.3.2  Results for 2001-2009 Project (Part 2)   216 
5.3.2.1  All prescribing errors collectively    216 
5.3.2.2  Prescribing errors of Commission    219  
5.3.2.3  Prescribing errors of Omission    220 
5.3.2.4  Non-prescribing errors (NPEs)    220 
5.4  Discussion       221 
5.4.1  Discussion (part 1) 2007 Project    221 
 
 
xii 
5.4.2  Discussion (part 2) 2001-2009 project   223 
5.4.2.1  Phase of the hospital episode     224 
5.4.2.2  Technical prescribing errors     225 
5.4.2.3  Clinical prescribing errors     227 
5.4.2.4  Errors of omission and commission    228 
5.4.2.5  Prescribing errors of commission    229 
5.4.2.6  Prescribing errors of omission    232 
5.4.2.7  Non- prescribing errors     234 
5.4.3  EQIP study       237 
5.5  Limitations of this study     239 
5.6  Recommendations      240 
5.7  Conclusions       241 
Chapter 6 – Research summary and suggestions for    
future work        
 245 
 
6.1   Introduction       245 
6.2   Summary of Chapter 2     246 
6.3   Summary of Chapter 3     247 
6.3.1   Numbers and severity scores     247 
6.3.2   Types of intervention      248 
6.3.3  Outcomes       249 
6.3.4  High severity interventions     249 
6.3.5  Medicines education for other healthcare workers  249 
6.4  Summary of Chapter 4     250 
6.5  Summary of Chapter 5     254 
6.5.1  Overview       254 
 
 
xiii 
6.5.2  Phase 2 of secondary care loop    256 
6.5.3  Changing the culture      256 
6.5.4  All prescribing errors      256 
6.5.5  Prescribing errors of commission    256 
6.5.6  Prescribing errors of omission    257 
6.5.7  Transcription errors      257 
6.5.8  Technical and clinical PEs     258 
6.5.9  Non-prescribing errors     258 
6.5.10  Summary comparison with the EQUIP study   258 
Chapter 7 Overall conclusions     260 
Recommendations for further research and future practice development  263 
References        
 265 
Appendices 
Appendix 1 Data collection form used in point prevalence activity studies. 
Appendix 2 Data collection form used in the intervention studies. (2006 version). 
Appendix 3 Patient information forms for controlled study. 
Appendix 4 Process map for the controlled study. 
Appendix 5 A&E side-study questionnaire.
Appendix 6. Definitions of prescribing errors. 
Appendix 7 Data collection form (post 2007) – not used. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
xiv 
  
List of tables 
Table Page
Table 1.1 Reasons for therapeutic failure. 
 
8 
Table 1.2 Definitions of severity (NCCMERP) 
 
18 
Table 1.3 Definitions for a severity index. 19 
Table 1.4 Advantages and disadvantages of methods of detecting medication related 
errors. 
 
26 
Table 1.5 Knowledge deficiencies that cause prescribing errors. 
 
41 
Table 1.6 Competencies for junior doctors in prescribing. 
 
42 
Table 1.7 Ten commandments for CDS. 
 
52 
Table 1.8 Key literature showing the proportion of hospital admissions that are drug 
related admissions. 
 
62 
Table 2.1 NPSA definitions with consequences of errors 
 
77 
Table 2.2 Clinical pharmacists’ activity survey data for 1990-2001 
 
83 
Table 2.3 Clinical pharmacists’ activity survey data for 2001-2009 
 
84 
Table 2.4 Detailed activity data from 2005 
 
85 
Table 3.1 Justification for undertaking intervention surveys 97 
Table 3.2 Main sections of the intervention form 
 
100 
Table 3.3 Severity or potential harm scoring  
 
103 
Table 3.4 Codings and interpretations for intervention type. 
 
104 
Table 3.5 Financial motivation codings and interpretation 
 
107 
Table 3.6 Outcome of intervention codes and interpretation 108 
Table 3.7 Total interventions per week 
 
110 
Table 3.8 Distribution of intervention severity 
 
111 
 
 
xv 
Table 3.9 Intervention severity distribution for selected periods 
 
112 
Table 3.10 Distribution of severity scores for 2001 and 2007 
 
114 
Table 3.11 Type of intervention 2006 – 2009 
 
115 
Table 3.12 Ranking and percentage of types of intervention 2006 to 2009 
 
116 
Table 3.13 A comparison types of intervention in 2001 and 2007. 
 
117 
Table 3.14 Number of interventions in 2007 and magnitude of change since 2001. 
 
119 
Table 3.15 Financial motivation of interventions 1999 to 2009 
 
120 
Table 3.16 Outcome of interventions 
 
120 
Table 3.17 Cohorts 2005-9, severity score 5 & 6 distribution variation with intervention 
type. 
 
146 
Table 4.1 -Frequency distribution of the number of medicines taken 
 
165 
Table 4.2- Frequency distribution of number of tablets (doses) taken each day in side-
study 
 
166 
Table 4.3 Answers to question 3, most frequently forgotten medicines 
 
168 
Table 4.4 Answers to question 4, disruption to daily routine 
 
168 
Table 4.5 Answers to question 5, names of prescribed medicines 
 
168 
Table 4.6 Answers to question 5, where the respondent could provide names 
 
169 
Table 4.7 Answers to question 6, did patients know what their medicines were for 
 
169 
Table 4.8 Answers to question 6 where a condition was named 
 
170 
Table 4.9 Answers to question 7 where patients did not take painkillers 
 
170 
Table 4.10 Answers to question 8 – allergies to drugs 
 
171 
Table 4.11 Answers to question 8 descriptions of possible allergic reactions 
 
171 
Table 4.12 Answers to question 9, reactions to antibiotics 
 
172 
Table 4.13 Answers to question 9 where further information was supplied 
 
172 
Table 4.14 Answers to question 10, taking antibiotics often 
 
172 
Table 4.15 reasons why patients often took antibiotics 172 
 
 
xvi 
 
Table 4.16 Answers to question 11, did patients bring their own medicines into hospital. 
 
173 
 
Table 4.17 Answers to question 12, use of someone else’s medicines 
 
173 
Table 4.18 Initial recruitment distribution to the pilot randomised study 
 
174 
Table 4.19 Distribution of patients for consent to the pilot randomised study 
 
174 
Table 4.20 Distribution of patients between control and intervention arms 
 
175 
Table 4.21 Patients with or without events throughout hospital episode 
 
176 
Table 4.22 Medication anomalies detected that may be related to the reason for 
admission 
 
177 
Table 4.23 Distribution of medication-related admissions by type 
 
179 
Table 4.24 Events detected during the admission process 
 
180 
Table 4.25 distribution of errors during the admission phase 
 
182 
Table 4.26 Events detected during the inpatient phase 
 
183 
Table 4.27 Distribution of inpatient anomalies in control group 
 
184 
Table 4.28 Events detected during the discharge process 
 
184 
Table 4.29 Summarised events detected during the discharge phase 
 
186 
Table 4.30 Distribution of patients throughout main study with number of events 
 
186 
Table 4.31 Distribution of patients with multiple events within the hospital episode. 
 
187 
Table 4.32 Summary of events during the complete hospital episode 
 
187 
Table 4.33 Summary of events that occurred before and during the hospital episode. 
 
188 
Table 4.34 Summary of events that occurred within hospital processes. 
 
188 
Table 5.1 Descriptors for different prescribing errors 
 
213 
Table 5.2 Summary of interventions and errors in June 2007 
 
214 
Table 5.3 Distribution of PE vs. hospital phase after recalibration 
 
215 
Table 5.4 Distribution of type of prescribing error across phase of hospital episode. 
 
216 
 
 
xvii 
Table 5.5 Distribution of all prescribing error across phase of hospital episode 
 
216 
 
 
Table 5.6 Distribution of all prescribing errors between those of omission and 
commission 
 
216 
Table 5.7 Distribution of type of prescribing errors across phase of hospital episode 
 
217 
Table 5.8 Detailed distribution of prescribing errors into those of commission and those 
of omission 
 
218 
Table 5.9 CPE distribution across phases of hospital episode 
 
219 
Table 5.10 CPEs during the admission phase sorted into 7 categories 
 
219 
Table 5.11 CPEs during the inpatient phase was sorted into 9 categories 
 
219 
Table 5.12 CPEs during the discharge phase was sorted into 8 categories 
 
219 
Table 5.13 OPE distribution across phases of hospital episode 
 
220 
Table 5.14 OPEs during the admission phase categorised as to type.  
 
220 
Table 5.15 OPEs during the inpatient phase categorised as to type. 
 
220 
Table 5.16 OPEs during the discharge phase categorised as to type 
 
221 
Table 5.17 remaining NPEs categorised by type. 
 
221 
Table 5.18 Medication adverse event forms from SUHT submitted each year to NPSA, 
by healthcare profession. 
 
224 
Table 5.19 Comparison of intervention data with NPE data for 2005-9 
 
235 
 
 
 
 
xviii 
List of figures 
Figure Page
Figure 1.1 Relationship between different types of adverse events in medical practice. 
 
6 
Figure 1.2 Illustrating Adverse drug events (ADEs) in a Venn diagram 
 
9 
Figure 1.3 Diagram of errors 
 
15 
Figure 1.4 The Swiss Cheese model 
 
21 
Figure 1.5 The bow – tie model adapted from Shell 
 
22 
Figure 1.6 The medicines use process (MUP) 
 
32 
Figure 1.7 The temporary secondary care loop 
 
57 
Figure 2.1 Diagram showing the different possible phases of the hospital episode 
 
71 
Figure 2.2 Trends in activity data for 1990-2001 
 
83 
Figure 2.3 Trends in activity data for 2001-2009 
 
84 
Figure 3.1 Total interventions per week-long study over the period 1999-2009 
 
110 
Figure 3.2 Distribution of severity of all interventions per survey 
 
112 
Figure 3.3 Distribution of severity of serious interventions 
 
113 
Figure 3.4 Truncated distribution of severity of serious intervention 
 
113 
Figure 3.5 Percentage distribution of severity scores for 2001 & 2007 
 
114 
Figure 3.6 Ranking and percentage of types of intervention 2006-9 
 
116 
Figure 3.7 Comparison between 2001 & 2007 of the percentage of different types of 
intervention. 
 
118 
Figure 3.8 Percentage changes from 2001 data to 2007 based on the data in Table 3.13.  
 
119 
Figure 4.1 The admission process including additional pharmacist research arm 
 
156 
Figure 4.2 – Frequency distribution of number of medicines taken in side-study 
 
166 
Figure 4.3 Frequency distribution of number of tablets (doses) taken each day in side-
study 
 
167 
Figure 4.4 Frequency distribution of medicines named in side-study 
 
169 
 
 
xix 
DECLARATION 
 
Whilst registered as a candidate for this PhD, I have not been registered for any other 
research award. The results and conclusions embodied in this thesis are the work of 
the named candidate and have not been submitted for any other academic award. 
 
 
Mark Tomlin 
June 2011 
 
 
 
xx 
List of abbreviations used in this thesis 
 
Abbreviation Interpretation 
A&E Accident and emergency 
ADE Adverse drug event 
ADDM Advance dispensing of discharge medication 
ADR Adverse drug reaction 
AFC Agenda for Change 
BNF British national Formulary 
CDS Clinical decision support 
CPE Commission prescribing error 
CPOE Computerised physician order entry 
CUR Clinical use review 
DUP Drug use process 
FMECA Failure mode effect and critical analysis 
GMC General Medical Council 
IP Inpatient 
LOS Length of stay 
MAE Medicine administration error 
MAU Medical assessment unit 
MDS Monitored dose system 
MRA Medication related admission 
MRE Medication related error 
MUP Medicines use process 
MUR Medicines use review 
NPSA National Patient Safety Agency 
NPSA National Patient Safety Agency 
OPE Omission prescribing error 
PE Prescribing error 
PODs Patient’s  own drugs 
PODTechs POD technicians 
PRN As required 
SE Side effect 
SEA Significant effect audit 
SUHT Southampton University Hospitals NHS Trust 
TDM Therapeutic drug monitoring 
TPN Total parenteral nutrition 
TS Therapeutic substitution 
TTO To take out 
WHO  World Health Organisation 
WTE Work time equivalent 
 
 
 
xxi 
 Acknowledgements 
 
 
Firstly I would like to thank Prof. David Brown for his support throughout this PhD, 
but particularly in guiding me through the preparation of the thesis. 
 
I would like to thank Jennifer Thomson for her work in A&E in delivering the first 
prescription charts that avoided the errors. I would like to thank Samantha Jackson 
and Karen Collins who were the research nurses who organised the patients, obtained 
consent for the research and administered the questionnaires in A&E. 
 
I would like to thank Dr Rob Crouch and Dr Mike Clancey for their support and 
assistance in organising the A&E project, particularly in persuading the senior staff to 
allow the experiment to proceed. I would also like to thank Martin Stephens , John 
Jackson and Prof. Saad Shakir for their support in gaining the funding so the research 
nurses could be seconded to conduct the research. 
 
Thanks are also due to Angela Badiani, Mark Pepperrell and Andy Fox for 
participating in the severity scoring validation. The author would also like to thank all 
the other pharmacists at SUHT who delivered the interventions over many years and 
supporting the conduct of each survey. 
 
A special thank you goes to the Critical Care pharmacists who covered the clinical 
areas whilst the author was retrieving notes and writing the thesis. 
 
Finally, thank you to my family for their patience and understanding  my need for 
absolute focus in writing the thesis. 
 
 
xxii 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
This research studies the roles and potential roles for pharmacists in the minimisation 
of medication related errors at various stages of the patient journey to, through, and 
leaving the secondary care environment. An overview of the research undertaken is 
provided in Section 1.11.3. This chapter discusses the generation of medication errors, 
key drivers behind initiatives to reduce them and strategies proposed for reducing 
them. It will be seen that pharmacists could make a difference at every stage of the 
medicines use process.  
 
Medication errors are an unwanted aspect of modern medicine. The Hippocratic Oath1 
insists that physicians will ‘do no harm or injustice’ to their patients. However the 
complexity of healthcare almost guarantees that errors will occur. Therefore how that 
risk of errors is managed in an organisation defines its attitude to safety. 
 
Risk is simply the potential for an unwanted outcome. In general the more complex 
the activity the greater the risk and the more stages in the process the greater the 
number of risks. Risk management encompasses a series of activities including risk 
assessment, learning from mistakes, implementing changes as a result and reporting 
adverse events. This results in safer practice, enhanced patient care and reduced 
litigation.2  
 
‘Safety cultures’ that encourage open reporting and balanced analysis have a better 
performance than ‘blame cultures’ where there is fear of retribution for failure.3
Academic research about healthcare failures is well developed in Australia and 
America but is still in its infancy in the UK. The NHS is not good at learning lessons 
from these failures and research in this area is to be encouraged.3 
 
1.1 Industries with a safety culture 
This section will discuss other complex industries that have a culture of safety to 
illuminate the management of risks. Many of the examples are taken from an 
American report into errors in healthcare entitled ‘To err is human’.4 This report was 
published in 2000 for the US National Research Council by the Committee on Quality 
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of Health Care in America. The committee was formed from the national academies 
of sciences, engineering and medicine. 
 
Healthcare is a complex system with multiple processes, entry pathways and feedback 
loops. It has similarities with space, air and train travel, as well as banking and 
nuclear power generation.  
 
The public perception is that healthcare should operate like a train company. You 
book your ticket, enter the train, travel from A to B, disembark and arrive at your 
planned destination. Thus you book your elective operation (when it suits you), you 
are admitted, surgery goes to plan, you recover and are then discharged and continue 
on your life journey as if there had been no interruption. 
 
Air travel is different to train travel because there are no train tracks, the weather may 
delay, divert or cancel your flight, there are others using the airspace and collisions 
have to be avoided and (rarely) you may crash and burn. So healthcare is more like air 
travel than train travel.4  
 
Train travel, air travel and nuclear power are perceived as organisations that give a 
high priority to maintaining safe systems and the processes are much more reliable 
than healthcare. In air travel and banking a 1% error rate is acceptable; so why is this 
not tolerated in healthcare? 
 
Healthcare differs from other industries because the damage is caused to a third party 
(the patient) whereas in an airline accident, the pilot is the first to know and the 
company damaged subsequently. 
 
Train or aeroplane crashes provoke big enquiries because many people are injured at 
once. In healthcare, individuals may be harmed by single events or by the 
convergence of otherwise innocuous errors. There may be a large collective problem 
of errors in medical care but it is insidious and largely invisible to the general public. 
Therefore the journey of the patient through the healthcare system (particularly a 
hospital episode) may be more hazardous than they expect. 
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1.1.1 Complex systems 
Many industries have linear systems or processes where steps are followed 
sequentially and there are few decision points or secondary pathways. These 
industries ensure a good product is delivered by careful selection of the raw materials 
and good quality control of the processes. Healthcare is much more complex with 
multiple entry points, multiple exits and many feedback loops.4 Indeed the raw 
material (the patient) is not in good working order, despite a perception that all 
patients enter the system in pristine condition. 
 
Coupling is a mechanical engineering term that describes how processes are linked.  
Loosely coupled systems have time buffers that can tolerate processing delays, can 
reorder the sequence of production and can employ alternative methods or resources. 
 
The engineering term ‘tightly coupled’ means that processes have few buffers and 
events proceed quickly from one stage to the next. When errors occur in tightly 
coupled systems, there is no time delay before disaster; there is no time to recover. 
The Kegworth air crash was not caused by an engine fire, but by the pilot switching 
off the remaining good engine.5 There was not enough time to correct this error of 
communication, despite the stewardess being able to see which engine was on fire. 
Errors arise from informational problems and incomplete knowledge.5 Time buffers 
(waiting lists) are used to manage entry into hospitals. However once inside the 
system, many medication processes are ‘tightly coupled’. 
 
The objectives for safety are to make it difficult for individuals to make errors, and 
absorb errors that do occur i.e. permit their detection and correction before harm 
occurs.6  However the tightly coupled systems in hospital limit the usefulness of time 
buffers and a complex system tends to introduce steps that produce choices rather 
than an easy flow of processes.  
 
Further differences are also apparent. The patient may be treated by multiple modes 
(surgery, drugs, radiotherapy, or counselling). The intended outcome many be full 
recovery, an improvement in their health status, stabilisation of their condition, or 
palliation before death.  
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1.1.2 The role of practitioners 
Serious errors are unusual to practitioners and lots of trivial errors produce noise.7 
Practitioners (components of the system) become familiar with frequent, apparently 
inconsequential errors, but remain unfamiliar with disasters. 
 
Historically, this has built a perception that disasters occur because an individual 
practitioner has failed. The answer therefore has been to punish, disqualify or shame 
that practitioner so they either improve their performance or are dismissed.4  
The individual is sanctioned and given rules to follow until they improve their 
performance. Retraining is perceived as part of the disciplinary process.  
 
Healthcare practitioners are usually well trained and motivated to avoid patient harm 
There is a clear public expectation that no harm should occur. Healthcare workers 
know that errors do occur, but most do not produce harm to patients. Where harm 
does occur, the burden to the patient is fully comprehended and produces a period of 
remorse and then blame. The blame culture is perpetuated by findings that depressed 
doctors are six times more likely to make medication errors.8  
 
The prescriber who kills a patient is shocked and confused as to what went wrong. 
In many cases they were repeating practice undertaken a thousand times before. The 
problem with this belief system is that even well motivated workers  make mistakes; 
one cannot just re-train so mistakes will not be made. 
 
In order to protect future individuals from harm, it may be more effective to change 
the system as a whole to reduce the likelihood of repetition and future accidents. New 
technology and processes are continually being incorporated into healthcare in order 
to improve the outcomes for patients. However constant vigilance is required to 
ensure new errors are not being introduced. 
 
All humans err frequently. Systems that rely on error-free performance are doomed to 
fail.7 The difficulty is changing perceptions so that healthcare learns from other 
industries to change systems to make it safer for patients. 
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1.1.3 Impact of the media 
 The role of the media is crucial in raising public awareness about disasters in all 
industries. 
 
The Challenger spaceship disaster and the Three Mile Island nuclear accident were 
significant engineering errors that raised awareness in the general public about safety 
cultures in space travel and nuclear power generation.4 This was partly because they 
produced newspaper headlines, and detailed background stories over many weeks. 
 
In healthcare, the media publicise individual deaths rather than large cohorts of 
patients. So there is a tendency to produce anecdotal reports of deaths of famous 
people or personal tragedies to which the public can easily relate; for example:  
reported cases of amputation of the wrong leg, or accidental overdose of a child, or 
death from an anticancer drug. A hospital in the USA was fined approximately 
£12,500 for giving (1,000 times) overdoses of an anticoagulant to three children 
including the newborn twins of actor Dennis Quaid and this case gained wide media 
coverage.9 However such reporting tends to spread alarm, rather than an 
understanding of what is really happening throughout the healthcare system. 
 
1.1.4 Definitions 
Before exploring the impact of medicines misadventures further, it is worth defining 
the meaning of some commonly used terms. 
 
1.1.4.1 Adverse Event (AE) 
An adverse event has been defined as – an injury caused by medical management 
rather than the underlying condition of the patient.6  
 
In 1997 there were two significant studies in the USA looking at AEs producing 
hospital admissions. In the Colorado and Utah study in 1992, an AE occurred in 2.9% 
of hospital admissions.10 A similar study in New York, Harvard Medical Practice in 
1984 showed 3.7% hospital admissions experienced an AE.11 In the former study 10, 
6.6% of AEs led to death; in New York11, the figure was 13.6%. From this it was 
 
 
5 
extrapolated that in the US in 1997 there were nationally, 33.6 million admissions and 
44 to 96 thousand Americans died each year as a result of medical errors in hospital. 
This would make medical adverse events the eighth leading cause of death; higher 
than car accident deaths (43,000), breast cancer deaths (42,000), and deaths from 
AIDS (16,000).4  
 
1.1.4.2 Preventable adverse event (PAE) 
A preventable adverse event is an adverse event attributable to a medical error.4 PAEs 
are a subset of AEs. A negligent adverse event (NAE) represents a subset of PAEs. In 
negligent PAEs the provider fails to meet the standard of care reasonably expected of 
an average physician qualified to take care of the patient in question. While many 
PAEs involve drugs, many do not. 
 
Figure 1.1 shows the linkage between the concepts of AEs, PAEs and NAEs. 
 
AE PAE NAE
Infection Post-operative infection Post-op. infection 
due to dirty hands
Wrong-site 
surgery
Cross-infection 
from other patients
 
Figure 1.1 Relationship between different types of adverse events in medical 
practice. (see text for definitions). 
 
 
1.1.4.3 Preventable adverse drug events (PADEs) 
PADE is the term used to describe PAEs that are related to drugs. This thesis will 
only be examining PAEs that are associated with medication. In the New York 
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study11, 58% of AEs were PAEs, including 27.6% that were NAEs; In the Colorado 
and Utah study10, 53% were PAEs including 29.2% NAEs. In this study it was 
estimated that 2% of admissions to hospitals in the US were the consequence of 
PADEs, representing a cost of $2billion nationally.  
 
A study in 1988 by Dubois et al. 12 showed that of 182 deaths from 3 conditions 
(cerebrovascular accident, myocardial infarction and pneumonia) in 12 hospitals, at 
least 14% and possibly as many as 27% might have been prevented. 
 
1.1.4.4 Adverse drug event (ADE) 
Complications arise in defining an adverse drug event. Not surprisingly, different 
publications have produced different definitions. 
 
The World Health Organisation (WHO) defines an ADE as a detrimental response 
that may be related to medication that is undesired and unintended, excluding 
therapeutic failure, poisoning, and overdose.13 An ADR (adverse drug reaction) is a 
subset of ADEs and is unavoidable. A meta-analysis showed that on average 5.3% of 
hospital admissions were associated with ADRs.14
 
However a therapeutic failure could fall into any of the groups shown in Table 1.1, 
which uses the choice of antibiotics as its theme. Example 1 could be regarded as a 
therapeutic failure consistent with action on poor evidence. Example 2 might be poor 
practice. Example 3 would be a PAE as defined above. Examples 4 and 5 are 
medication errors or PADEs. Similarly, overdose could be accidental, deliberate or 
the result of a prescription.  
 
Bates et al.15 defined an ADE as ‘any untoward medical occurrence that may present 
during treatment with a pharmaceutical product but which does not necessarily have 
a causal relationship with this treatment’. 
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Table 1.1 Reasons for therapeutic failure. 
 Reason Example 
1 Poor selection of drug 
due to inadequate data 
Choosing  penicillin V for an infection where there is 
evidence that the infection is actually due to 
Pseudomonas, which is intrinsically resistant. 
2 Poor procedure Not collecting samples so that a choice can be 
informed or confirmed.  
3 Poor selection on the 
basis of inaccurate data 
Choosing penicillin V because the laboratory 
inaccurately reported sensitivity of the organism. 
4 Poor selection of drug 
despite good data 
Choosing penicillin V due to mis-reading the 
laboratory report that clearly states resistance to 
penicillin V. 
5 Poor prescribing Choosing penicillin V for a sensitive organism but 
using a sub-therapeutic dose by mistake. 
 
 
A more helpful definition of  medication errors used by Phillipps et al. 16 is:  ‘any 
preventable event that may cause or lead to inappropriate medication use or patient 
harm, while the medication is in the control of the healthcare professional, patient or 
consumer’. This definition is associated with some useful quantitative data that enable 
the reader to appreciate the size of this problem. 
 
Tomsen et al. 17 presented a systematic analysis of 29 studies showing that 
ambulatory care in the US had an incidence of 14.9 ADEs per 1000 person months. 
Preventable ADEs represented 5.6 ADEs per 1000 patients (21% of all ADEs) and 
half of the preventable ADEs required hospitalisation. Although ADEs represented 
only one fifth of AEs they are in general, the most studied because computerised data 
is often available on what is prescribed, the medicines use process is studied in detail, 
and the outcomes of treatment are recorded on death certificates. Circumstances 
around other AEs are frequently more opaque. 
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1.1.4.5 Adverse drug reaction (ADR) 
An ADR is defined by the WHO as an effect that is ‘noxious and unintended, and 
which occurs at doses used in man for prophylaxis, diagnosis or therapy’.13 ADRS 
can be sub-classified into type A: usually predictable from the drug’s pharmacology 
and dose dependent (e.g. respiratory depression from opiates) and type B: not 
predictable from the pharmacology, relatively rare, idiosyncratic and often more 
hazardous when compared to type A reactions (e.g. liver toxicity associated with 
troglitazone). ADRs are thus a refined subset of ADEs, where some systematic 
assessment has lead to an assumption that the drug actually caused the ADE.18
 
Summarising, and with reference to Figure 1.2, the broad term of adverse drug events 
(ADEs) encompasses true adverse drug reactions (both A and B ADRs) and  
medication errors, which may or may not lead to patient harm. Many will be 
preventable (PADEs). 
 
 
ADEs
Indirect 
Events 
ADR - Bs
PADEs
Medication errors
ADR - As
 
 
Figure 1.2 Illustrating Adverse drug events (ADEs) in a Venn diagram (see text 
for definitions) 
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Some indirect adverse events are preventable (e.g. falls from postural hypotension 
caused by drugs) and some are not. Some adverse drug reactions are predictable and 
therefore preventable (e.g. penicillin anaphylaxis in a patient who has had a previous 
reaction) and some unpredictable (e.g. a patient given penicillin for the first time). 
All medication errors are theoretically preventable; the challenge is to design systems 
the make them less likely to occur.  
 
Some patients will be admitted to hospital because of adverse drug reactions (both A 
and B) some from indirect events and some from medication errors. Collectively these 
can be called medication related admissions (MRAs) and are feature of this research. 
 
1.1.5 Patient Safety  
The concept of patient safety is that patients do not suffer from accidental injury.  
However the concept differs from reality because the reality is not absolute. The truth 
is that medicines do cause adverse events and not all are preventable. Getting the 
public to accept this unpleasant truth is a challenge.4 Not all errors result in harm. If 
organisations can learn from the errors that occur to create an environment with safer 
systems of working and staff who are alert to the risks then harm can be prevented, 
limited or eliminated.  
 
According to the US Committee on Quality of Healthcare, quality of care in health 
has three components: 4
 
1. Safe Care,   
Is identifying forces in the external environment that can drive quality 
improvement in the delivery system (regulatory/legislative and economic 
incentives); 
2 Best Practice 
Is the provision of services in a manner that is consistent with current medical 
knowledge and best practices; 
3 Customisation 
Is the ability to meet customer-specific values and expectations. It permits the 
responsiveness to individual values and preferences. 
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In the American system the committee wanted to create market place incentives to 
direct values, culture and priorities of healthcare organisations and reward 
performance beyond the minimum. 
 
Quality improvement has been described as a design concept that raises the ceiling of 
performance so that patients receive a higher level of care. Patient safety programs are 
designed to raise the floor, so that fewer patients are harmed.19 Thus patient safety is a 
minimum standard and quality improvement is an aspirational goal above the patient 
safety level. 
 
1.1.6 The UK position 
In effect, the US report ‘To err is human’4 was direct marketing to patients about 
medical errors. The impact was tangible, with near saturation coverage in the media 
over three days.20
 
The UK responded with ‘Organisation with a memory’ (OWAM).3 This report called 
for the NHS to adopt an open culture of reporting and learning lessons from failures. 
However the implied effect was that this culture change would happen immediately 
and the effect would be to eliminate errors.  The report defined an adverse event as an 
event or omission arising during clinical care and causing physical or psychological 
injury to as patient. It reported that historically individuals may learn from their 
mistakes but those around them fail to do so. 
 
The authors proposed that human error could be managed by either blaming the 
individual for their carelessness or blaming the system. In order to prevent repetition, 
the system must be investigated to uncover the hidden traps that allowed the error to 
occur; i.e. how and why did the defences in the system fail? 
 
Hard barriers are physical, e.g. layout of rooms and the environment. Soft barriers are 
procedures, protocols and people. Surmounting both types of barrier can be used to 
reduce the chance of errors occurring. 
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Although death resulting from medical errors was as common as car crashes, the 
public appears to have a lower tolerance for them. Research suggests that as many as 
10% of admissions or 850,000 patients have adverse health care events  each year in 
the NHS hospital sector, probably costing the NHS more than £2billion a year. 21 A 
reduction of medication errors would help to decrease liability and litigation costs, 
which affect the whole economy in an unacceptable way; and their prevention and 
associated cost savings would allow more money for effective and innovative medical 
treatments.22
 
In 2000, the NHS set up the National Reporting and Learning System. This was a 
mandatory reporting system for adverse health care events and near misses based on 
sound standardised reporting systems and clear definitions. It was established as a 
single overall data base for analysing and sharing lessons from incidents and near 
misses, as well as litigation and complaints data. This encouragement of a reporting 
and questioning culture in the NHS moved away from ‘blame and encourages a 
proper understanding of the underlying causes of failures.21
 
After OWAM 3 came Building a Safer National Health Service.23 This went further in 
describing how the NHS might achieve this culture change. The preferred method of 
that time was to set goals and targets. The famous quote from this publication was that 
by 2005, the NHS would ‘reduce by 40% the number of serious errors in the use of 
prescribed drugs’. At the time medication related errors accounted for 20% of clinical 
negligence litigation.21 However due to the lack of research data and definitions, the 
baseline for medication errors was not clear. It was thought likely that setting up a 
safety culture and National Reporting and Learning System would initially increase 
the number of reports. 
 
In 2008, the UK Healthcare Commission stated that quality in the NHS had improved. 
One of the standards with the highest annual improvement was compliance rates with 
standards, which increased to 94% from 91% in the annual period. Improved 
compliance, it can be suggested, should reduce medication errors. 
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1.1.7 The role of human beings 
Human beings, in all lines of work, make errors. Errors can be prevented by designing 
systems that make it hard for people to do the wrong thing and easy for people to do 
the right thing. 
 
If airline pilots can ask their juniors to report any mistakes they make – why does this 
appear to not be possible in healthcare? Pilots are trained to anticipate and deal with 
system failure and see human error as normal. These are important principles to 
incorporate into healthcare. As described in the previous section, in the UK, progress 
has been made; but it is not a universally accepted principle. 
 
Healthcare professionals are expected to exercise proper care in their work. If they 
neglect to do so and their patients are harmed they can expect to be criticised.25 
However, the rules of negligence limit the numbers that are prosecuted. This is 
because a successful claim of negligence requires the plaintive to address five 
elements: duty of care, breach of duty, factual causation, legal causation and harm. If 
any one of the elements is not proved, the whole case is lost. This is both complex and 
a difficult legal test. Systems need to be made safer but individuals must be held to 
account in particular if there is evidence of gross negligence or recklessness or of 
criminal behaviour.25  
 
It is worth remembering that errors do not respect seniority and experience. A recent 
study in Edinburgh found that during one week, 10% of trainee doctors and 6% of 
consultants made prescribing (i.e. drug-related) mistakes.26
 
1.2 Error theory 
1.2.1 Errors 
Reason5 defined an error as ‘the failure of a planned sequence of mental or physical 
activities to achieve its intended outcome when failures cannot be attributed to 
chance.’ An error is therefore a preventable adverse event (PAE).  These can be sub-
divided into two types. The first is an execution error, where a planned action fails to 
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be completed as intended. The second is a planning error, where the wrong plan is 
chosen to achieve an aim. 
 
In a 1984 New York study of AEs 11, the most common event was a drug 
complication (19%); other events included wound infections (14%) and technical 
complications (13%). Less common adverse events included: transfusion errors, 
wrong-site surgery, surgical injuries, preventable suicides, restraint related injuries or 
death, hospital acquired infection and other treatment related infections, falls, burns, 
pressure ulcers and mistaken identity. This then demonstrates that studies of this type 
are likely to unearth a rich mixture of planning and executions errors. 
 
Medication related errors (MREs) occur frequently in hospital; not all result in actual 
harm, but those that do are costly. Furthermore, by no means all are preventable. A 
study of 4,000 admissions to tertiary hospitals over six months found 247 ADEs and 
194 potential ADEs.15 Extrapolated event rates were 6.5 ADEs and 5.5 potential 
ADEs per 100 non-obstetrical admissions, for mean numbers per hospital per year of 
approximately 1,900 ADEs and 1,600 potential ADEs. Of all the ADEs, 1% were 
fatal (none preventable), 12% life-threatening, 30% serious, and 57% ‘significant’; 
twenty-eight percent were judged preventable. Of the life-threatening and serious 
ADEs, 42% were preventable, compared with 18% of significant ADEs. 
 
Reason stated that when large systems fail it is due to multiple faults that occur 
together in an unanticipated interaction, creating a chain of events in which the faults 
grow and evolve; their accumulation results in an accident.5 He further defined errors 
as slips, lapses or mistakes as below. 
Slips or Lapses 
A slip or lapse occurs when the action conducted is not what was intended – an error 
of execution. A slip is observable and a lapse is not. Turning the wrong knob is a slip; 
not being able to remember the right sequence of knobs from memory is a lapse. 
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Mistake 
Here, the action proceeds as planned but fails to achieve its intended outcome because 
the planned action is wrong. A mistake could occur from a lack of knowledge of the 
situation. In a mistake the original intention is inadequate – a failure of planning. 
 
A slip would be prescribing a dose of 10mg instead of 1mg. A lapse would be not 
remembering the dose. A mistake would be selecting the wrong drug because the 
diagnosis is wrong. ‘Slip’ does not imply minor. So an error is either an error of 
execution (slips or lapses) or an error of planning (mistake). These distinctions are 
shown diagrammatically in Figure 1.3. 
 
Errors
Planning Error Execution Error
Mistake LapseSlips
visible invisible
 
 
Figure 1.3 Diagram of errors (after Reason5). 
 
Failure to follow a pattern is a slip (i.e. a failure of skill or task execution). Slips may 
be a loss of automatic subliminal concentration, such as monitoring a prescription but 
also worrying about something else. Another slip would be a failure to describe 
something precisely, resulting in the wrong pattern being retrieved. 
 
A memory lapse is a loss of attention such that one cannot remember which pattern 
one is following. Causal factors may be being busy, stressed, in an unfamiliar or 
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hostile environment or simple boredom. The memory first retrieves commonly used 
patterns and if nothing fits the scenario, it follows common logic pathways. 
Mistakes (planning failures) are where the logic rule has failed or synthetic function 
has not produced the ideal solution. 
 
1.2.2 Theory of cognition and its relationship to errors 
 
Most errors result from aberrations in mental functioning. Automatic and unconscious 
processing is the norm in most daily activities. The human brain is a pattern 
recognition system; it looks for what it has seen before; indeed optical illusions are 
possible because of this. The theory is that conscious thought is required for problem 
solving which requires attention because it is slower than the routine auto processing.7  
 
Conscious thought may be split into rule-based thinking (logic or common sense) and 
synthetic thought. Expertise is the accumulation of a store of patterns that novices 
need to learn. Experts use the rule based logic for anything that does not fit a known 
pattern and only use synthetic processing as a last resort because it takes more energy 
and concentration. 
 
The complex coincidences that cause systems to fail could rarely have been foreseen 
by the people involved. When an accident is investigated the reviewer is privileged by 
knowing that something did go wrong. This introduces a bias because causes may 
seem obvious retrospectively, but prospectively, causes are often concealed from 
practitioners. This bias of hindsight misleads a reviewer into simplifying the accident 
or error, and overlooking several contributory factors. Multiple participants often have 
incomplete data that are only apparent when viewed as a whole – simplistic solutions 
may emerge that do not identify what really went wrong. 
 
In cognition, the weakest process is short term memory of plans and problem solving 
pathways. The risk from this can be minimised by simplifying processes. For 
example, using the same intravenous pump throughout the hospital so all staff know 
how to use it. Another might be using the same strength of noradrenaline in all ITUs. 
Standardisation increases pattern recognition. It makes it easier for everyone to 
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remember how to calculate the dose and prepare the product. Buying ready-made 
syringes would eliminate the risk altogether. Is there a trade-off with efficiency? All 
these processes add time, but maybe they save time (and lives) in the long run. 
 
1.2.3 Latent and active errors 
 Medication related errors may be either latent or active; the difference being in the  
lengths of time that pass before human failures are shown to have an adverse impact 
on safety.5 Active errors occur at the level of the front line operator and their effects 
are felt almost immediately. Latent errors tend to be remote from the direct control of 
the operator and include things such as poor design, incorrect installation, faulty 
manufacture, bad management decisions and poorly structured organisations.  
 
The active error is the nurse giving the overdose. The latent error is the doctor not 
knowing the correct dose, but unwilling to look it up. The doctor asks a colleague 
who partially remembers and without checking, prescribes the dose of a different 
antibiotic. 
 
Latent errors may be hidden in the design of routine processes. They may never come 
to the surface – people work around problems (design defects) so they are often not 
recognised for what they are. This may be compounded by ‘normalisation of 
deviance’ 5 where small changes in behaviour became the norm and expanded the 
boundaries, so that additional deviations became acceptable. 
 
A focus on active errors may ignore larger and more important latent errors. Events 
may lead to new procedures that prohibit the particular behaviour but do not prevent it 
from re-occurring.5 Accidents are rarely single events, humans do not intend harm. 
Local repairs may occur but leave the latent failure unchanged so creating a false 
sense of security. 
 
In 2004, an Australian tertiary hospital interviewed junior doctors to find out what 
caused errors. Causes were multifactorial, with a median of 4 (range, 2–5) different 
types of performance-influencing factors per error.  
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Lack of drug knowledge was not the single causative factor in any incident. The 
factors in new-prescribing errors included team, individual, patient and task factors. 
Factors associated with errors in re-prescribing were environment, task and number of 
weeks into the term. Defences against error, such as other clinicians and guidelines, 
were porous, and supervision was inadequate or not tailored to the patient, task, intern 
or environment. Factors were underpinned by an underlying culture in which 
prescribing was seen as a repetitive, low-risk chore.27 
 
Having acknowledged that medication related errors can never be eliminated from the 
healthcare system, the following section discusses ways in which they can be 
described and evaluated. 
 
1.2.4 Coding error severity 
The National Co-ordinating Council for Medication Error Reporting and Prevention 
(NCC MERP) developed a coding system for error severity levels. A tabulated form 
of this appears in Table 1.2. 
 
Table 1.2 Definitions of severity (NCCMERP) (adapted from references 27 & 28) 
 
 Harm Reached 
patient 
Intervention 
required 
Duration 
of harm 
Description 
A No 
Error 
No No 0 Circumstances that have 
the capacity to cause error 
B No No No 0 An error occurred but the 
error did not reach the 
patient (e.g. omission) 
C No Yes No 0 An error occurred that 
reached the patient but did 
not cause harm 
D No Yes Monitoring 
or 
preventive 
action 
0 An error that required 
monitoring to confirm that 
it resulted in no harm to 
the patient and/or required 
intervention to preclude it 
E Yes Yes Yes Temporary An error occurred that 
may have contributed to 
or resulted in temporary 
harm to the patient and 
required intervention 
F Yes Yes Yes Temporary An error occurred that 
 
 
18 
may have contributed to 
or resulted in temporary 
harm to the patient and 
required initial or 
prolonged hospitalisation 
G Yes Yes Yes Permanent An error occurred that 
may have contributed to 
or resulted in permanent 
harm 
H Yes Yes Yes Death 
avoided 
An error occurred that 
required intervention to 
sustain life 
I Yes Yes Yes Death An error occurred that 
may have contributed to 
or resulted in the patient’s 
death 
 
The classification is thorough; but a simplification of this was thought to be more 
appropriate for studies of large numbers of errors described by the author in Chapter 
3.  
 
The author selected the severity index of incidents according to the classification of 
several authors, including Devine et al. 29 which was based on the work of Hatoum 
and colleagues30 and contained just 7 categories; this is summarised in Table 1.3. 
 
Table 1.3 Definitions for a severity index. 
 
 Incident 
reached 
patient 
Morbidity Description 
0 No No incidents occurred but stopped before reaching 
patient  
1 Yes No incidents occurred (reached patients) but no injury 
sustained – may have required monitoring ⁄ 
investigation ⁄ minor treatment; 
2 Yes Minor minor injury – no change in vital signs, but required 
monitoring ⁄ investigation ⁄ minor treatment 
3 Yes Temporary temporary morbidity – some changes in vital signs, 
required monitoring ⁄ investigation /simple treatment 
4 Yes Significant significant changes in vital signs, required transfer to 
a higher care level ⁄emergency surgical intervention ⁄ 
antidote 
5 Yes Major major permanent loss of function ⁄ disability 
6 Yes Death  
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 1.2.5 Concept models of errors 
A study in 19956 examined the medical records of all admission to two tertiary 
hospitals over a six month period and detected 334 errors causing 264 ADEs. 
Approximately 6.5% of all admissions suffered an ADE; sixteen were major system 
errors, and seven system failures accounted for 78% of all errors. The two most 
important causal factors were poor dissemination of drug knowledge to doctors (29% 
of errors) and inadequate availability of patient information, such as laboratory tests 
(18% of medical errors). 
 
These data demonstrate that the culture of blame is outdated and it must be more 
effective to change the system as a whole to reduce the likelihood of accidents. Two 
major objectives for improving safety were firstly, to make it difficult for individuals 
to make errors, and secondly, to absorb errors that do occur i.e. permit their detection 
and correction before harm occurs. 
 
The error pathway to patient harm may be complex. This has been illustrated using a 
number of concepts, the most famous of which is the Swiss Cheese Model. 
 
1.2.5.1 Swiss cheese model  
Reason first suggested the model of a number of barriers (slices of cheese) that are 
interposed between the hazards and the outcomes to be avoided (see Figure 1.4).31 
The barriers represent the defences and the holes in the slices of cheese represent the 
weaknesses in those defences. The holes allow propagation of failures so that hazards 
can turn into losses such as accidents or other negative outcomes. 
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Figure 1.4 The Swiss Cheese model – adapted from Reason 31. 
 
The model has been used to describe error generation, and ways to avoid them in a 
range of industrial settings. In a healthcare environment, error avoidance might start 
with examining a number of important medication errors to see what barriers to their 
generation had been penetrated (the cheese slices) and how this could be prevented in 
future. For example, identical twin children, where only one needs medication, have a 
high risk of ‘wrong person’ errors. The cheese slices might then be manipulated to try 
and avoid future incidences (i.e. the holes never align) by for example, better 
medicine labelling, better twin labelling or better carer counselling. 
 
1.2.5.2 Bow Tie model 
The oil company Shell used a ‘bow-tie’ model combining the concepts of fault and 
event trees to explain how industrial hazards become real; this is illustrated in Figure 
1.5. Hazards arise from various engineering activities, but maintenance tasks and 
schedules, and projects/activities would normally be in place to stop them from 
producing a harmful event (on the left hand side of the diagram) or propagating its 
effects (on the left hand side), ultimately causing harm to people, assets or the 
environment. 4, 28, 32 While this model has found favour in the pharmaceutical industry 
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33 and some medication errors analyses 34, it is more complex than Reason’s Swiss 
Cheese model 31 when attempting to describe the generation of medication errors. 
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Figure 1.5 The bow – tie model adapted from Shell and illustrated in reference 4.  
 
1.3 Detecting errors 
In this section the author describes the different methods of detecting and recording 
medication errors. The advantages and disadvantages of the different methods are 
then summarised in Table 1.4. 
 
1.3.1 Analysing medical records 
A cohort of patients is selected and have their notes read through. Reviewers can 
record changes in diagnosis and treatments, detect medication related admissions and 
monitor pharmacist entries relating to prescribing errors. 
 
1.3.2 Prescription chart review 
This can be either active review of charts in use in clinical areas or retrospective 
review after discharge. The review can either be of charts from a particular clinical 
area or those containing a particular drug. The quantity of pharmacists’ ‘green pen’ 
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annotations is an indicator of how much work has been put into bringing prescriptions 
up to acceptable standard.   
 
1.3.3 Self-reporting 
Prescribers report errors they have made to be logged on an anonymised database. 
 
1.3.4 Detection by other prescribers 
Prescribers report errors made by their colleagues that they have corrected. 
 
1.3.5 Observation of practice 
Trained observers record errors in the drug usage process seen in practice. This can be 
overt or covert. 
 
1.3.6 Trigger signals 
Scanning prescriptions for trigger drugs (e.g. antihistamines or naloxone) may signal 
otherwise unreported errors; or scanning biochemical and haematology laboratory 
reports for significant trend changes in biochemistry that might indicate the 
emergence of abnormalities due to an ADR. 
 
1.3.7 Interviewing prescribers 
Medical students or junior doctors may be interviewed about attitudes to prescribing 
errors. Alternatively they may be interviewed about general prescribing errors they 
have made. Those who have recently been found making errors could be interviewed 
about specific errors they have made. 
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1.3.8 Electronic prescriptions that are cancelled within two 
hours 
Some electronic prescribing systems can detect prescriptions that have been changed 
soon after they were initiated, as a signal of likely error. One study using this 
method35  identified that the main reasons orders were discontinued were drug-disease 
reconsiderations, drug-drug interactions, and patient preferences. Physicians 
frequently reported they caught their own mistakes. Most of the changes, not 
surprisingly, were drug and dosage changes. 
 
1.3.9 Combination methods 
Combining errors made from notes with interviews of those making entries or 
interviewing prescribers after pharmacist interventions have been made, could reveal 
causative factors. Combinations may increase the range of errors detected, or depth of 
detail. 
 
1.3.10 Failure Modes, Effect and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) 
FMECA is a process of speculating on possible errors, then designing processes to 
prevent them from occurring. This has been used to reduce errors in IV potassium 
administration in paediatric intensive care.36 A request form was produced that forced 
the collection and recording of specific data before processing by pharmacy could 
proceed. This presented the doctor with relevant data so they should have been able to 
evaluate hazards before prescribing. Nurses could not order without this prescription 
and form. This procedural intervention reduced the number of patients receiving 
potassium with creatinine>2mg/dL from 28% to 14% and the number given high 
strength potassium infusions decreased from 3% to zero.  
 
FMECA is prospective, whereas the traditional method of root cause analysis works 
backwards from an event to look for causes. FMECA describes the process in detail, 
examines possibilities of how and where things could go wrong (failure modes) and 
estimates the frequencies and consequences of a whole range of possible outcomes.28  
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FMECA is a well described tool that identifies possible failure modes and gauges 
what their effect will be, even before they take place. It allows both quantitative and 
qualitative evaluation of the criticality of each failure mode. Criticality indices may be 
calculated by multiplying three components:  likelihood of occurrence, severity and 
detection—on the basis of known or estimated data. FMECA compares the top critical 
events in different process organisations, allowing a simple measurement of the 
potential impact of new solutions on patient safety.37 For example, in the study by 
White et al. 37, who used  FMECA in paediatric and neonatal ITU, the likelihood of 
occurrence (incidence) for each failure mode could be classified from 1 to 10, the 
severity of the potential effect for the patient from 1 to 9, and the chance of detecting 
the failure before it affected patient safety from 1 to 9. Estimates were obtained by 
team consensus for all failure modes, taking into account the local context and 
workload.  
 
Another FMECA project38, calculated yearly costs for achieving a criticality reduction 
of 1 per day. Thirty-one failure modes were identified with a total criticality index of 
4,540. The most critical was microbial contamination of extemporaneously prepared 
IV preparations; ready to use syringes reduced the criticality score by 1,292 (46,500 
per day). Employing a clinical pharmacist reduced the score by 1201 (72,060 per day) 
and a double-check by nurses reduced the score by 996 (59,780 per day). 
 
The major benefits of using FMECA as a proactive risk analysis method are its 
simplicity and the quantitative evaluation it allows by combining the three 
complementary factors. The evaluation can be easily performed by the users and 
developers themselves, with the help of a moderator, and the time required is limited 
to a few working lunches for the team and a few hours analysis for the moderator. 
The analysis identifies the top critical events and quantifies the potential impact of 
process modifications, even before they have been implemented, which is very 
helpful for prioritising actions to be taken. 
 
With FMECA, the highest identified criticality failures are having lethal doses 
available, complex mathematical calculations or setting of infusion pump flow rates, 
not checking patient identity bands, and having excess stock available. These  
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Table 1.4 Advantages and disadvantages of methods of detecting medication 
related errors. 
 Method Advantages and  Disadvantages 
1 Analysing 
medical records 
Detects errors of diagnosis and 
delays 
May detect errors that do not 
reach the patient 
May detect medication related 
admissions. 
May capture pharmacist’s 
warnings if they write in the 
notes.  
Only reveals those that are 
documented, and time consuming. 
Rarely detects supply and 
administration errors. Time 
consuming. 
2 Prescription 
chart review 
Good detection of corrections 
made by pharmacist but 
detection of pharmacist green 
pen may just be annotations 
Detects re-admissions and 
changes made 
 
Will not detect verbal interventions 
that produce new prescriptions by 
doctors. Some administration 
errors detected (delays and 
omissions) 
3 Self-reporting May reveal causes of error The prescriber may be unaware 
they have made an error so unable 
to report. Reporting may be 
inhibited by concerns about 
perceived status and fears of 
litigation or performance review. 
Culture may produce a bias to 
administration errors 
4 Detection by 
other prescribers 
Practiced prescribers so sharing 
on ward round leads to team 
learning 
Correction maybe informal  
changes so not reported 
5 Observation of 
practice 
Observers must be 
knowledgeable or trained. 
Captures administration or 
supply errors.  
Cannot detect errors due to data 
omission or poor prescribing. Very 
time-consuming 
6 trigger signals Good for detected ADEs, shows 
promise and could be cheap if 
automated 
Will only detect errors associated 
with triggers. 
7 Interviewing 
prescribers 
Good for detecting explanation 
of why prescribing events occur 
but Relies on honesty and ability 
to recall.  
Really needs some prompts. Nor 
good for prevalence data. 
Participation might be difficult 
without authority champion 
8 Electronic 
prescriptions 
that are 
cancelled within 
two hours 
Rapid, constant method for 
detecting and teaching errors.  
Shows promise if system is 
capable 
9 Combination 
methods 
Comprehensive capture of 
positive finding but still 
systemic bias of under-reporting. 
More expensive 
10 FMECA Intensive process review good 
for predicting errors and 
building defences, requires 
expertise and enthusiasm 
Experience needed for prediction. 
Barriers may not be easy to create 
11 Pharmacist 
interventions 
Periodic study can capture 
nearly all prescribing errors Poor 
at capturing administration 
errors. Continuous data capture 
is time consuming 
Not good for administration errors 
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were addressed by minimisation strategies such as having a standard infusion 
handbook with rate charts and protocols for the administration of specific drugs. 39  
 
The major limitation of FMECA is unavoidable subjectivity in the selection of failure 
modes and the determination of the criticality indices.37,40 
 
1.3.11 Pharmacist interventions 
Pharmacists review drug charts in use in the clinical areas. They add additional 
information (annotations) to charts to increase clarity of the prescriber’s intentions. 
These annotations may assist nurses administering unusual medicines. The pharmacist 
may discuss the item with prescribers to either prompt completion (e.g. signature) or 
question choice of drug or details such as dose. These discussions intervene in patient 
care. Interventions provide information, education or advice. In the absence of a 
prescriber these interventions may be recorded in the notes. However it is more usual 
for them to be verbal messages to nurses, or added to a doctor’s job list. If these 
interventions are recorded, subsequent analysis may reveal useful patterns of data 
deficiency, types of prescribing errors or as an educational tool for pharmacists and 
junior doctors. 
 
Summarising, each of the methods of error detection described above and in Table 1.4 
has its own advantages and disadvantages. Using a single method constantly will 
show fatigue; so either periodic study, as in the present research, or rotation of method 
might maintain rigour. Many medication errors are not recognised nor detected as the 
data is hidden in different sources. Some errors can only detected by integrating the 
data, either electronically or by someone like a pharmacist. Many systems might be 
biased due to the nature of the primary investigator or the subject investigated. Some 
of these features are discussed below. 
 
1.3.12 Voluntary adverse event reporting 
Nurses have a culture of reporting errors and are more numerous that other healthcare 
professionals. So these schemes have a bias towards administration errors. Doctors 
have a culture of not reporting, so voluntary reporting schemes have almost no 
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participation. In contrast in Chapter Five the author will show that pharmacist 
intervention reports show a significant bias towards prescribing errors. 
 
Successful error-reporting systems are non-punitive, confidential, independent, 
timely, responsive, and system oriented and are based on expert analysis. One 
example of a successful reporting system is Medmarx, established in 1998 by the 
United States Pharmacopeia (USP). Medmarx is an internet-accessible, voluntary 
medication error-reporting program available to institutions by subscription.41
 
This database was used to analyse patient-controlled analgesia (PCA) related errors 42 
and found that whilst errors were reported across all phases of the medication-use 
process, the majority occurred during drug administration. Prescribers often issued 
incomplete, duplicated, or contradictory orders. This suggests that prescribers only 
make ‘silly human errors’ that would be eliminated by a good electronic prescribing 
system. Pharmacists are aware that prescribing errors are not limited to the technical 
aspects of prescribing. Over one third of errors (38%) involved an improper dosage or 
quantity, 17.4% involved an omission and 17.3% an unauthorized or wrong drug. 
Overwhelmingly, human factors were the main cause of PCA errors. Distractions 
(37.8%) and inexperienced staff (26.3%) were leading contributing factors. 
Administration errors involved the wrong drug, amount, or concentration, often 
because the PCA device was mis-programmed. Clearly, training staff how to use PCA 
equipment was important, and the potent drugs used were high on the ‘risky drugs’ 
list. Similar drug names and product packaging (11.6%) were also implicated. 
This study gives a useful list of likely causes of medication errors generally. 
 
The Vermont Oxford Network covered 54 hospitals and used a voluntary reporting 
system for all types of errors in the NICU.19  In 1989 it started a four-year, 
prospective study to identify medication errors in the paediatric intensive care unit 
and NICU; 315 errors were reported for the 2,147 neonatal and paediatric intensive 
care patients (representing 23,307 patient days). Almost half (47%) of the medication 
errors reported were either  the wrong medication, wrong dose or schedule or infusion 
rate. The study also found that infants who required more intensive levels of care 
were at greater risk for medication error. In 2001 this network reported that 5.5% of 
 
 
28 
administered NICU medications had an identified error, and potential adverse drug 
events occurred eight times more frequently in the NICU than in adult populations. 
 
In the UK, the National Patient Safety Agency (NPSA) collects and analyses incidents 
reported through a voluntary scheme. Adverse events are defined as any ‘unintended 
or unexpected incident, which could have, or did, lead to harm for one or more 
Patients receiving NHS funded healthcare’. 43 The function of the NPSA, particularly 
with regards to rating the severity of the reports it receives, is discussed in later 
chapters. 
 
In general, voluntary reporting systems have major defects. They may under-report 
incidents owing to lack of feedback, time constraints, fear of shame, blame, litigation 
or professional censure and unsatisfactory processes. 44 In particular, nurses may fail 
to recognise errors of administration or forget to report, be reluctant to report or not 
report errors that they feel to be innocuous. 45,46 In the latter study,  a review of 
incident reports over 7 months from intensive care or high dependency units showed 
errors to be linked to drug administration in 61% of cases and prescribing in a further 
26%. 
 
A recent study attempted to augment a voluntary reporting scheme, with targeted and 
non-targeted chart review and direct observation on the ICU by adding a code for 
ADEs (the E-code) on the computerised discharge system.47 This was then analysed 
to compare how often the discharge E-code correlated with ITU observations. 
Reviewing discharge summaries indicated a detection rate of approximately 20% (48 
of 245) for adverse medical events; of these, 54% were ADEs. Further study may be 
needed using an ICU discharge note or the transfer note from the ICU to the ward to 
identify more ADEs. 
 
In another study48, nurses and office staff were asked to report all communications 
with community pharmacists regarding prescription problems over a period of six 
months from seven primary care offices in Vermont, USA. Analysis of this voluntary 
prescribing-error-reporting system yielded 216 reports. Nearly 90% (142/165) of 
errors were severity Category B (errors that did not reach the patient) according to the 
National Coordinating Council for Medication Error Reporting and Prevention Index 
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for Categorizing Medication Errors. Nineteen errors reached the patient without 
causing harm (Category C); and 4 errors caused temporary harm requiring 
intervention (Category E). Errors involving drug strength were found in 30% of 
reports, including 23 prescriptions written for strengths not commercially available. 
 
Ashcroft and Cooke49 undertook a retrospective analysis of medication-related 
incidents reported to an on-line incident-reporting scheme in a large (1000-bed) 
teaching hospital in the UK. Over a 26-month period, there were 495 medication-
related incidents reported, of which 38.6% were classified to be a ‘‘near miss’’. 
Medication related incidents were reported most often at the stages of administration 
(230, 46.5%) and prescribing (192, 38.8%). Pharmacists produced 51.9% of reports, 
and doctors produced 9.1%. Pharmacists reported the majority (155, 80.7%) of 
prescribing incidents. 
 
Tenfold errors in calculation of paediatric drug doses are more plausible than in adults 
because of the wide range of sizes, weights and age in this population. A Canadian 
study in 2006 50 examined paediatric tenfold errors using various detection methods. 
Errors were reported during a voluntary reporting period. Almost all errors were 
prescribing errors. The calculated incidence was 1 per 22,500 doses prescribed. Two 
tenfold errors where found in 1678 orders in a chart auditing study of 1532 patients in 
the Emergency Department. Four tenfold errors were identified in eight mock 
resuscitations (125 orders for drugs). The study indicated that the incidence of tenfold 
errors in paediatrics varied dramatically when different detection approaches were 
used. The rate of tenfold errors may be especially high in resuscitation situations and 
is underestimated by spontaneous reporting.  
 
1.3.13 Observational studies 
There are both covert and overt sorts of observational studies. Covert observation is 
difficult because it has to be disguised observation such that ward staff are unaware of 
true purpose of study. The cover may be the suggestion of a different audit such as 
one concerned with drug distribution. Overt studies are more acceptable to staff and 
can be useful as a learning tool. 
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In one study 51, two pharmacists observed consecutive drug rounds by nurses on two 
wards and recorded all medicine related administration errors; the pharmacist only 
intervened if serious errors were observed. There was no change in error rate with 
repeat observation. There was no difference in error rate before and after the first 
pharmacist intervention. Also, there was no detectable effect of overt observation on 
rates of error. The authors concluded that observational error rates should not be 
affected by lack of knowledge errors, but overt observation might affect those from 
carelessness or lack of concentration.  
 
A team of reporters actively captured errors for 3 months in a tertiary care hospital in 
the USA.52 They generated 321 medication error reports. Eighty-one were disregarded 
because they were either unpreventable ADRs or risks justified by treatment benefits. 
Two-hundred and forty were analysed and 95 clinically manifested error. There were 
94 near misses (not manifested or averted) and 51 were averted before they could 
cause patient harm. Of the manifested errors, 24% were uncontrolled infections 
associated with under dosing of anti-infectives, 4% were overdoses  with anti-
infectives, 4% represented CNS drug toxicity from overdose, and 4% uncontrolled 
pain due to under dosing. Almost three quarters of errors (72%) were from 
prescribing; of these, 39% were due to lack of drug knowledge and 18% because of 
failure to consider critical patient information. Dispensing and administration errors 
were largely associated with accidental slips or lapses reflecting poor performance.  
The authors  cited the advantages of overt observation as mainly allowing in-depth 
analysis of the nature of errors and their causes and, consistent with others 44-46, that it 
produced more, reliable data than voluntary reporting which was associated with 
unreliable error frequency data. 
 
1.3.14 Significant event audit 
Significant event audit (SEA) is a process in which individual episodes are analysed 
in a systematic and detailed way to ascertain what can be learnt about the overall 
quality of care and to indicate changes that might lead to improvements.53 This is 
mentioned for completeness here. The method appears to work best when team 
relationships are well established, but could be implemented in new teams to help 
members understand each others’ roles. 
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1.4 The medicines use process  
Medication errors can occur at any stage of the medicines use process (MUP), an 
overview of which is provided here. Pharmacists hold key knowledge about drugs and 
the details of the MUP. The basis of this thesis is to explore errors that arise in this 
process. 
 
1.4.1 Overview of MUP 
The MUP covers the stages of prescribing, dispensing, administering and monitoring 
the effects of the medicine; this is illustrated in Figure 1.6. 
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Figure 1.6 The medicines use process (MUP) 
 
In hospital it is possible to go directly from prescribing to administration by using the 
drugs stored routinely on the wards. Also drug preparation may be part of the supply 
or administration process. This is because pharmacy may supply reconstituted, ready-
to-use products or they may require reconstitution or dilution on the ward. Monitoring 
should occur throughout the process, but some staff may only perceive that it occurs 
before prescriptions are written. The review stage is important to ensure that 
prescribing objectives have been achieved and side-effects minimised. Review also 
confirms or modifies the diagnosis. 
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The ultimate objective of the MUP is that each prescription item is reviewed and 
supplied by the pharmacist so that the nurse can administer each medicine in the 
correct dose, formulation and frequency, via the correct route by the correct method at 
the right time to the right patient. Most preventable errors occur during the prescribing 
stage of the MUP. During the prescribing process, thoughts are transformed into 
decisions, by which a series of actions are triggered, ultimately resulting in patients 
receiving their medication.54  
 
In principle this is a simple linear process, and is perceived as such by the healthcare 
professionals involved. However there are multiple hidden feedback loops, external 
influences and complex communications involved.4 This is especially problematic 
where the first hospital prescription is illegible, incomplete or unwittingly ambiguous. 
The prescriber may not be aware that the drug is available in multiple formulations 
(e.g. nifedipine) or that different formulations have different doses and frequencies 
(e.g. diclofenac 50mg TDS and 75mg SR BD). This is fundamental to why so many 
errors occur.  
 
The prescribing process includes assessing the need for a medicine, the choice of a 
medicine, and the technical aspects of writing a prescription. The dispensing process 
includes receiving the prescription, checking for legality and clarity, assessing safety 
and appropriateness, the technical supply function and delivery to the patient or carer. 
 
Administration covers identifying those medicines that are needed, initiating supply 
on request (if appropriate) and selecting the prescribed medicine. It also includes 
preparing for administration, the technicalities of administering a medicine and 
relevant record keeping.  
 
Monitoring covers patient consent and compliance a well as appropriate tests before 
and after administration to assess the patient’s response and safety. 
 
1.4.2 Supply errors 
There is a large literature on dispensing errors but this is not the focus of this thesis. 
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Dispensing errors may be caused by selecting the wrong patient on a list, working 
from a label rather than the prescription, workload pressures, interruptions, 
prescription tracking, phone calls.55 Automated dispensing machines linked to 
barcode scanning increase effectiveness and efficiency of the process for unit dose 
systems, but only a few studies show improvement of medication safety upon 
implementation of automation; most are inconclusive.28
 
1.4.3 Errors in medicine preparation 
If the pharmacy provides a solid dose form there is no preparation stage, unless the 
patient has difficulty swallowing in which case the nurse may crush the tablet. In this 
case the pharmacy could eliminate this preparation stage, but only if they knew a 
liquid was required. Crushing a slow release tablet or one designed not to be crushed 
could have adverse effects. Thus the pharmacy might supply a product that is suitable 
for the route of administration prescribed but this may be unsuitable for the way in 
which the nurse is going to administer the product. Errors may be caused because 
preparation is seen as part of the administration process. It may be that redesign 
would incorporate preparation into the supply process to reduce error generation. 
Thus pharmacy would supply ready-to-use products.   
 
This is an important concept for injectables, especially with intravenously 
administered drugs, because of serious consequences.28 Intravenous drugs can be 
given as a bolus (over 2-5minutes), a short infusion (30-120minutes) an intermittent 
infusion (run over four hours, three times a day) or as a continuous infusion. Steps to 
ensure the correct administration of bolus doses and to reduce mistakes in making up 
drugs that require multiple step preparation will have the greatest effect on error 
rates.55
 
Several institutions have implemented decentralised pharmacy intravenous admixture 
units to decrease both microbiological contamination and medication errors of 
preparation. Error rates have been reported as 71% poor technique by nurses on 
wards, compared with 2% by skilled pharmacy technicians.28 A 4-year study of 
aseptic preparation in pharmacy showed that just 0.49% of doses were in error. 
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Preparation on wards was associated with a higher error rate. 56 The highest risks were 
observed with cytotoxics. These were associated with 40% of errors. Other injectables 
were associated with 27% of errors. Labelling errors occurred most frequently 
(34.2%), then transcription errors (11.1%) and then incorrect expiry (7.5%). These 
staff were focussed on preparation, yet mistakes were still made. 
 
It is not clear if cytotoxic preparation is more complex and therefore prone to error, or 
if the consequences are more obvious, so minor faults are manifested in patients. It is 
unclear if the consequences of giving these toxic agents are a true effect of the drug or 
a fault in its preparation. 
 
A recent review of parenteral product preparation across secondary care acute trusts in 
the north of England 57 showed that whilst parenteral nutrition and cytotoxics were 
almost all prepared in pharmacy parenteral preparation units, there were still 
53 strong potassium solutions, 40 different epidural and 20 different intrathecal 
preparations processed.  
 
Clinical pharmacy should confirm the need for such a diverse range of preparations 
and assess the potential for minimising risk by standardising practice where possible. 
Generally it would appear the preparation of intravenous products is safer when this 
forms part of the pharmacy supply process. However this may produce further 
unintended consequences in terms of product labelling.  
 
1.4.4 Errors in product identification 
Physically selecting a product on a shelf for administration requires differentiation of 
products from the same company or of similar name or from a range of strengths. 
Similarly coloured company logos and formats have been implicated in incorrect 
product selection. Ward stock is designed to limit the choice of medicines in a 
particular area or speciality. This also helps doctors choose from a smaller range but 
particularly assists nurses in selecting the right product to administer. Confusion can 
also arise with brand names and pharmacists are encouraged to endorse all drug 
names with the generic or British Approved Name (BAN). International Non-
proprietary names (INNs) can contribute to errors when BANs have previously been 
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used; e.g. levothyroxine has been confused with liothyronine and mercaptamine 
(previously cysteamine) confused with mercaptopurine. 58
 
The NPSA and designers from the Royal College of Art have developed new 
guidelines for the labelling and packaging of injectable medicines. The guidelines 
recommend simple changes to design, such as using paper labels and coloured print, 
to help distinguish similar medicines from each other and prevent mistakes in 
administering the drugs. Dominant key information should be a generic name that can 
be read at a glance. A two dimensional bar code includes batch number and expiry 
date, and a unique product identifier.59
 
1.4.5 Errors in administration 
In the community, the patient usually administers the medicine themselves. This 
involves a complex series of influences including beliefs about healthcare and values 
placed on lifestyle. This influences consent and concordance and may significantly 
differ from what the prescriber intended. There may also be a carer who is largely 
untrained. Again this is not the focus of this thesis. 
 
In hospital, medicines administration is undertaken mainly by nurses and there is a 
worldwide literature on this. In outline the drug administration process in the UK 
involves periodic ‘drug rounds’ with the nurse pushing a trolley, containing non 
injectable medicines, around the ward. Usually one nurse is involved but in some 
hospitals, there is a second checker who may be a nurse or a healthcare assistant.  
 
For injections, a separate process operates, usually with one nurse preparing the 
product for administration and a second confirming that the product has been prepared 
correctly and the correct patient identified. One nurse then administers the medicine, 
usually alone. 
 
Incompatibilities between IV drugs, when admixed for administration, represent a 
preventable adverse drug event. Appropriate and timely pharmaceutical advice is 
mandatory to prevent incompatibilities that could lead to patient harm.22
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 A 6-month UK study over 10 wards identified 249 errors with intravenous drugs with 
at least one error in 212cases (49%) out of 430 drug doses. The errors were classified 
as 1% potentially severe, 29% potentially moderate 19% potentially minor. Most 
errors occurred when giving bolus doses or making up drugs that required multiple 
step preparation.60
 
Workers in a 2004 study on an 18-bed SITU in the US conducted a daily check on all 
continuous IV infusions. The infusions were checked for charting, concentration, rate, 
and dose against the patients’ height and weight (actual, ideal and ‘dry’); 71 patients 
had 202 infusions and 106 errors were detected per 1000 patient days. Almost all 
(94%) of non-weight based doses were correct; but more than 10% were incorrect for 
weight based dosing. Although the difference was not statistically significant, the 
authors point out the greater potential for calculation errors among the latter.61  
 
Interruptions to the administration process have a negative impact on memory by 
requiring individuals to switch attention from one task to another. The nurse 
undertaking the drug round may also be the most senior nurse who has to respond to 
phone calls and visits by medical staff. Returning to a disrupted task requires 
completion of the interrupting task and then regaining the context of the original task. 
In an observational study from Australia, 62 over half (53.1%) of all administrations 
were interrupted and 74.4% of total drug administrations had at least one procedural 
failure. Approximately 70% of procedural errors had no interruptions, but of those 
that were interrupted, 84.6% had up to three interruptions. For each interruption, there 
was a 12.1% increase in procedural failures and a 12.7% increase in clinical errors. 
One quarter of administrations had at least 1 clinical error and of these, 25.3% had no 
interruptions, whilst 38.9% had up to 3 interruptions. 
 
Summarising, interruptions in the administration process are significant events in 
terms of error generation. However procedural errors may still occur without any 
interruptions. 
 
To improve patient focus some wards have been divided into smaller teams (called 
team nursing) looking after 6-10 patients. One advantage of this is that because the 
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‘drug round’ takes less time there are fewer interruptions and medicines are likely to 
be administered at the correct time. However this introduces more multitasking and if 
it does not increase the nurse: patient ratio there be more mental leaping to different 
tasks. In the USA they have experimented with small-ream team nursing and have 
now returned to the ‘single task at one time model’ where a nurse is allocated to give 
all medicines on that floor rather than participate in a team nursing; this has been 
reported to have had a favourable effect: it kept interruptions at bay and that nurse 
knew her medicines and the patients better.63 
 
1.5  Prescribing 
Prescribing errors represent a key target for clinical pharmacy interventions and a key 
feature of the author’s research. 
 
1.5.1 Prescribing errors 
Dean et al. used a Delphi technique to reach a practitioner-derived consensus on a 
definition of ‘prescribing error’. The definition finally adopted was:   
‘A clinically meaningful prescribing error occurs when, as a result of a prescribing 
decision or prescription writing process, there is an unintentional significant (1) 
reduction in the probability of treatment being timely and effective or (2) increase in 
the risk of harm when compared with generally accepted practice’ 64
 
The prescribing stage of the medicines use process is linked to the diagnosis. It is 
generally perceived that a precise diagnosis is formed followed by evidence based 
treatment options. Whilst this does happen, there a more common presumptive 
diagnoses followed by preliminary treatment. If this treatment is successful, it 
confirms that the presumptive diagnosis was correct. If the initial treatment does not 
improve symptoms; then the presumptive diagnosis may be incorrect. 28 Thus 
planning errors in prescribing may sometimes be an inevitable consequence of this 
second routine to the final diagnosis. 
 
Prescribing has two phases: a decision making stage; the second is the technical 
process of writing the prescription. The decision making phase focuses on whether to 
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treat, by what modality and includes choosing a therapeutic group. The technical 
phase of writing the prescription ensures clarity, precision, legality and completeness. 
Most error studies focus on the technical phase, but the decision making phase may 
produce more significant, but subtle errors.65  
 
It should be noted however, that failures to adhere to standards such as hospital or 
national guidelines, or the drug’s product licence, are not usually classified as 
prescribing errors. 64 This latter clause relates to the perception that these rules break 
with clinical freedom and are part of managing medicines use. However it can be 
argued that these rules are intended to improve safety of the medicines use process. 
Formularies were originally invented to decrease the quantity of knowledge that a 
junior doctor had to learn, thus decreasing errors of recollection. Non-formulary 
prescribing may produce latent errors that ultimately harm patients. 
 
1.5.2 Prescribing - Decision phase 
The first stage of prescribing is that of drug choice. It is presumed that the evidence 
base of various medicines is first considered and combined with clinical experience. 
However it is likely that pharmaceutical industry marketing, paper authorship and 
sponsorship contribute to the decision.28 Logically, the therapeutic group should be 
selected before an optimal individual agent, but in many cases selection is made from 
a smaller list of ‘favourite’ agents. 
 
Decisions then have to be made about route of administration, dose and frequency. In 
hospital, details such as strength and dilution of common medicines might be left to 
the nursing staff.  
 
1.5.3 Prescribing – technical phase 
The technical writing phase can be further divided into drug factors and patient 
factors. Drug factors are those relating to choice of drug, route, dose, and frequency. 
Patient factors relate to bodyweight, allergies, interaction with other medicines 
consumed, liver and renal dysfunction and concurrent disease. The last two factors 
may form part of a feedback loop into the decision phase. 
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 Traditionally, prescriber training has been physician led but today, it has become 
increasingly complex. In many countries, the support of the clinical pharmacist at the 
point of prescribing is increasingly crucial to safe prescribing.28
 
A university-affiliated acute general hospital in Hong Kong conducted a study into the 
time, nature, source and severity of medication errors. 36 The authors reviewed all 
medication incident reports collected during January 2004–December 2006. 
The most common type of error was wrong strength or dosage (36.5%), followed by 
wrong drug (16.7%), wrong frequency (7.7%), and wrong formulation (7.0%). Most 
errors (80.2%) were detected before any drug was wrongly administered. The 
medications were administered in 212 cases (19.7%), which resulted in an untoward 
effect in just nine cases (0.8%). These results suggest that whilst errors may be 
relatively common, only a small proportion reach the patient and few of these cause 
ostensible harm. 
 
Inpatient medication charts in a regional general hospital in New Zealand were 
audited annually from 1998 to 2007. 66 Charts were assessed against predetermined 
standards for good-quality prescribing. Initially an unacceptable proportion of 
medication charts failed to document adequately one or more of the following: 
prescriber identification (58%), legible prescriptions (14%), route of administration 
(14%), a dose (11%), date (11%) or adequate patient identification (8%). Only 53% of 
charts had any information about medication alerts and 15% contained at least one 
verbal order.  Interventions designed to address these deficiencies included 
educational strategies: e.g. feedback of audit results, education sessions for doctors 
and nurses on prescribing and medication errors and changes to systems: e.g. 
modifications to medication charts, development of hospital wide prescribing 
standards and an alert notification system. Serial audits showed progressive 
improvements in all items by 2007 including: legibility (97%), patient identification 
(100%), documentation of date (98%), drug dose (99%) and route (97%), use of 
medication alerts (98%) and the prevalence of verbal orders (<1%). Identification of 
prescribers remained suboptimal (81% in 2006 versus 53% in 2007). While the study 
only considered technical prescribing errors and there was no consideration of the 
clinical appropriateness of prescribing, it did demonstrate the benefits of education 
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and awareness campaigns. However it is continual vigilance and assessment that 
compounds the benefits over time. As junior doctors rotate their placements every six 
months in the UK, this teaching must be repeated on a regular basis.  
 
1.5.4 Types of prescribing error 
Table 1.5 summarises the different knowledge deficiencies that causes errors. These 
are sorted into lack of knowledge about the patient, or the drug, or the technical 
aspects of prescribing. 
 
Table 1.5 Knowledge deficiencies that cause prescribing errors (compiled from 
references 4, 6, 15, 16, 67, 68 & 69)   
Lack of knowledge Examples 
The patient Allergy status 
 Changing renal function 
 Changing liver function  
The drug Name – look-a-like and sound-a-like 
abbreviations e.g. AZT, MTX 
 Details – dose, route, frequency 
 High risk drugs* 
The technical process Dose calculation 
 Decimal point – zeros before and after 
 Lack of standardisation 
 Data availability at point of prescribing 
technical and policy 
 Transcription errors (including cross out 
old chart and drugs) 
 Drugs that have been given before 
 Similar labelling and packaging 
 Multiple strengths of product 
 Complex protocols 
 Poor checking drug identity 
 Rule violation 
*High risk drugs are: cytotoxics, opiates, potassium IV, dopamine, digoxin, heparin 
and insulin. 
 
In 2009, 15 recommendations were made for reducing the risk of medication errors 
including the provision of sufficient undergraduate learning opportunities to make 
medical students from the UK safe prescribers and opportunities to practice skills that 
help to reduce errors. 70 Two of the recommendations were for greater involvement of 
pharmacists and better systems for monitoring errors. 
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There have been calls for simple solutions to standardise the system, which can vary 
from one hospital to another. The possibility of a standardised prescription form is 
under active consideration across the UK. 26
 
1.5.5 Off –label and unlicensed prescribing 
Licensed medicines may be used for off label indications, doses and routes. However 
this may lack rigorous scientific scrutiny and introduces concerns about patient safety. 
The frequency of off-label drug use is largely unknown but estimates of 160 
commonly used drugs have been made from a survey in 2001.70
 
1.5.6 Reducing Prescribing errors 
In 2007, The General Medical Council (GMC) and the Medical Schools Council 
established a Safe Prescribing Group that described competencies for junior doctors.71 
The eight capabilities required to prescribe safely are listed in Table 1.6 
Table 1.6 Competencies for junior doctors in prescribing71
The ability to establish an accurate drug history 
The ability to plan appropriate therapy for common indications 
The ability to write a safe and legal prescription 
The ability to appraise critically the prescribing of others 
The ability to calculate appropriate doses 
The ability to provide patients with appropriate information about their medicines 
The ability to access information about medicines 
The ability to detect and report adverse drug reactions  
 
This requirement was to ensure that medical schools had clear objectives for training.  
The GMC commissioned research investigating the prevalence and causes of 
prescribing errors made by junior doctors. The EQUIP research was conducted by the 
University of Manchester and the report 72 is discussed further in Chapter 5. 
 
There is evidence that risks can be reduced by having a pharmacist present when 
decisions about therapy are made on doctors’ ward rounds. In Intensive Care, having 
a pharmacist present was reported to reduced ADEs by two thirds.73 A controlled 
study in 2003 set out to see if the same effect could be seen in general medicine 
wards.74 There were 165 patients in the study; overall pharmacists made 150 
interventions and these were accepted by doctors on 147 occasions. The most 
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common were amendments to dosage, then addition of medicines to the discharge 
prescription. Looking at the preventable ADEs, the control group had 26.5 
preventable ADEs per 1000 patient days and the active group had just 5.7 per 1000 
patient days. This is a 78% reduction in errors; in addition there was a cost reduction. 
 
A study in a Canadian paediatric A&E department75 looked at the impact of a tutorial 
on prescribing errors for doctors as part of their induction into this rotational post. A 
large proportion (40%) of trainees committed a calculation error in a written pre-
tutorial test. The study included a chart review over 18 days. Thirteen trainees 
prescribed 899 items and made 66 errors (12%). This was the same for those who 
attended the  tutorial and those who did not. So the answer is not as simple as raising 
awareness about prescribing errors. The same study showed that senior doctors 
committed fewer errors than juniors and junior doctors made fewer errors at the end 
of their rotation compared with at the start. So there was something about learning 
from experience. It was not clear if this was safer technique learned from mistakes or 
a human performance factor from lots of prescribing experience. The authors 
concluded that including pharmacists as part of healthcare teams was another 
effective intervention to reduce errors. Pharmacists detected errors that were not 
easily identifiable by physicians such as drug interactions, wrong diluents and 
incorrect infusion rates.  
 
1.6 Impact of technology on error avoiding strategies 
Having accepted the fact that medicine related errors can never be eliminated entirely, 
various strategies have been adopted to try and minimise them. This section describes 
some of them that have exploited technological advances with this objective in mind. 
 
1.6.1 Electronic transfer of prescriptions 
A Swedish study showed some interesting aspects of technology introduction. Firstly 
because complete data capture was possible in Sweden, a national study showed that 
14% of prescriptions were never presented to a pharmacy.76 So presumably products 
were prescribed that the patient decided were unimportant or not the reason they went 
to the doctor. The prescription refill rate was 57%, but with a large variation with 
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drug class; for example, 87% with oral contraceptives, but just 20% with dementia 
drugs. This indicated that there was some disparity between what the doctor thought 
the patient needed and what they actually used and that this technology could detect 
such differences with ease. 
 
Another study examined the collection of prescriptions by patients before and after 
the introduction of an electronic prescription transfer scheme.77 In total, 2,148 
electronic-prescriptions and 414 paper prescriptions were analysed. Fifteen percent of 
paper prescriptions were not collected within 5 days but the figure was only 10% for 
electronically transferred prescriptions. It is not clear of the reasons for this, but 
patient beliefs about medication have a key influence on these early stages of the 
medicines use process. 
 
Other technology solutions have been proposed and are under study. The most 
attractive approach might be a portable computer with wireless network and 
electronic prescribing to avoid handwritten prescriptions being misread. 
 
1.6.2 Bar Coding 
Point of care scanning of the drug product can display drug allergy alerts and 
administration instructions. The patient can also be scanned to confirm their identity 
and warn of problems. The FDA put into operation its plan that by 2007, all new 
human drug products and biological products would be bar-coded.28 This technology 
has been used for blood products, blood prescriptions and patients with success. 
However uptake has been poor due to the costs associated with this closed loop 
system.77 Other studies have shown mixed results for bar coding in terms of 
medication errors. One study has shown that barcode ordering of stock reduces 
transcription errors by nurses.78 However another study suggested that bar codes may 
increase errors, because the system works imperfectly and/or staff find 
workarounds.79 If the system is perceived to be inefficient, it is human nature to 
attempt to find ways of cutting corners, without realising that this may introduce risks 
that the system was designed to prevent. Nurses overrode the technology for 4.2% of 
patients charted and for 10.3% of medicines charted. 
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1.6.3 Unit specific formularies 
Having electronic access to formularies that are specific to certain clinical groups (e.g. 
neonates) has been recommended to control errors.80 These formularies are controlled 
by pharmacists who enter drug files with specific dose calculations for the patient 
group. The improved access to information reduced errors and facilitated 
simplification and standardisation of practice.80
 
1.7 Electronic prescribing 
The next two sections discuss the literature on two important technologies that are 
collectively called electronic prescribing or e-prescribing. The first technology is 
computerised physician order entry (CPOE) and the second is clinical decision 
support (CDS). CPOE in its most basic form enables typing of prescriptions in such a 
way as to resolve technical prescribing errors. CDS provides access to protocols, 
policies and guidelines and other information to guide, or facilitate, the prescriber into 
making correct prescribing decisions so that clinical/planning errors are avoided. 
Literature on this subject is confusing in that the term CPOE can be used to 
encompass some very sophisticated features that are really CDS. Some papers discuss 
CDS as if it was just basic dose checking, whilst others use the term to include 
completely integrated clinical information systems. 
 
1.7.1 Computerised physician order entry (CPOE) 
A literature search on medication errors and adverse events produces many papers on 
CPOE. This is often presented as a huge step forward in error management; however 
one must be aware of publication bias and the promotional efforts of producers of 
systems selling very expensive solutions to this problem. Some sales pitches would 
have you believe that errors will never occur again. It is also important to assess how 
much installing a system compromises current care and how much an installed 
debugged system will decrease efficiency of future care.81
 
The major reason to evaluate e-prescribing systems is to determine how their use 
improves or impairs clinical and process-related outcomes. According to Rosenbloom 
82, there are documented risks involved in integrating such clinical systems into 
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healthcare processes. These risks generally fall into two categories. First, new 
technologies may not accomplish what they are designed to do. Second, introduction 
of new technologies may lead to unintended consequences such as patient harm or 
misused resources. 
 
CPOE in its simplest form is an electronic application for writing orders that reliably 
produces legible, unambiguous prescriptions using standard names and eliminates 
poor handwriting and spelling. 19, 28, 83 However it can be linked to the supply function 
using electronic communication so decreasing transcription errors.28,84 Most 
importantly, CPOE can incorporate various levels of clinical decision support at the 
point of ordering and can be integrated with pharmacy stock control and ordering 
systems.78
 
CPOE also improves standardisation of the times that medicines are administered 
across all wards and can ensure that administration occurs at scheduled times without 
significant delays.5
 
Electronic systems were first introduced into pharmacy in the 1970s to manage 
formularies and produce rapid communication with pharmacy. In some countries such 
as the Netherlands and Australia, pharmacy has considerable say over formularies via 
the technology; whereas in Germany and France, pharmacy is excluded.85 Poor 
connectivity with pharmacy may produce fewer inconsequential errors but more 
errors of a serious nature.85
 
In 2002 only about 10% of US hospitals had fully adopted CPOE.86 In 2008 the 
majority of prescriptions in the USA were still handwritten, reflecting poor uptake of 
the technology in the intervening years.87 However, one UK study at Doncaster Royal 
Infirmary showed a reduction in transcription errors, moving from 37 to 96% 
transcription accuracy after installing an electronic prescribing system; in addition the 
quality of administration records improved from 65 to100%.88
 
The perception of users is crucial to the smooth introduction of CPOE. Difficulties 
can be created where insufficient training is provided. 89
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One of the key benefits of CPOE may be to initially slow down prescribing by 
requiring extra data to be recorded (such as justified choices) and demand complete 
prescriptions. 90  
 
A study of verbal orders (VOs) at a tertiary care children’s hospital, showed that the 
introduction of CPOE forced the reduction of VOs and unsigned VOs from 23% and 
43% respectively to 10% and 9% respectively.91 So CPOE may only be changing bad 
practice into better practice by enforcing a new requirement on doctors to follow 
hospital policy. 
 
1.7.2 Adverse consequences of CPOE 
CPOE systems can help hospitals improve health care quality, but they can also 
introduce new problems. They may create new work or extra work, disrupt workflow 
and make demands that practitioners find distressing. Forcing prescribers to enter all 
required data may promote safe care, but the additional alerts and passwords may be 
emotional challenging and take more time. Additional work may be created to support 
this crucial technology and paper output may actually increase. Entry into a computer 
may create the illusion of communication, whilst not producing certainty that the 
message has been received.92
 
CPOE can generate new kinds of errors such as juxtaposition errors, in which 
clinicians click on the adjacent patient name or medication from a list and 
inadvertently enter the wrong order.90,92
 
Human adaptability creates ‘workarounds’ where if prescribers cannot readily find the 
“correct” place to enter the data, they put it where it might fit. It is intuitive to the 
prescriber but the computer cannot find or process the information; or they enter ‘free 
text’ so all the advantages or correct spelling disappear. CPOE only manages error 
risk if prescribers use it, know how to use it and find it easy to use. Complex 
prescribing may not fit with the programming and causes frustration.90  
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1.7.3 Effect of electronic prescribing on medicine 
administration errors 
A UK study was set up to assess the effect of an electronic prescribing and 
administration system on the safety and quality of medicine administration in a UK 
hospital.93 The study was conducted on a surgical ward with electronic prescribing, 
automated dispensing, barcode patient identification and electronic patient records. 
The researchers observed medicine administration and monitored for medicines 
administration errors (MAEs) for ward stock and non-ward stock drugs.  
 
Pre- and post-intervention MAE rates were 6.4 and 2.3% respectively for ward-stock 
drugs (95% confidence interval for the difference (CI) −5.8 to −2.4%), and 14.6 and 
13.7% for non-ward-stock drugs (CI −6.5 to 4.7%). Excluding omissions due to 
unavailability, pre- and post-intervention MAE rates were 6.2 and 2.2% respectively 
for ward-stock drugs (CI −5.7 to −2.3%), and 9.2 and 3.5% for non-ward-stock drugs 
(CI −9.3 to −2.1%). Pre-intervention, 2,086 doses (96.3%) were documented correctly 
and 1,557 (95.9%) post-intervention (CI −1.6 to 0.8%). There were five clinically 
significant documentation discrepancies pre-intervention (0.2%), and 33 (2.0%) 
afterwards (CI 1.1 to 2.5%). Timeliness of administration improved post-intervention 
(P < 0.001; Chi-square test), as did administration of medication from unlocked areas 
(CI 4.7 to 7.3%) and supervision of patients taking oral medication (CI 17 to 23%). 
Hence it appears that in this clinical setting at least, electronic prescribing can reduce 
MAEs for ward stock drugs and the need for interventions with both drug types. It can 
also improve timeliness and security of drug administration. However, there was an 
increase in potentially significant documentation discrepancies. 
 
1.7.4 Clinical decision support (CDS) and errors 
CDS is designed to improve the decision phase of the prescribing process and so 
reduce medication errors.94 Installing these complex systems requires patience and 
politics. Patients may be put at risk whilst links are established. 
 
CDS can provide either basic (e.g. drug-allergy checking, dose guidance and 
formulary compliance, drug duplication and interaction checking) or advanced (e.g. 
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drug dosing support for renal insufficiency, laboratory tests required for certain 
medicines, drug-pregnancy risks, drug-disease alerts) guidance to the prescriber.78,95 
There is a tendency for developers of CDS systems to provide excess alerts that are 
either overridden or make finely balanced decisions more difficult.83 Designing 
explicit guidelines should decrease the time to develop automation of medical 
knowledge. However reports in 2006 showed that successful integration had not 
happened.95
 
CDS might provide support for dose calculations and dilutions and this would be 
important in neonates and paediatrics where these errors are the most common.96  
Dose banding based on age and/or weight is common but doses have to be checked in 
specialist books such as the BNF for Children.97
 
A 2008 systematic review98 looked for evidence that CPOE and CDS combined 
prevented ADEs. The review found 543 citations but only identified 10 studies that 
met inclusion criteria. CPOE with CDS contributed to a statistically significant 
decrease in ADEs in 5 (50.0%) of the 10 studies. Four studies (40.0%) reported a non-
statistically significant reduction in ADE rates, and 1 study (10.0%) demonstrated no 
change in ADE rates. 
 
One example of an area where CDS has been used successfully is in patients with 
renal dysfunction. 
 
1.7.4.1 CDS in patients with renal dysfunction 
CDS offers the potential to improve the selection of a dose for a patient with renal 
dysfunction - an area of concern for junior doctors. A CDS system in the US 
generated alerts for inappropriate prescriptions based on the renal function of 
inpatients. The rate of inappropriate first prescriptions did not differ significantly 
between intervention and control periods (19.9% vs. 21.3 %;). The alerts did reduced 
these ‘errors’ with junior doctors (odds ratio 0.69), but not with senior doctors (odds 
ratio 1.88). 99
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Another randomized trial in the US100 conducted within the long-stay units of a large 
long-term care facility, tested the introduction of alerts related to medication 
prescribing for residents with renal insufficiency. The alerts were displayed to 
prescribers in the intervention units and hidden but tracked by the investigators in 
control units.  The rates of alerts were nearly equal in the intervention and control 
units: 2.5 versus 2.4 per 1,000 resident days. The proportions of dose alerts for which 
the final drug orders were appropriate were also similar: relative risk 0.95 (95% CI:  
0.83-1.1). For other alert categories, significantly higher proportions of final drug 
orders were appropriate in the intervention units: relative risk 2.4 for maximum 
frequency (95% CI: 1.4- 4.4); 2.6 for drugs that should be avoided (95% CI: 1.4- 5.0); 
and 1.8 for alerts to acquire missing information (95% CI: 1.1- 3.4). Overall, final 
drug orders were considered appropriate significantly more often in the intervention 
units-relative risk 1.2 (95% CI: 1.0- 1.4). The authors concluded that clinical decision 
support for physicians prescribing medications for long-term care residents with renal 
insufficiency could improve the quality of prescribing decisions. 
 
1.7.4.2 CDS in other areas 
The use of CDS in other areas has produced mixed results. A Dutch CDS system for 
general practitioners issued reminders about decreasing prescribing of antibiotics and 
asthma/COPD prescriptions. Antibiotic prescribing decreased from 39.7 to 28.2 per 
1000 patients per GP; however the difference was not statistically significant.101
 
Twenty-nine residential care units (containing 1,118 long-term care residents) in the 
US were randomized to having a CDS (intervention units) or not (control units).102 
Both intervention and control units had computerised order entry. Within intervention 
units, 411 adverse drug events occurred over 3,803 resident-months of observation 
time; 152 (37.0%) were deemed preventable. Within control units, there were 340 
adverse drug events over 3,257 resident-months of observation time; 126 (37.1%) 
were characterized as preventable. There were 10.8 adverse drug events per 100 
resident-months and 4.0 preventable events per 100 resident-months on intervention 
units. There were 10.4 adverse drug events per 100 resident-months and 3.9 
preventable events per 100 resident-months on control units. Comparing intervention 
and control units, the adjusted rate ratios were 1.06 (95% CI: 0.92-1.23) for all 
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adverse drug events and 1.02 (95% CI: 0.81-1.30) for preventable adverse drug 
events. The authors concluded that computerized provider order entry with decision 
support did not reduce the adverse drug event rate or preventable adverse drug event 
rate in the long-term care setting. Alert burden, limited scope of the alerts, and a need 
more fully to integrate clinical and laboratory information may have affected efficacy. 
 
Excess alerts generated by CDS systems may lead to alert overload, fatigue and rapid 
override; on the other hand, simple drug interaction alerts provide inadequate 
information that can cause annoyance without value. It has proven difficult to 
replicate the doctor-pharmacist interaction that takes place during a discussion.81
 
Guchelar et al.28 concluded that it was possible that alerts for drug interactions, 
duplicate medication, drug overdoses and allergies improved medication safety but no 
broad scientific evidence for this hypothesis could be found in the literature.  
 
A survey of over 3,000 US hospitals in 2009 103 found that only 1.5% had a 
comprehensive electronic-records system (i.e., present in all clinical units), and an 
additional 7.6% had a basic system (i.e. present in at least one clinical unit). 
Computerized provider-order entry for medications had been implemented in only 
17% of hospitals. Respondents cited capital requirements and high maintenance costs 
as the primary barriers to implementation. This study suggests that the evidence from 
systems so far is not sufficient to make computerized prescribing mandatory. 
1.7.4.3 The ten Commandments of CDS 
Gross et al.86 have proposed ten commandments for making sure that CDS systems 
are effective. These are shown in Table 1.7. 
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Table 1.7 Ten commandments for CDS (after Gross et al. 86)  
 
No. Rule Reason 
1 Speed is everything this is what information system users value 
most 
2 Anticipate needs and deliver in 
real time 
deliver information when needed 
3 Fit into the user’s work flow Integrate suggestions with clinical practice 
4 Little things can make a big 
difference 
improve usability to “do the right thing.” 
5 Recognize that physicians will 
strongly resist stopping 
offer alternatives rather than insist on 
stopping an action 
6 Changing direction is easier than 
stopping 
changing defaults for dose, route, or 
frequency of a medication can change 
behaviour 
7 Simple interventions work best simplify guidelines by reducing to a single 
computer screen 
8 Ask for additional information 
only when you really need it 
The more data elements requested, the less 
likely a guideline will be implemented 
9 Monitor impact, get feedback, 
and respond 
If certain reminders are not followed, 
readjust or eliminate the reminder 
10 Manage and maintain your 
knowledge-based systems 
both use of information and currency of 
information should be carefully monitored 
 
 
1.7.5 Clinical Information systems (CISs) 
Clinical information systems should integrate electronic health records with pathology 
results to save time pulling information together. For example prescribing 
anticoagulants should be accompanied by relevant results about blood clotting. If data 
are only keyed in once, this not only saves time but reduces errors.  
 
A review of CIS in the USA in 2007 showed that medication errors were reduced 
when it was used. Significant reductions were seen in prescribing errors related to 
drug allergy detection, excessive dosing and, incomplete or unclear orders. 
Pharmacists were also twice as likely to identify dosages requiring adjustment for 
renal insufficiency when the integrated technology was in place and more than six 
times more likely to detect drug levels outside of the therapeutic range. 73 
administration-related errors were intercepted through electronic bar-code scanning 
for every 100,000 doses charted.94 In this study, pharmacists were authorised to 
change any product or associated details (e.g. vial size, tablet strength, solution 
concentration) without requiring a doctor’s co-signature. The primary source of 
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prevented (i.e., intercepted) error reports was through   documentation of pharmacists’ 
clinical interventions.  A statistically significant increase in the rate of pharmacist 
interventions was observed after implementation of the integrated pharmacy 
information system, laboratory information system, and CIS with clinical monitoring 
tools. There was a notable doubling of renal dose adjustment and a six fold increase in 
orders for therapeutic drug monitoring. 
 
1.8 Errors in critical care 
The following sections look at just one area of practice of particular interest to the 
author, where specific studies on medication errors have been undertaken. Many of 
the types of error encountered here are common to other clinical areas, but the 
specialised environment often magnifies the importance of the error and compounds 
its production. The role of the pharmacist in this area is also discussed. 
 
1.8.1 The critical care environment 
The ICU brings together high-risk patients with multiple co-morbidities who require 
urgent, complex interventions from a number of different health care professionals in 
a technologically integrated environment. It has been calculated that a single dose of a 
single medication in a critically ill patient may require the correct execution of 80–
200 steps.104 The ICU is organisationally complex with tightly coupled processes, 
high instrumentation, and multiple interactions between different professional 
groups.5  
 
A literature review in 2009 found that, on average, 1.7 medical errors occurred each 
day in an ICU, and many patients suffered a potentially life-threatening error during 
their stay. Medication errors were the most common type of error and accounted for 
78% of serious medical errors in the ICU.104
 
In intensive care, patients are exposed to twice as many medications as those in 
general medical wards. In addition, critically ill patients differ from most other 
hospital patients because they have limited ability to participate in their medical care 
and lack the physiologic reserve to tolerate additional injury. 
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A 647-bed US academic medical centre (containing more than 120 ICU beds) 
conducted a retrospective evaluation of voluntarily reported medication errors over 
4.5 years.105 The study compared reported medication errors in intensive care, and 
general care units for adult patients. There were a total of 3,252 medication errors 
reported, with 541 occurring in ICUs and 2,711 occurring in general care units. In the 
ICUs the primary type of medication errors was prescribing and in the general care 
units it was omission. Medication errors were associated with harm in 12% of ICU 
cases and 6% of cases in general care units. Voluntary reporting is likely to be biased 
towards those healthcare professionals who report. On general wards this may 
predominantly be nurses where on ITU this may be the pharmacist. On general wards 
omissions are most frequently reported. On ITU these are still likely occur but 
prescribing errors are more significant and therefore take priority when reporting. 
 
A UK study showed that 1% of inpatients experience ADEs related to IV fluids and 
intravenously administered drugs.69 Infusions of drugs and fluids are still poorly 
understood in most ward areas. These are crucial management issues on ITU. 
 
An Australian study reviewed all ICU patient case notes for 6 months in 2001 (n = 
524) and similarly in 2002 (n = 536).106  This was before and after the introduction of 
a real-time microbiology browser and computerized decision support system for 
isolate directed antibiotic prescription. This tool streamlined collation and clinical use 
of microbiology results linked to common antibiotic sensitivies and guidelines. There 
was a significant reduction in the proportion of patients prescribed broad-spectrum 
antibiotics (carbapenems, cephalosporins and vancomycin) and an increase in the 
number of switches to narrower spectrum antibiotics, thus decreasing the selection 
pressure for MRSA and Clostridium difficile. These are two highly significant 
adverse events, associated with prolonged hospital stay and increased mortality. 
 
Errors in the administration of parenteral drugs to patients in intensive care are 
common and pose a serious threat to patient safety.  In 2007, 113 ITUs in 27 
countries, including 17 in the UK, participated in a 24-hour observational study on 
medication administration errors where a questionnaire was completed for each 
patient (1,328 in total). One third of patients had at least one medication error with a 
recorded error rate of 74.5 per 100 patient days. The most frequently reported error 
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was a time delay before administration, followed by missed medicines and dosing 
errors.107  
 
In the intensive care setting, patients who are the victims of an error have been shown 
to have a higher 28-day mortality than those who experience no errors.107
 
A US study involving five ITUs identified 187 medication errors during 5,744 
observations (3.3%). The most frequently reported errors were wrong infusion rate 
(40.1%), dose omission (14.4%), improper dose (11.7%) and wrong dose timing 
(13.9%); and the most common drugs involved were cardiovascular drugs and 
sedatives.108 
 
Medication reconciliation may improve patient safety in the ICU, and an updated list 
of medications should be maintained, including long-standing medications, the 
reasons for starting new medications and their planned stop dates and the reasons for 
discontinuing or holding old medications. Engaging pharmacists in this role has been 
proposed for some time.104
 
Errors in ICU can occur at any stage of the patient’s journey through it. A Canadian 
study reviewed the hospital records of consecutive ICU discharges at one academic 
and two community hospitals throughout 2002.109  Eligible patients were prescribed at 
least one of six medication groups before hospitalization: statins, 
antiplatelets/anticoagulants, L-thyroxine, non-prn inhalers, acid-suppressing drugs 
and allopurinol. A total of 1,402 charts were eligible for the study and 834 had 
prescriptions for at least one of the medication groups. One third (33%; 251/834) of 
patients had one or more of their chronic medications unintentionally omitted at 
hospital discharge.  
 
A study was conducted to compare the ITU discharge medications with the patient’s 
regular medications and documentation of allergies. Screening the data before 
hospital discharge would have prevented an average of 10 medication errors per week 
in a single 14-bed surgical ICU.110
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1.8.1.1 Strategies for prevention of errors in critical care 
Keep prescribing simple 
Prescribing should also be kept as simple as possible and prescribers should be given 
education and feedback, access to drug information and advice from clinical 
pharmacists. They should work in an environment where the importance of correct 
prescribing is recognised by senior staff. Increasing complexity is known to increase 
error rates and the large numbers of incidents associated with gentamicin and 
vancomycin, which are complicated to prescribe and monitor, suggest this is 
important in medication practice.45 
 
Adoption of CPOE 
One study showed that following the introduction of computerized physician order 
entry in the ICU, the proportion of prescriptions with errors decreased from 6.7% to 
4.8% .111 A comparison of paper-based prescribing and computerized physician order 
entry showed that the number of prescription errors was significantly lower in the 
ICU that used computerized entry (3.4% v. 27%, p < 0.001). The number of reported 
adverse drug events following electronic prescribing with CDS implementation, 
decreased from 28 to 4 (p < 0.02).  
 
Introducing pharmacists specialising in critical care. 
Several studies have demonstrated the value of having specially trained pharmacists 
present in the ITU in the reduction in medication errors; either through frequent 
informal teaching and encouragement in the use of computerised decision support 
systems106; dealing with patients with multiple risk factors or altered 
pharmacokinetics104; systematic review of medication orders and reviewing drug 
costs73; and participation on ICU ward rounds.73  
 
1.9 Temporary secondary care loop 
As previously mentioned, medication errors can occur at any stage of the patient’s 
journey through a healthcare episode. This thesis is concerned with events that occur 
in hospital – the temporary secondary care loop of the patient journey. The loop 
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represents a temporary change from the health status of normal life and encompasses 
the phases of admission, inpatient care and discharge from secondary care, described 
below. The process is illustrated in Figure 1.7. 
 
              
Normal
Health
Status
Primary Care
Secondary Care
Inpatient
 
Figure 1.7 The temporary secondary care loop. 
 
Medication Errors creep into all stages and phases of this process. Transfer of location 
or carer is always associated with potential error and good communication is crucial. 
Admission and discharge to hospital are significant data pinch points, where efficient 
communication is critical. 
 
Medication Related Admissions (MRAs) may be drug related side-effects, allergy or 
more indirect events such as a fall related to postural hypotension from an alpha 
blocker. 
 
1.9.1 Admission  
A study in Leeds over 5 months in 2004 44 looked at 1,006 admissions to general 
surgical and medical wards. Three hundred and twenty-four patient safety incidents 
were found in 230 of the 1,006 patients admitted (22.9%); 270/324 (83%) were found 
by case note review alone, 21(7%) were found by a routine incident reporting system 
and 33(10%) were found by both methods. Case note review identified 110/1006 
(10.9%) of admissions that had at least one patient safety incident resulting in patient 
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harm. Just 5% of these incidents were also revealed by voluntary reports. Case note 
review was clearly the most sensitive at detecting these events. 
 
This study shows that a large proportion of admissions were related to patient safety 
issues and medication related admissions were only a sub-group of this cohort. Never 
the less, they may be involved in related events such as falls. In this study the patient 
safety incidents fell into three categories: 
 
Group 1 – pressure ulcer, fall, drug problems, operation cancelled, peri-operative 
complications (excluding infections), patient dissatisfaction or miscellaneous; 
 
Group 2 – unplanned transfer to ITU, unplanned return to operation, inappropriate or 
self discharge, unplanned readmission; and, 
 
Group 3 – infection. 
 
Medication related hospital admissions are reported as representing between 4 and 
30% of all admissions;28 and up to one third of medication related hospital admissions 
are reported as due to prescribing errors.112 
 
1.9.2 Inpatient activity 
The effect of an American clinical pharmacist’s interventions was studied in 2005.113 
The patients were from a 651-bed tertiary care teaching hospital and were prescribed 
highly active antiretroviral therapy (HAART). The pharmacist recorded interventions 
in the first 6 months of being appointed and reviewed charts over the previous six 
months for comparison. There were 199 admissions with human immunodeficiency 
virus (HIV) admitted over the study period. A total of 73 HAART errors were 
confirmed in 41 patients. These included: incomplete regimen (the commonest), 
incorrect dosage, incorrect schedule, medication–disease interaction, incorrect 
formulation, incorrect antiretroviral, duplication of therapy, and drug–drug 
interactions. The duration of each error was measured from the time of the initial 
incorrect order until a correct order was placed or until the patient was discharged. 
There was no significant difference in the frequency or type of prescribing when 
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comparing the pre-intervention and intervention phases. The median length of time 
until an error was corrected, however, was significantly shorter during the 
intervention phase (15.5 hours) than the pre-intervention phase (84 hours)  
 
The impact of a program of pharmacist-led changes was studied in orthopaedic 
patients in 2008 in the US.114 The changes included improved chart surveillance by 
pharmacists, a newly developed medication/ history form given to and reviewed with 
patients before surgery, in-service education of preoperative nursing staff, patient 
database form changes, and requests for patients to bring their medications in on 
admission. Before the changes, medication errors were detected in 62% of orders 
overall. Of these, 43% were found to be of moderate or high potential for harm. After 
the institution of the above measures, overall errors were reduced by 31%; 
moderate/high risk potential harm was reduced by 64%; and errors of omission were 
detected twice as often. 
 
These changes are typical of specialist clinical pharmacy activities in the UK and will 
be explored in more depth in Chapter 3. 
 
1.9.3 Discharge 
The Care Quality Commission recently reported on studies of patient discharges from 
NHS hospitals and stated that hospitals needed to improve the quality and timeliness 
of information sent to a patient’s GP when they are discharged from hospital.115  
 
In hospital the discharge process is more complicated than first inspection suggests. 
Within the pharmacy, many changes are made to the original discharge prescription 
because it does not match the inpatient chart or introduces new anomalies. Thus the 
original draft will often not match the final list. If the first draft is transmitted to the 
GP this would explain the CQC findings. In addition on admission to hospital many 
medication changes are deliberately made to avoid medication related problems 
(including the reason for admission) and would therefore be different from the GP 
record. 
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An Australian study indicated that on average, dispensing pharmacists intervened on 
180 occasions per month to clarify and amend prescriptions.116 Resolution of these 
medication anomalies at discharge had resulted in considerable delays to patients and 
reduced the availability of beds for newly admitted patients. The inaccurate and slow 
production of discharge prescriptions was attributed to the inexperience and immense 
workload of junior doctors.  A new system was introduced where the prescriptions 
were prepared electronically and printed by the pharmacist for confirmation and 
signature by the doctor. The pharmacist also prepared an electronic advice form 
detailing any medication changes and the reasons for the changes. They studied 40 
cases before and after introduction of the new service. The authors concluded that the 
pharmacist-initiated e-script transcription service had been successfully implemented. 
The discharge process was faster with the time taken from decision to discharge to 
actual discharge decreased by 34% (p = 0.02). The time spent by dispensing 
pharmacists in clarifying and amending discharge prescriptions decreased from 9.5 to 
1.5 minutes per patient. The time spent by doctors in preparing discharge 
prescriptions fell from 15 to 2 minutes per patient. There were also fewer prescribing 
errors; the number of errors decreased from 0.83 to 0.1 per patient (p = 0.0005) and 
from 0.0962 to 0.0137 per item (p = 0.011).  The authors concluded that combining a 
prescribing role with the medication safety elements of electronic prescribing and 
medication reconciliation resulted in significant improvements in the quality, 
accuracy and timeliness of discharge prescriptions. 
 
1.9.4 Re-admission 
Data from the NHS information centre on readmissions to hospital shows that 
between 1998 and 2006, in inpatients aged 16-75 years, there was a 22% increase to 
8.6 readmissions per 100 discharges. In the over 75years cohort, the rate was 13.6 
readmissions per 100 discharges. In 2007 the Health Minister Andy Burnham stated 
that ‘we need more research to help us understand the often complex underlying 
causes of readmission.’ 117 As data from this research will show, a major contributor 
to readmission is the large number of medication errors made during the discharge 
process in secondary care. 
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1.9.5 Medicines reconciliation 
Medicines reconciliation has been defined as a process of deriving the most accurate 
list of all medicines a patient is taking and using this list to provide care for a patient. 
The medication list should include prescription, herbal, over-the-counter preparations 
and supplements.118 
 
It involves a process of comparing a patient's medication orders to all medications that 
the patient has been taking to avoid medication errors such as omissions, duplications, 
dosing errors, or drug interactions. Reconciliation should be conducted at every 
transition of care in which new medications are ordered or existing orders are 
rewritten and could therefore be carried out at any of the boundaries shown in Figure 
1.7. 119
 
Medication reconciliation is composed of five steps:  creation of a current medication 
list; listing of medications to be prescribed; comparison of those medication lists; 
development of clinical recommendations; and communication with appropriate 
caregivers and the patient.119
 
The first 24 hours of a hospital admission are important for clinical decisions. The 
first inpatient chart is written based on a drug history and an initial or working 
diagnosis. It is therefore important that the list of medicines consumed prior to 
admission is both accurate and complete. This might impinge on the cause of the 
admission and the resolution of adverse events. One paper has indicated that 50-60% 
of initial drug charts are written incorrectly.120 Initial omissions here can be 
promulgated through a whole episode of hospital stay and result in readmission.120  
 
A prospective study in 2005 in Canada121 examined patients consuming at least four 
medicines at time of admission. It compared the medicines prescribed on admission 
with a comprehensive drug history. The researchers asked the admitting medical team 
which changes were intentional. Out of 523 admissions, 151 patients were enrolled 
into the study; 81 (53%) had at least one unintended discrepancy and 46% were 
omissions. Nearly two thirds (61%) were of no consequence but 38.6% were judged 
to have caused moderate to severe discomfort or clinical deterioration. Six percent of 
 
 
61 
patients experienced inadvertent omission with serious consequence. This study 
clearly identified a need for a better method of ensuring an accurate medication 
history at the time of admission.  
 
1.9.6 Medication related admissions 
Medication errors arising before admission can result in transfer from primary to 
secondary care. The primary/secondary interface can be a challenge but where 
hospital pharmacists have identified medication related admissions, it has been 
possible to gather together key stakeholders to talk about medication errors.122 
Various studies have attempted to assess the magnitude of the problem; results from 
key studies are shown in Table 1.8 and show that the problem is a sizeable one. 
 
Table 1.8 Key literature showing the proportion of hospital admissions that are 
drug related admissions. 
 
Percentage of all admissions Country Reference (events or 
ADRs) 
1.9 UK 123 (events) 
3.1 UK 124 (ADRs)* 
5.1 Canada 125 (events)* 
5.4 France 126 (events) 
6.5 UK 127(ADRs) 
*These report the results from meta-analyses. 
 
 
 
As a patient is admitted to hospital there is an abrupt change in responsibility for 
medicines from patient to care provider. The patient often assumes the healthcare 
provider automatically knows the complete medication list, so does not remember nor 
record the details.128 The communication could be improved if there were electronic 
health records and a system of transfer when the patient moves from home to hospital. 
Patients who are booked for elective admission should be reminded to bring in a list 
of their medicines because this has been shown to decreased medicine reconciliation 
errors by 50%.129  For emergency admissions through A&E this is more difficult as 
patients often forget to bring in their medicines. 
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A Study in Merseyside127, one of the most thorough of its type (see Table 1.9) found 
that 1,225 admissions (6.5%) were related to an ADR and in 80% of these, there was 
a direct link to the specific drugs they were taking. These patients had a median length 
of stay of eight days and occupied 4% of hospital bed capacity. Most ADRs were 
predictable from the known pharmacology of the drugs and many represented known 
interactions and were therefore likely to be preventable. Two percent of patients 
admitted with an ADR died, suggesting that adverse effects may be responsible for 
the death of 0.15% of all patients admitted. 
 
The NPSA issued technical guidance on medicines reconciliation in 2007.129 This 
advised Trusts that pharmacists should be involved in medicines reconciliation as 
soon as possible after admission. All healthcare organisations that admit adult 
inpatients should put policies in place for medicines reconciliation on admission. In a 
systematic review130, pharmacist-led interventions appear to be the most cost-effective 
ways of preventing medicine errors. 
 
A Welsh study in a district general hospital in 2007131, prospectively looked at 200 
acute medical admissions. A pharmacy technician worked with a pharmacist, and 
compiled an accurate drug history. The pharmacist investigated any discrepancies 
between the history and the inpatient chart. A multidisciplinary team coded the 
discrepancy using an NPSA risk assessment tool; 123 patients had at least one error. 
There was a total of 234 errors or an average of 1.9 per patient. Almost two thirds 
(62%) of medication history errors were drug omissions, 25.2% incorrect doses and 
8.6% incorrect drugs. The majority (189; 79%) were judged to be minor, 46 (20%) 
moderate, and 1 (0.4%) of major consequence. 
 
1.10 The developing role of the pharmacist in error 
prevention. 
In the 1980s, hospitals produced formularies that limited the range of products 
stocked in the pharmacy. A formulary is a collaborative project between doctors and 
pharmacists who examine the evidence supporting the efficacy, safety and cost of 
products as they enter the market. Their original purpose was to simplify the choices 
available to junior doctors.  A limited list of products reduces the amount of teaching 
required for safe prescribing. It is part of ensuring that appropriate products are 
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selected for patients – a risk management function. This process has undergone 
considerable change including the increased prominence of the cost saving 
component. 
 
At the same time, ward pharmacy evolved to move the supply function out from the 
pharmacy onto the wards. This was an expansion of the risk management component 
of the dispensing process. It was conceived to trap errors earlier in the prescribing 
process. The pharmacist’s understanding of how medicines were used increased as did 
the way in which errors were generated. Junior pharmacists were then taught by their 
senior colleagues how to identify prescribing errors. This educational role was 
improved by capturing data on the interventions that pharmacists made.  Pharmacists 
were also able to identify errors in the administration of medicines to patients. 
 
Clinical pharmacists emerged who spent the majority of their time looking for 
prescribing and administration errors; they advised doctors and nurses on the safest 
way to use medicines, before a prescription was written. Pharmacists are now fully 
involved in the management of medicines at policy level and in the management of 
medicines risks.  Pharmacists attend consultant/registrar ward rounds to assist in the 
selection of therapeutic group and individual drugs within groups. This is to avoid 
contra-indications and adverse effects but also to reduce the likely errors in the 
delivery of care. We have seen earlier that this is more effective that just visiting the 
ward.74  
 
Pharmacists are involved in the training of junior doctors to address lack of 
knowledge about medicines and how they should be used safely thus managing risk 
through education and sharing of experience. They are also helping to reduce 
medication related errors at the admission and discharge phases of the patient’s 
journey.  The hospital pharmacist is best placed to oversee the quality of the entire 
drug distribution chain from prescribing, drug choice, dispensing and preparation to 
the administration of drugs and can fulfil a vital role in improving medication safety. 
 
A key function for the hospital pharmacist is to review the medicines of individual 
patients; during this process prescription anomalies and errors can be detected and 
reconciled quickly before harm occurs. In addition, medication reviews can improve 
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patients’ understanding and confidence about their medicines and so improve long 
term outcomes. If this was to occur before and after entering the secondary care loop 
(see Figure 1.7) then many interface problems could be resolved. The existing and 
potential roles for pharmacists in reducing medication related errors are discussed 
further in the ensuing chapters. 
 
All of the research presented in this thesis was carried out in Southampton University 
Hospitals NHS Trust. A brief overview of this environment appears in the next 
section. 
 
1.11 Southampton University Hospitals NHS Trust 
Southampton University Hospitals NHS Trust (SUHT) serves a local population of 
560,000 and provides tertiary services for three million people. The Trust includes 
three hospital sites of which Southampton General is the largest with about 1000 beds 
in 50 wards. In 2009 the trust admitted 114,000 inpatients and 100,000 patients 
attended A&E. SUHT contains more than 1,300 beds and employs 7,000 staff, 
including 260 in pharmacy. The pharmacy contains a total of 220 whole time 
equivalents including 82 (69 WTE) pharmacists. In 2009, the dispensary was issuing 
approximately 500,000 items per year or nearly 1000 items per week-day; 350,000 
items were issued as ward stock and a further 80,000 products were dispensed 
asceptically. The pharmacy also answered approximately 5,000 medicine enquires 
through its Medicines Information department. 
 
1.12 Research overview 
 
1.12.1 Research contextualisation 
In the literature review, the author has described publications on the safety culture and 
how it should improve patient safety. The pivotal American report ‘To err is human’ 4 
applied the safety culture and principles of quality improvement into healthcare. ‘An 
organisation with a memory’3 translated these principles into healthcare in the UK and 
commented that the culture of the NHS needed to change to one that openly learnt 
from errors. OWAM also stated that the NHS was not good at learning lessons from 
these failures and research in this area was to be encouraged. The conceptual model 
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and theory of errors have been described to inform this culture change to one of 
learning from errors.  
 
Methods of detecting medication errors have been described, with an emphasis on 
prescribing errors. The impact of technology has been discussed, with a focus on 
CPOE and CDS. Whilst some perceive that this technology will eliminate prescribing 
errors, the literature shows that new errors can be created. 
 
Building a safer NHS23 was published in 2001 to implement OWAM. This was 
accompanied by the birth of the National Patient Safety Agency (NPSA) to collect 
and analyse adverse events and learn lessons from them.  
 
Alan Milburn, the then Secretary of State for health, wrote the forward for the DOH 
paper.23 He called for more research into errors in healthcare and set a number of 
targets for the NHS to reduce them. However due to the lack of research data and 
common definitions of medication errors there was no clear baseline data from which 
to work.  Pharmacists had been reluctant to publicise the interventions that they make. 
Their role is largely hidden from the public eye and the media.  
 
There was little published data that described a stable UK data set that had been 
compiled over a number of years and which could be used to explore trends. However 
this data were being generated at SUHT. The data were initially disorganised and 
there was uncertainty about how it could be presented. The author decided to conduct 
further studies to add to existing data, and analyse and share them.  
 
1.12.2 Aims of this research 
The overall aim of this research was to quantify medication related events and 
prescribing errors and to measure the contribution of the pharmacist in their 
management. 
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1.12.3 Research objectives 
To conduct a study into a pharmacist obtaining complete drug histories and writing 
the first hospital prescription. 
To analyse a cohort of hospital admissions to determine if the cause of admission was 
medication related. 
To describe, quantify and analyse for trends the risk management activities of 
pharmacy.  
To organise and analyse data on pharmacist intervention audits that have been 
conducted regularly in one organisation and analyse trends over a decade. 
To analyse a dataset of pharmacist interventions to determine the proportion that were 
caused by prescribing errors. 
 
1.12.4 Chapter summary 
Chapter Two discusses the scope of clinical activities of pharmacists that occur in 
addition to drug supply. These clinical pharmacy activities included obtaining drug 
histories, interpreting drug concentrations, enhancing discharge of patients, 
monitoring the effects of medicines and solving problems that occurred in the use of 
medicines. The activities are quantified in a series of annual surveys at SUHT and 
analysed for trends. 
 
Chapter Three discusses the interventions of pharmacists at SUHT. The interventions 
are categorised into different types, financial motivation and the outcomes. If the 
pharmacist had not intervened there would be consequences for patients and these are 
assessed in terms of the likely severity. The impacts of the interventions with highest 
severity are also discussed. The data are gathered from annual, week-long surveys 
over a decade. 
 
Chapter Four describes a project set in the Accident and Emergency (A&E) 
department at SUHT. The study quantifies the proportion of admissions that may be 
medication related. It examines the effects of a pharmacist obtaining drug histories 
from patients and writing the first hospital prescription. It looks at the anomalies and 
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errors that are prevented by this intervention, throughout the patient journey through 
the hospital. Patients’ views on medication issues and their care are also reported. 
 
Chapter Five looks at the dataset of intervention surveys from Chapter Three. These 
are re-coded to determine where the pharmacist intervened to prevent a prescribing 
error from reaching the patient. The proportion of interventions that are related to 
prescribing errors is determined. The PEs are further divided into those that were acts 
of omission or commission. An examination is then made of whether the PEs 
occurred on admission, discharge or inpatient phases of the temporary secondary care 
loop. There is an exploration of what remains if prescribing errors are eliminated from 
the intervention dataset. 
 
Chapter Six discusses the findings of the research in the round, focussing on the 
potential of the pharmacist to prevent errors and reduce patient harm, and provides 
suggestions for future work. Chapter Seven provides overall conclusions from this 
research.  
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Chapter 2 Pharmacy activity surveys 
This chapter outlines some of the activities of pharmacists and their contribution to 
more than just the supply of medicines. Pharmacists supply medicines, but they also 
contribute to ensuring that drugs are used safely, educate healthcare staff and optimise 
the way that medicines are used. The different components of ‘clinical activities’ are 
described, discussed and quantified. 
 
Whilst it is relatively easy to count the number of items issued it is more difficult to 
quantify clinical activities and their contribution to patient care. At Southampton, 
surveys of clinical pharmacy activities have been conducted on a regular basis since 
1979. This chapter describes surveys undertaken between 1990 and 2009, under the 
author’s direction. In these surveys the pharmacists completed report forms that 
described and quantified what they did. This chapter is an analysis of the reports from 
these surveys. In Chapter 3 the data are considered in more detail. 
 2.1 Introduction 
Everyone has a view of what ‘chemists’ do from their perception of community 
pharmacies:  they supply medicines from prescriptions. Community pharmacists also 
offer advice on how medicines should be used, and make sales of non-prescription 
medicines. In addition the new pharmacy contract has expanded activities to include 
medicine use reviews (MURs), smoking cessation services, syringe and needle 
exchange, pregnancy testing, Chlamydia screening and many other public health 
services.132  
 
This chapter will look at how these activities translate into hospital pharmacy 
practice.  Firstly, hospital pharmacies can be registered as community pharmacies so 
they can also sell over-the-counter (OTC) products; but this is a very minor activity, if 
it exists at all. Hospital pharmacies supply medicines to patients in beds and on 
discharge back to the community. The advisory role of pharmacists in hospital is a 
major activity; the range and depth are explored in this chapter. The focus is on risk 
management activities rather than supply of medicines, but this function is included 
for completeness. 
 
 
 
69 
2.1.1 Patient access to hospitals 
Patients may attend hospital outpatient clinics to see specialists. The specialist may 
issue a hospital outpatient prescription that can only be dispensed from the hospital 
pharmacy. Alternatively the specialist may issue FP10 (HP) prescriptions; these are 
similar to those from general practitioners in that they can be dispensed by 
community pharmacies, but are paid for by the hospital. The specialist may write 
recommendations of treatment for the GP to prescribe  
 
Patients may also attend hospital Accident and Emergency (A&E) departments for 
urgent assessment and treatment before returning to full health or the care of their 
general practitioners. A&E attendees may receive medicines for their treatment in the 
A&E department but do not usually visit the hospital pharmacy.   
 
Some patients may visit a clinical area in the hospital for a few hours to be assessed. 
Others may have short surgical procedures but are discharged without occupying a 
hospital bed overnight. These patients are called day cases. Many will receive 
medicines during the day but will be discharged, possibly with prepared packs of pain 
killers or antibiotics, without visiting the hospital pharmacy. 
 
Most hospital activity is focussed on delivering care to patients who are admitted to 
hospital through A&E to medical wards or urgent surgery. Unpublished data gathered 
at Southampton shows that these patients represent about a fifth of those who visit 
A&E. Other patients may present themselves to surgical wards directly without 
visiting A&E for elective surgical procedures. A complete hospital episode has an 
admission phase, an inpatient phase -which must include an overnight stay in a 
hospital bed- and a discharge phase as shown in Figure 2.1. 
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Figure 2.1 Diagram showing the different possible phases of the hospital episode. 
 
2.1.2 Supply of Medicines 
Hospital pharmacies supply medicines to clinical areas on the premises, including 
theatres and wards.  The largest numbers of medicines are supplied by the pharmacy 
department to wards to hold as stock, in anticipation of a prescription. Wards are 
organised into clinical specialties that are then grouped into directorates (e.g. surgical 
wards) to facilitate management and communication to groups of clinicians who care 
for similar patients.  
 
Each ward has its own medicines stock list, agreed between senior nurses and 
pharmacists. Stock drugs are those that are commonly prescribed in that clinical 
speciality. The stock list ensures that frequently used drugs are readily available. 
Nurses should be familiar with the cautions and appropriate use of all stock drugs. 
When ward stock medicines are used, replacements are ordered by pharmacy 
technicians and assistants, selected from pharmacy stores and delivered in boxes to 
the wards. This stock drug distribution process at Southampton, as with most other 
hospitals, has no routine oversight by pharmacists. Only medicines on the approved 
stock list should be supplied in this way. Any difficulties or unusual requests are 
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redirected to the dispensary or discussed with clinical pharmacists visiting that 
particular group of wards. 
 
Approximately 55% (500,000 / 910,000) of the number of medicines supplied by 
pharmacy is delivered as individually dispensed items through the dispensary 
(unpublished data). Non-stock items are individually dispensed because they are 
expensive, toxic or associated with a high risk of errors. Items from the dispensary are 
for a particular patient and are authorised either directly by a prescription or a written 
request from a clinical pharmacist. The dispensary processes all outpatient and 
discharge prescriptions as well as inpatient items. Data from Southampton 
performance management statistics show that the pharmacy dispenses approximately 
one thousand items per day. 
 
Some medicines are not commercially available and have to be prepared 
extemporaneously either in the dispensary or more usually, in a technical support 
area. The technical support area also prepares injectables such as parenteral nutrition, 
cytotoxics and reconstituted and ready prepared injections and infusions. This is 
known as the Central Intravenous Additive Service (CIVAS).  
 
2.1.3 Supply of Information  
In hospital the pharmacists in the dispensary may offer simple verbal advice about 
medicines in response to questions from patients and ward staff. However, most 
questions are referred from the dispensary to the Medicines Information centre. Here 
pharmacists can take phone calls from the general public; but their main work 
involves questions from healthcare professionals that require interrogation of 
databases, similar to a medical library. Pharmacists collate, analyse and summarise 
what is retrieved, often adding professional advice using their clinical experience 
from working on wards. 
 
On the wards the clinical pharmacists have a substantial role in the provision of 
information about medicines. Apart from factual information, they share experience 
and offer professional advice about how to prescribe and use medicines safely. This 
 
 
72 
role has grown substantially over the last two decades. Chapter 3 analyses the 
contributions of clinical pharmacists in this area in more detail. 
 
Pharmacists provide passive information to nurses in response to queries. They also 
annotate drug charts to provide information and guidance to enable nurses to 
administer medicines in a safe way. By annotating the drug chart the doctor’s 
intention is made clearer so the nurse is less likely to make a drug administration 
error. For example poor handwriting may allow amlodipine to be read as amiodarone. 
Annotating the chart clearly as amlodipine ensures that the nurse gives the correct 
drug. Writing the ingredients of co-dydramol on the chart and setting a maximum in 
24 hours avoids an overdose of paracetamol; especially if paracetamol is itself also 
prescribed PRN (as required).This can be seen as the active provision of education or 
relevant information. 
 
In addition, the pharmacist will actively intervene in the drug use process if they feel 
that an error is likely or the process could be improved. For example a macrolide 
antibiotic should not be prescribed with a statin due to an increased risk of muscle 
breakdown. Where co-prescription occurs the pharmacist would consult the doctor to 
ensure the prescribing is changed so that an alternative non-interacting antibiotic is 
prescribed. A patient who is allergic to penicillin may be prescribed co-amoxiclav 
because the junior doctor does not realise this contains a penicillin. Discussion 
between the pharmacist and the doctor results in an alternative treatment to which the 
patient is not allergic. In this way pharmacists may prevent prescribing, 
administration and supply errors from occurring, or reaching the patient. They may 
then prepare additional information or guidelines to junior doctors and nurses to 
reduce the risk of an error occurring again. This is an active pharmacovigilance role 
and has been reported to save many patients from harm.132,133,134  
 
2.1.3.1 The pharmacist as educator 
Many problems are solved by simple education. The pharmacist possesses knowledge 
about the supply chain, formulary process and products that are available. So for 
example nifedipine is available in multiple formulations that are usually prescribed in 
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set frequencies specified in the BNF. Therefore a prescription for nifedipine 20mg 
twice daily should be given as plain capsules. However it is likely that the prescriber 
intended a ‘retard’ formulation that is given twice a day rather than plain capsules that 
are given three times a day. Similarly beclometasone inhalers are available in many 
strengths, so a strength should be specified or else the lowest strength will be given. 
Knowing which products are available as injections or liquid formulations can assist a 
patient with swallowing difficulties. Knowing which drugs are on the hospital 
formulary and which drugs are controlled under the Misuse of Drugs Act 1972 will 
affect the way that they are supplied to the ward. Many problems are solved by an 
explanation of a drug’s pharmacology. Being present on a ward enables the nurse, or 
doctor, to ask how a drug works. This is less likely to happen from the dispensary; 
indeed it is likely that the question will not be asked at all, missing an educational 
opportunity. 
 
This sharing of knowledge and application of expertise is the heart of the educational 
input of pharmacists to other healthcare professionals. 
 
2.1.4 Risk management functions for pharmacists 
2.1.4.1 Risk management function in the dispensary 
In the dispensary, pharmacists screen hospital prescription charts and resolve any 
anomalies that are detected. Pharmacy technicians and assistants then dispense and 
label any items required and these are checked by authorised senior technicians or 
pharmacists before release to the wards.  
 
Prescription related anomalies in the dispensary include prescriptions that do not 
match legal requirements and doses outside usual practice. Medication errors are 
detected, where discharge prescriptions do not match inpatient prescriptions or 
patients’ own drugs (PODs) brought into hospital. Medicines prescribed on admission 
are only seen in the dispensary if the patient does not bring in sufficient of their PODs 
and it is not a ‘stock’ drug for the admitting ward. New prescribed items are usually 
ordered via a pharmacist visiting the ward. 
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In this way pharmacists in the dispensary detect errors that have occurred in the 
prescribing of medicines. The risk management role is centred on ensuring 
documentation is legible, legal, complete and unambiguous such that accurate 
dispensing of prescriptions is possible. They also ensure that doses are within the 
normal range quoted in the British National Formulary (BNF). 
 
2.1.4.2 Risk management function on the wards 
Pharmacists begin their training in the dispensary and are then introduced to the 
wards. Pharmacists who visit wards are called clinical pharmacists and their role is to 
scrutinise the selection and use of medicines in these clinical areas. They order the 
medicines that are not held as stock on the ward, ensuring that the prescribed usage is 
both safe and appropriate for the individual patient.  This risk management activity is 
similar to that which occurs in the dispensary, but has greater depth due to the 
increased access to data, including patients’ notes, care plans and test results. 
 
In addition, pharmacists can talk to patients and healthcare staff and oversee the best 
use of medicines. This activity includes detecting errors in prescribing and 
administration and ensuring that the most appropriate medicinal products are 
supplied. The junior doctors are in training and may be unaware of the choice of 
formulations available. For example the pharmacist may recommend and supply a 
liquid or dispersible formulation for those who have difficulty swallowing or are fed 
through a naso-gastric tube. This is part of optimising patient care and minimising 
risk.  
 
There is an initial superficial screening of prescription charts on the ward. Where 
prescription inconsistencies alert the pharmacist to complex or anomalous use of 
medicines in a particular patient this triggers a detailed clinical usage review (CUR).  
 
A CUR is where the pharmacist investigates more closely the clinical use of 
medicines in a patient and makes recommendations. This might include changing the 
chosen individual agent to another within the same therapeutic group. A medicines 
use review (MUR), as seen in community pharmacy practice, is conducted where 
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compliance might be a problem. For many patients the screening takes a few minutes, 
but a detailed review could take 20 minutes, or longer 
 
Clinical pharmacy covers a wide range of medical specialities that use different 
medicines with different monitoring requirements and so for example, the role of the 
pharmacist in oncology is different from that in critical care. Clinical pharmacists 
ensure that medicines are used safely and effectively. This contributes to the 
collective management of medicines in a hospital. Whilst cost effectiveness is a 
priority for the pharmacy, the clinical pharmacist’s primary goal is the management of 
risks in the use of medicines.  
 
There are a number of common functions; some are specific for a group of patients 
and some are triggered by individual drugs. Whilst the pharmacy department ensures 
that clinical pharmacists are trained to fulfil their risk management roles, there is no 
collective consciousness about what pharmacists do in daily practice.  
 
2.1.5 Surveys of pharmacist activity at SUHT 
This thesis is about understanding errors that occur in the use of medicines and how 
pharmacists can prevent them translating into patient harm. 
 
In order to capture and understand this activity, many hospitals conduct an annual 
point prevalence survey to record the interventions that pharmacists make. The data 
describe what pharmacists do and quantify their activities and their outputs. An 
analysis of data from recent surveys at Southampton is an important part of the 
author’s research because the intervention forms record the details of the 
contributions that clinical pharmacists make to patient care. The forms describe the 
practical problems that the pharmacist solves.  
 
The surveys allow the collective analysis of clinical pharmacy activities.  They 
demonstrate the value that pharmacists add to the safe and effective use of medicines. 
Analysis of these surveys categories the risk management role of pharmacists. 
Without this activity the potential for harm would be invisible. These data describe 
the check that pharmacists provide in the medicines use process to filter out errors. 
 
 
76 
More specialised surveys, in which the author was involved during his research and 
which impacted upon it, were conducted on a regional basis. These are described in 
the following section.  
 
2.1.6 LENARD 
The LENARD (local entry, near-miss and adverse event database) studies were 
commissioned by the NPSA (National Patient Safety Agency) and organised by the 
London and Southeast Regional Clinical Pharmacy Team.135  
 
Under the author’s guidance, Southampton participated in the pilot and full studies. 
The LENARD studies were designed to collect data on errors and near-miss events 
detected or prevented by pharmacists, where the likely consequence would have been 
moderate, major or catastrophic; NPSA definitions of these terms are given in Table 
2.1. 
 
Table 2.1 NPSA definitions with consequences of errors 
 
Catastrophic 
 
Death 
Permanent harm (loss of function) or semi-
permanent, lasting greater that 1 year. 
Major 
or increasing length of stay (LOS) by more than 
15 days or increasing level of care required by the 
patient of more than 15 days. 
Semi-permanent damage likely to resolve within 
one year. Healthcare associated infections 
resulting in non-permanent harm 
Moderate 
Increased LOS of 8-15 days or increased level of 
care for 8-15 days. 
Non-permanent harm (less than 1 month) 
including healthcare associated infections resulting 
in non-permanent harm. 
Minor 
Increased LOS of up to 7 days or increased level 
of care of up to 7 days. 
None No obvious harm. 
 
 
The pilot study was focussed on all errors to try to identify high risk drugs. Later 
studies focussed on risks with antibiotics and another, on omitted doses. So during the 
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period 2002 to 2004, only specific errors were collected, and not the broader category 
of interventions by pharmacists. 
 
2.2 Methods  
 
2.2.1 Point prevalence activity studies 
Point prevalence studies were useful because they showed the workload of the 
pharmacy department in screening hospital medicine charts for anomalies and errors. 
They also provided some useful denominators for ratios of prevalence of interventions 
made or prescribing errors detected by the pharmacy team. 
 
The data collection form (see Appendix 1) was designed by the author to capture the 
number of patients seen on each ward. Patient names were recorded to avoid double 
counting, but at the end of the week-long study, only the number of patients was 
recorded. The forms also provided space to tally the number of newly prescribed 
items for each patient, the number of interventions made and the number of 
annotations added to the prescription chart. The forms were collected at the end of the 
week and data for each ward were counted, then entered into an Excel spreadsheet. 
Figures for each ward in a care group were added together and then summarised in 
tables. 
 
Data in these surveys were captured over one week periods from 1990 to 2009. These 
were usually organised to coincide with an intervention survey (see Chapter 3). The 
activity study was designed to gather data on how many patients were encountered 
and the number of newly prescribed items that were reviewed. This could then be 
compared to the number of interventions in that week. 
 
Data for 2002-4 are unavailable because of participation in a separate project called 
LENARD (see Section 2.1.6). When the LENARD project was completed, it was 
decided to return to the previous activity study methodology. For 2005 a particularly 
detailed study was conducted to look at all the parameters that could feasibly be 
collected (see Section 2.3.2). 
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2.2.2 Drug History 
A drug history in this context was an interview with a patient and comparison of that 
history with PODs, recorded on the back of the hospital inpatient prescription. The 
drug history was then compared to what was prescribed on the first hospital inpatient 
prescription and the number of items reconciled was recorded. It may also have 
included comparison with a GP repeat prescription printout. Where there was doubt 
about the completeness or clarity of the data, the GP surgery was telephoned to 
confirm this data.  
 
2.2.3 Items Supplied 
Items supplied were those that were requested by the clinical pharmacist; this 
excluded the normal stock drugs. The supply was requested by the pharmacist either 
because no PODs were available or new medicines had been initiated. Complex forms 
of supply are described in the following sections. 
 
2.2.4 Monitored dosage systems 
Monitored dosage systems (MDS) contained medication in a tray divided into 
sections for each day of the week and mealtimes throughout each day. Tablets were 
then dispensed into each section of the tray every week to aid compliance. Patients 
who had difficulty remembering when to take different medicines were identified by 
the nursing staff. The pharmacist visiting the ward was notified and they subsequently 
talked to the patient to verify the need for an MDS, to check that the patient 
understood how to use the MDS and to identify their usual community pharmacist. 
The community pharmacist was contacted and the device was discussed. If the 
community pharmacy was willing to supply, then the hospital pharmacy dispensed the 
discharge medication in an appropriate device. In the study period, community 
pharmacists were not remunerated for the additional work involved in filling these 
devices and many were reluctant to undertake this. If the community pharmacist was 
unwilling to continue filling the MDS there was no point in the hospital supplying a 
device. These arrangements often required multiple phone calls prior to discharge. 
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2.2.5 Drugs requiring special monitoring 
Monitoring was undertaken where use of a medicine required checking of various 
biochemical parameters. For example a potassium supplement such as Slow K 
prompted the pharmacist to check that the patient had recently had a blood sample 
analysed for potassium content. The pharmacist accessed the pathology computer to 
see if this had been done and whether the result was now normal. Similarly, a digoxin 
prescription prompted a check of serum creatinine and potassium. Rifampicin 
prompted a weekly check of alkaline phosphatase (ALP) and alanine transaminase 
(ALT) and international normalised ratio (INR). This is different from therapeutic 
drug level monitoring (see Section 2.4.3.3). 
 
2.2.6 Advanced Dispensing of Discharge Medication (ADDM) 
ADDM was where the pharmacist felt able to predict the majority (or all) of the 
discharge prescription. This was easiest on a surgical ward where the patient often 
went home on the same drugs as on admission, plus antibiotics and analgesics. The 
pharmacist wrote out the discharge medication on the TTO (to take out – discharge) 
form and arranged dispensing a day or two in advance. On the day of discharge the 
doctor added the analgesics and antibiotics as appropriate and signed the TTO 
prescription. If the analgesics and antibiotics were pre-packed on the ward, the 
pharmacist could approve release and the patient could go home immediately. If this 
was not possible the TTO and dispensed items were returned to the pharmacy for final 
amendment and additions. Although this process usually resulted in a faster discharge, 
each ADDM was additional work and responsibility for the pharmacist.  
 
2.2.7 Therapeutic substitution 
 Therapeutic substitution was a hospital policy approved by the SUHT Drug and 
Therapeutics Committee. It was constructed from interventions made repeatedly by 
pharmacists that were always implemented by the doctor; for example changing times 
of administration of magnesium hydroxide, on a chart with digoxin, so they were 
separated by at least 2 hours. This avoided reducing the absorption of digoxin by up to 
80%. 
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 2.2.8 Review of patient care 
During an activity study, when a pharmacist visited the ward they recorded the name 
(or initials) of every patient whose charts they reviewed. When two pharmacists 
covered one ward they were encouraged to use the same activity sheet. However this 
was not always possible; in which case, the pharmacist recorded the names of all the 
patients whose charts they reviewed and before analysis, patient identifiers were 
matched carefully to avoid duplicates. 
 
2.2.9 Identification of newly prescribed items 
On opening the drug chart on a Monday morning, the pharmacist counted every item 
prescribed (even if they were seen in the previous week) and this figure was recorded 
on the activity monitoring sheet next to the patient’s name. On Tuesday they recorded 
only those items that had been added since the chart was seen on Monday morning 
and so on, throughout the week, including weekends if the patient was seen. This 
produced a substantial workload on the Monday but diminished as the week 
progressed. If a chart was rewritten, all the re-prescribed items were recounted as the 
pharmacist had to check that no transcription errors had occurred. A second 
pharmacist may have visited the same ward the next day due to job sharing, sickness, 
absence or to cover for the first pharmacist where their skills were needed elsewhere. 
Whilst every effort was made to maintain consistency, staff shortage and sickness 
were a random confounding factor. Ideally one pharmacist visited the same ward 
throughout the week, providing an accurate reflection of the number of patients whose 
charts had been reviewed and an accurate count of the total number of items that had 
been screened.  
 
2.2.10 Pharmacist screening activity 
The activity count covered all the pharmacists who were employed by the pharmacy 
departments of SUHT, who covered approximately 1330 beds. This included 
Southampton General Hospital (about 1000 beds), and Princess Anne Hospital (200 
beds), Royal South Hants hospital (130 beds).  
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 The bed count remained fairly stable with small fluctuations over the study period. 
However a bigger variable was the number of charts the pharmacist screened on the 
wards. Each pharmacist visited between one and three wards. Pharmacists who 
worked in the main department were allocated 60-90 minutes for ward work, visiting 
one ward of less than 30 beds. Those pharmacists on permanent, or rotational, clinical 
duties spent from 100 to 300 minutes on wards covering two or three ward areas. Bed 
numbers varied from 15 to 100 depending on the level of complexity and specialism. 
The remainder of their allocated time was spent at meetings, developing clinical 
guidelines, auditing practice, teaching and learning programmes. 
 
2.2.11 POD technicians (PODtechs) 
Pharmacy technicians also visited the clinical areas to check that prescriptions 
matched the PODs that patients brought into hospital. Any anomalies were discussed 
with the patient, carers or relatives and if unresolved, were reported to the pharmacist 
for action. The pharmacist may have chosen to contact the GP or electronically access 
the patient’s medication record or repeat slip before discussing it with the junior 
doctors. 
2.3 Results 
 
2.3.1 Results of activity point prevalence studies 
Results for activity surveys in early and more recent years are shown in Tables 2.2 
and 2.3 respectively. Surveys were for single weeks in each year are reported. The 
weeks were chosen a few months in advance when the staff absence for holidays was 
minimal. They therefore varied from year to year. Results are displayed as bar charts 
in Figures 2.1 and 2.2 respectively. 
  
The patient/item/intervention data were split into two parts: early years (1990-2001) 
and post- 2000 (2001-2009). This was to demonstrate possible changes over long 
periods of time. 
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Data from 2001 have been included in both tables to show the trend from before and 
after 2002-4 where there is a data gap due to the LENARD studies (as explained in 
Section 2.1.6)  
 
Table 2.2 Clinical pharmacists’ activity survey data for 1990-2001 
 
Month & Year May1990 Jan1992 Feb1993 Nov1999 May2001
Patients 210 634 327 1137 1000 
New items 1505 4294 2056 8799 8000 
Interventions 36 96 66 613 603 
New Items per patient 7.2 6.8 6.3 7.7 8 
Patients per 
Intervention 
5.8 6.6 5.0 1.9 1.7 
Interventions per    
100 patients 
17.1 15.1 20.2 53.9 60.3 
Items per Intervention 41.8 44.7 31.2 14.4 13.3 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2 Trends in activity data for 1990-2001 
(Interventions are divided by four to enable the histogram to be plotted on the same Y 
axis scale).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.3 Clinical pharmacists’ activity survey data for 2001-2009 
 
Month & Year May2001 Jun2005 May2006 Jun2007 Jun2008 Jun2009
Patients 1000 1414 1137 2004 1361 735 
New items 8000 12779 8799 17955 8668 6142 
Interventions 603 1197 910 912 1058 777 
New items per 
patient 
8 9.0 7.7 9.0 6.4 8.4 
Patients per 
Interventions 
1.7 1.2 1.2 2.2 1.3 0.9 
Interventions per 
100 patients 
60.3 84.7 80.0 45.5 77.7 105.7 
Items per 
Intervention 
13.3 10.7 9.7 19.7 8.2 7.9 
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Figure 2.3 Trends in activity data for 2001-2009 
(multipliers are different from those used in Figure 2.2 to enable the features of the  
histogram to be plotted on the same scale) 
 
2.3.2 Detailed data from 2005 
In 2005, additional activity data were recorded during the 7 days of study. This was 
not captured in other years but is presented in Table 2.4, to illustrate the depth and 
scope that could be captured and to give more detail of pharmacy activities.  
 
 
 
Table 2.4 Detailed activity data from 2005 
 
Number Activity 
1941 Drug history items 
77 Phone calls to GPs 
  
1268 Items supplied 
6 Monitored dosage systems (MDSs) 
  
3691 Annotations 
4579 Monitored items 
20 TDM advice 
1197 Interventions 
  
3027 Discharge items screened 
272 patients counselled on their medicines 
117 advanced dispensing of discharge medicines (ADDM) 
  
61 TPN bags prescribed 
67 therapeutic substitutions 
 
 
2.4 Discussion 
Table 2.2 summarises data for the years 1990, 1992, 1993, 1999 and 2001. These 
years were chosen because complete data were available and they demonstrate a trend 
from the early part of the 1990s up to and including 2001. Intervention data were 
available for other years but data on all activities were not collected. Table 2.3 
summarises the years 2001, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008 and 2009. These years were 
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chosen because complete data were available and they demonstrate a trend from 2001 
(before LENARD) and after the data gap (2005-9). The data were split into two to 
illustrate the underlying trend and the magnitude of the changes. Data for 2001 is 
repeated to provide a reference point for the two tables. Table 2.2 shows how ward 
cover and reporting of clinical pharmacy activity increased during the early years of 
the study. The later years, shown in Table 2.3 reflect a period of stable ward 
pharmacy cover. 
2.4.1 Early years data 
It can be seen that in the early 1990s, pharmacists at Southampton were only 
reviewing between 200 and 600 patients whereas from 1999 onwards, the number 
regularly exceeded 1,000. The number of items screened increased from 1500-4000 to 
approximately 8000. This was a period of rapid expansion of the clinical pharmacy 
service and a change from ‘supply outside the dispensary’ to a more clinical focus of 
activity. It was a time when the SUHT pharmacy department started to understand and 
focus on risk in drug usage rather than risk in supply. 
 
In the 1980s, the role of pharmacists on the wards was focussed on an efficient supply 
process and compliance with the hospital formulary. Interventions were largely 
limited to ensuring prescriptions were complete to enable accurate dispensing.  
 
So these early data reflect both growth of service as well as transformation of 
interventions into those directed at reducing clinical risk. 
 
The number of interventions increased from less than 100 (36-96) to over 600 from 
1999 onwards. So pharmacists were making more interventions and the increase was 
greater than the increases in the number of patients or items. It was a time of rapid 
development of knowledge of drug usage and application of pharmaceutical 
experience. 
 
The number of new items per patient remained relatively stable over the period of the 
study, but the number of patients per intervention showed a downward trend. The 
number of items screened for each intervention also fell from 30-45 to 13-14. This re-
enforces the concept of more interventions being made for each prescribed item. 
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 Anecdotally, in the 1990s, interventions became more clinical during the inpatient 
phase.  Emphasis was also placed on facilitating patient discharge. Medicines 
reconciliation as a concept did not exist at that time. However in the author’s opinion, 
around the year 2000, awareness was developing that the admission phase (where the 
pharmacy department had no presence) was not as risk-free as pharmacists had 
previously assumed. This was where the idea for the research in Chapter 4 started to 
emerge. 
2.4.2 Post-2000 data 
 During the second study period, there was a wide variation in the number of patients 
seen from 735 to 2004. Most of the data were between 1000 and 1414, with data from 
2007 and 2009 as outliers. This was because these studies relied on all the clinical 
pharmacy teams contributing data over the same week. However due to staff vacant 
posts and sickness, some teams were unable to submit complete data. This is 
noticeable in 2009; if this year is excluded there is a trend from 1999/2001 of 600 
interventions increasing to over 1000 in 2005-2008. 
  
The 2007 data appear anomalous in terms of the numbers of patients and items. The 
data were obtained from a number of report sheets. It appears that there may have 
been a small amount of double counting of the contributions of POD technicians and 
pharmacists although every effort was made to avoid this. The number of 
interventions was obtained by counting the individual report forms and appears 
consistent with the historical trend. 
 
With the exception of 2007, the number of items per intervention moved from the low 
teens (13-14) to below 10 and patients per intervention from about 1.8 downwards.  
Again the rate of interventions increased faster than the rate of increase in items or 
patient numbers. In the author’s opinion, these data reflect an increased confidence in 
the position of pharmacists within the clinical team and a move into a more proactive 
role. The 2005-9 data show a trend towards, on average, intervening on almost every 
patient. In practice this comprised an uneven distribution, with some patients 
receiving multiple interventions, whilst others required none. 
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If it were possible, in advance, to eliminate the patients who do not need a 
pharmacist’s intervention, then the whole process could be made more efficient.  
 
Over the entire reporting period (1999-2009) the average number of items per 
intervention was 11.5. Between 2006 and 2009 there was an average of 11.3 items per 
intervention with 2007 being the largest deviation. This suggests that the average rate 
of intervention remained stable and was not increasing. The total number of 
interventions only increased because the number of patients seen was also rising.  
 
The Labour Government proposed a 4 hour waiting target for A&E departments in 
2001. This prompted a number of innovative ways of processing patients, including 
early referral from the emergency department to a medical assessment unit. One 
strategy at SUHT was to create a holding area after initial resuscitation and clerking, 
now called the medical assessment unit (MAU), where it was possible for pharmacists 
to intervene early on in the patient’s admission. Pharmacists did not routinely visit 
A&E, but in 2007 extra funding was awarded for a pharmacy team to work in the new 
acute medical assessment unit; this contributed to the trend in increasing the total 
number of interventions seen from this time onwards. Previously pharmacists simply 
wrote that they intervened wherever the drug history did not match the inpatient chart, 
but gave no further details. From 2007, pharmacists were encouraged to report each 
item that could not be reconciled between drug history and inpatient chart. This is 
likely to have increased the number of interventions made on admission to hospital. 
 
2.4.3 2005 detailed data 
In 2005, a greater depth of activity analysis was undertaken. Drug histories were 
taken by pharmacists and POD technicians. To improve reliability of the 
reconciliation the pharmacy staff tried to obtain two data sources that correlated, one 
of which was GP surgeries.  
 
During the hospital episode the clinical pharmacists ordered 1,268 non-stock items 
from the dispensary. This is similar to the number of interventions (1,197) made for 
the same cohort of patients. This shows that the supply function was still a significant 
component of the pharmacist’s role. 
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 Several other aspects of the data in Table 2.4 are worthy of further comment. 
 
2.4.3.1 Monitored dose systems (MDSs) 
The supply of an MDS is a significant undertaking. It involves considerable 
negotiation by the clinical pharmacist, preparation time in the dispensary and ongoing 
workload in the community pharmacy. The pharmacy staff were reluctant to supply 
medicines in an MDS and this was why only six were provided. 
2.4.3.2 Annotations 
Annotations were added to drug charts to clarify what the doctors had written, such as 
correctly spelling drug names; or provided information, such as cautions with 
handling, to facilitate nurse administration. Annotations included the addition of 
generic names where brand names were prescribed; this facilitated generic 
substitution. Annotations also added missing data, such as timing or strength of 
products, to make them complete. There were 3691 annotations made to drug charts; 
this is more than the number of interventions (1197), more than the number of items 
supplied (1268) and an average of 2.6 (3691/1414) per patient. This activity was 
frequent but did it add value?  This activity involved no active communication to 
patients and healthcare staff. Annotations were considered to improve the efficiency 
of dispensing or administering the medicine. An annotation should reduce the risk of 
miss-interpreting a prescription, but there is no evidence that it does this. A study 
could be conducted to identify the justification of every annotation made. However 
determining what happens if they are not made would be more difficult. 
 
Electronic prescribing might be expected to eliminate the need for annotations 
because prescriptions would then be typed in a standard format and contain all the 
relevant details. For example an annotation on an IV antibiotic may describe the 
recommended administration details (e.g. 100ml dextrose 5% over one hour). This is 
a significant activity that should be evaluated prior to implementing an electronic 
prescribing system. 
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 2.4.3.3 Drugs requiring special monitoring 
During the inpatient stay, 4579 items were monitored; see Section 2.2.5 for 
explanation. This was where the pharmacist checked the pathology computer for 
results such as changes in serum creatinine when ACE inhibitors were started. Some 
of this activity led to interventions if the data alerted the pharmacist to potential 
problems. For example when ramipril was started and the renal function deteriorated 
the pharmacist discussed the treatment with the doctor and it was changed to 
bisoprolol (a beta-blocker). This was perceived as a significant contribution to 
reducing risk, but it was not clear how many times this monitoring activity detected 
errors or produced an intervention. It can be seen that interventions in total 
represented only 26.1% (1197/4579) of all monitoring events and interventions were 
also made independent of monitoring. It should be possible to run a study to 
determine the conversion rate of monitoring into interventions to gain an impression 
of the impact that monitoring actually has on patient care. 
 
2.4.3.4 Therapeutic drug level monitoring (TDM) 
Drug level monitoring activities are different from the monitoring described in 
Section 2.4.3.3. Routine monitoring looks at the electrolyte, enzymatic or biochemical 
effects of the drugs that were prescribed. TDM relates to the determination of the 
concentration of the drug itself in the blood. The pharmacists requested that the drug 
plasma level be measured for a particular drug, advised on when exactly a blood 
sample should be taken, expedited the assay when drug clearance was changing 
rapidly; or when the results were available, made a plan for changing the dose or 
frequency. Sometimes the pharmacist calculated the pharmacokinetic parameters of a 
drug in a particular patient where problems were anticipated. There were only 20 of 
these events during the one week of study. This reflects the relatively low frequency 
of prescribing of these drugs. However when these drugs are prescribed, there is often 
a series of interventions in an individual patient, to ensure the drug is maintained at a 
safe, non-toxic but efficacious concentration in the blood.  An example was managing 
gentamicin dosing in a patient with endocarditis. Optimal drug management in this 
scenario was crucial to survival or the successful outcome from a cardiac operation. 
So whilst this was a time consuming activity that occurred infrequently, it was one of 
the most important contributions to patient care made by clinical pharmacists  
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 2.4.3.5 Prescriptions for discharge from hospital (TTOs) 
When the patient was ready to return home the doctor prescribed a discharge 
prescription, or TTO (‘to take out’). Pharmacists screened 3027 items on the ward to 
facilitate speed of dispensing discharge medicines. This was a very significant 
workload for the clinical pharmacists. It was undertaken to reduce delays in the 
dispensary. Sometimes it was possible to completely avoid the TTO going to 
pharmacy.  Packs of antibiotics and analgesics were prepared in advance and stored 
on the ward. Many surgical patients only required the return of their PODS and the 
addition of antibiotics or analgesics. The ward screening and dispensing therefore 
facilitated a faster discharge process for the patient. 
 
2.4.3.6 Advanced dispensing of discharge medicines (ADDM) 
scheme 
Sometimes discharge prescriptions must go to pharmacy because new items have 
been added or changes made to existing medication. Wherever possible this was done 
under the ADDM scheme and there were 117 patients who benefitted from this. This 
is a much smaller number of events than ward screening because it relied on the 
ability of the pharmacist to predict confidently what would be needed. Clearly this 
was not possible on many occasions. 
 
2.4.3.7 Patient counselling 
Some patients required more detailed counselling about their medicines prior to 
discharge (similar to an MUR in community pharmacy). This was undertaken for 272 
patients in the week of study. Each counselling session took up to 20 minutes to 
complete; so this represented another important workload for the pharmacist. 
However educating patients is an important contribution to patient care and should 
also reduce the risk of readmission. However it is one of the first tasks to be cut when 
there is a shortage of pharmacists. 
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2.4.3.8 Pharmacist prescribing of parenteral nutrition (TPN) 
Pharmacists have traditionally advised on the formulation of parenteral nutrition. By 
the year 2000, pharmacists were drafting the parenteral nutrition which the doctor 
then signed. As soon as pharmacist prescribing became legal, three pharmacists 
trained as prescribers and after qualification and registration, started to prescribe TPN. 
This is now an embedded activity and one year after registering as supplementary 
prescribers, 61 TPN bags were prescribed in one week by pharmacists. In Critical 
Care areas, pharmacists prescribed all TPN after 2008. In other parts of the hospital 
half the bags were prescribed by pharmacists. This remains an important service to 
patients and a demonstrable contribution by pharmacists to front-line care. It also 
reflects a complete conversion from trainees to prescriber practitioners.  
2.4.3.9 Therapeutic substitution (TS) 
There were 67 therapeutic substitutions (see Section 2.2.7 for more details). This was 
where a protocol empowered the pharmacists to make changes directly for subsequent 
signature by a doctor. It was undertaken as an efficient use of time and to facilitate 
early correction of errors to prevent patient harm. Examples included directing that a 
statin should have been administered in the evening to optimise its effectiveness. It 
was a prelude to pharmacist prescribing. As more pharmacist become prescribers this 
activity is expected to diminish. 
 
TSs were a hybrid form of activity between an intervention and prescribing. The 
number of TSs illustrated a level of confidence of the pharmacist to act (change the 
prescription) and a recognition by senior doctors, that this was a change that should be 
made. In contrast to ‘interventions’ which involved the discussion of an anomaly 
between pharmacist and doctor, where the pharmacist sought to verify that they had 
understood the clinical context correctly, whilst educating the prescriber about the 
optimal or safest use or prescribing of medicine, TS was where the pharmacists 
accepted responsibility for the clinical context and required no further clarification 
from the prescriber.  
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2.4.3.10 Overall observations 
The 2005 data show the wide range of activities undertaken by pharmacists on the 
wards. It captures four new ways of working – prescribing TPN, managing TDM, TS, 
and ADDM. 
 
Pharmacists have historically advised on the need for TDM. There have been many 
interventions concerned with incorrect sampling times and poor interpretation of the 
results.  
 
The evolution of clinical pharmacy and arrival of pharmacist prescribers has enabled 
the pharmacist to lead and manage therapeutic drug monitoring on the wards they 
visit. The author is an independent pharmacist prescriber and during the course of this 
PhD, has moved from drafting TPN prescriptions to prescribing it. Furthermore, 
advising on TDM has changed into prescribing and adjusting doses for drugs 
requiring TDM. This has increased the pharmacist’s contribution and made this 
professional support more visible in the patient records. This is important because 
apart from intervention and activity studies the pharmacist contribution is largely 
invisible in the patient records. 
 
ADDM and TS were innovative practices designed to improve efficient use of staff 
time and reduce risks to patients from errors. Medication use systems in hospital are 
constantly evolving to design out errors and improve patient safety 
 
Chapter 3 looks in more detail at the interventions that pharmacists made in the drug 
use process. 
 
2.4.4 Study limitations 
The activity surveys reported in this chapter relied on all the clinical pharmacy teams 
contributing data over the same week. However due to staff vacant posts and sickness, 
some teams were unable to submit complete data or covering pharmacists may have 
been less diligent in their reporting. Variable reporting rates were an important but 
unavoidable feature. 
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 2.4.5 Suggestions for future work 
A study could be done to identify the justification of every annotation made. 
However, determining what happens if they are not made would be more difficult. 
 
It should be possible to run a study to determine the conversion rate of pharmacists’ 
monitoring activities into interventions having a real impact on clinical outcome. 
2.5 Conclusions 
Clinical pharmacy is a collective term for a number of activities enumerated in the 
research: obtaining medication histories and reconciliation with inpatient 
prescriptions, ordering medicines, supplying monitored dosage systems, monitoring 
the effects of medicines, contributing to management of therapeutic blood level 
measurement, facilitating the dispensing of discharge medicines, therapeutic 
substitution, and reviewing prescribed  medication. These are undertaken to ensure 
continuity of supply of medicines, and education of healthcare staff and patients, as 
well as playing an important role in the managing of risks with medicines. An 
intervention in the drug usage process is made when the pharmacist detects an 
anomaly in the data or where an error has occurred. As shown here, the quantification 
of these different functions can be determined by conducting periodic surveys. The 
key conclusions drawn from this section of the research are as follows: 
 
• The clinical activity of pharmacists at Southampton increased in range and 
load. This is illustrated by the data on interventions. The number of 
interventions increased from less than 100 (36-96) in the early 1990s to over 
600 from 1999 onwards. So pharmacists were making more interventions and 
the increase was greater than the increases in the number of patients or items. 
 
•  The number of new items per patient remained relatively stable over the 
period of the study, but the number of patients per intervention showed a 
downward trend. 
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•  The number of items screened for each intervention also fell from 30-45 to 
13-14. This re-enforces the concept of more interventions being made for each 
prescribed item. 
 
•  With the exception of 2007, the average number of items per intervention 
moved from the low teens (13-14) to below 10 and patients per intervention 
from about 1.8 to 1.2. Again the rate of interventions increased faster than the 
rate of increase in items or patient numbers. 
 
• Over the period of the study, the contribution of the pharmacist increased in 
clinical areas, but not at the expense of traditional medicines supply. 
 
Key finding 
 
At Southampton clinical pharmacy activities have dramatically increased to now 
include an average of over 1000 interventions each week, for the 8000 medicines used 
in over 1000 patients. These clinical activities represent not only a large workload for 
pharmacy but a considerable contribution to patient care. Preventing and trapping 
errors that occur in the use of medicines is the main purpose of clinical pharmacy 
activities. This is in addition to supplying over 1000 non-stock medicines 
 
This chapter has discussed the range of clinical pharmacy activities undertaken with 
some quantification. The number of patients, newly prescribed items and 
interventions has been compared in ratios from 1990 to 2009. The next chapter will 
look in more detail at the interventions made. 
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Chapter 3 - Intervention studies 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Chapter 2 described and quantified the range of activities undertaken by clinical 
pharmacists. In this chapter the interventions made are reported in more detail. 
 
The senior pharmacists in the SUHT pharmacy department trained the junior 
pharmacists on the activities to be undertaken in clinical areas (wards). The 
pharmacists recorded the interventions that they made. The annual survey on clinical 
pharmacy activities was accompanied by an intervention survey. These data describe 
what pharmacists did, i.e. their outputs, and are analysed in this chapter.  
 
Intervention surveys have been conducted in Southampton since 1979. Initially these 
were monthly but now annually, or in some years, twice a year. In the author’s 
opinion, monthly monitoring produced a diminishing number of intervention reports. 
This was based on the monthly reporting undertaken in the 1980s that showed a 
downward trend each month and was substantiated by feedback from participants. 
The motivation for pharmacists to participate was not sustainable as it became a 
significant workload and distracted from completing normal functions. Significant 
underreporting devalued the perception of the work undertaken. Undertaking this task 
every six or twelve months appreciably increased the number and clarity of the 
reports submitted.  
 
Recording the individual contributions that pharmacists made to patient care was one 
of the ways of measuring clinical pharmacy activity. These were written in the 
pharmacist’s own words on intervention forms. The intervention forms were sorted 
into categories so they could be collated, quantified and summarised in surveys. 
Reports of these surveys were then compared. This chapter describes the conduct and 
analysis of intervention surveys conducted over 10 years, 1999-2009. The reports 
have been coded, summarised and analysed for trends. The analysis reveals what 
pharmacists did; it describes their risk management role and their educational 
function. 
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Each year a clinical pharmacy intervention report was completed. This quantified the 
work undertaken, tabulated the results and presented them graphically for feedback to 
staff who had collected the data. Preceding each study the previous year’s results were 
reported again and the structure and conduct of the project was explained to all new 
staff.  
 
3.1.1 Justification of intervention surveys 
Conducting an intervention survey involved considerable organisation and workload. 
It required all pharmacists, and PODtechs (see Section 2.2.11), to commit time to 
complete the forms and contribute to the project. This was only worthwhile if the 
collated data produced a useful output. Table 3.1 gives the justification for the effort 
required. 
 
Table 3.1 Justification for undertaking intervention surveys 
 
To provide quantitative and qualitative descriptions of the contribution of the 
pharmacist to patient care. 
To provide quantitative and qualitative description of the contribution of the 
pharmacist to cost savings. 
To provide a record of an intervention as evidence in case of complaint or legal 
action. 
To enable the workload of pharmacists to be analysed. 
To demonstrate what would be lost if vacant posts were unfilled. 
To provide a source of educational data, that junior pharmacists could read to learn 
what their colleagues did when working on the wards. 
 
Clinical activities were undertaken in the dispensary and by technicians who visited 
wards to validate patients’ own drugs (PODs). Patients were asked to bring in the 
medicines that they normally consumed at home and technicians (PODtechs) checked 
the PODs to ensure that they were fit for use in the hospital (i.e. that they were of 
suitable quality and had not expired). The details were recorded on the back of the 
prescription and compared with what was written on the hospital chart. If there were 
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inconsistencies, PODtechs obtained a printout/fax of what the patient’s general 
practitioner had prescribed for the patient. Anomalies between these three pieces of 
data were communicated to the pharmacist who decided on a course of action. This 
may have involved discussion with the patient. This was called medicines 
reconciliation.  
 
Where PODtech triangulation of data revealed inconsistencies, these were recorded 
on the intervention forms and coded separately.  Interventions made by the dispensary 
staff were also given separate codes but included in the analysis of the intervention 
survey. 
  
3.2 Method 
 
3.2.1 Study setting 
All pharmacists who visited wards at Southampton took part in the annual 
intervention study. All pharmacists were briefed on the process in the week before the 
survey. This was to ensure all pharmacists, especially those new to the department, 
were familiar with what was expected from them and how the data would be gathered 
and processed. A5 forms were supplied for pharmacists to record their interventions 
and interventions made over a seven day period were recorded.  
A sample form is included in Appendix 2. 
 
During a survey period of one week, the clinical pharmacists were asked to record 
their identity, that of the patient and the ward they were working on. This was in order 
to clarify any ambiguity and ensure the coding was a true reflection of what 
happened. The clinical pharmacists were asked to write in their own words what 
happened, what they did and the outcome. The forms were placed in boxes positioned 
around the department. These boxes were emptied every three to four days during the 
week of study and the following week, by a junior pharmacist allocated to the survey. 
On the Thursday after the study week a reminder notice was posted in the department 
news briefing.  
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3.2.2 Data collection 
Two junior pharmacists (AFC pay band 6) were specifically briefed by the author on 
how to organise the study and their role. The role of these juniors was to motivate 
their colleagues to participate, explain or resolve queries, promote the process and 
collect the forms. The forms were then sorted into wards and directorates. If there 
were no forms from a particular ward, the juniors asked the relevant pharmacist for an 
explanation. This often prompted the appearance of the forms for that ward. It also 
identified absent staff, where wards were covered by others or those who had 
particular time pressures.  
 
The junior pharmacists were taught the coding system and undertook a preliminary 
sorting and coding of all the forms. The juniors then drafted an annual report that built 
on the work from the previous survey. An analysis of interventions was provided to 
the directorate in an annual report of clinical pharmacy activity. The author read and 
approved the final report before it was issued. This process was organised by the 
author who supervised the data collection and checked that coding of the forms was 
consistent within and between surveys. 
 
The annual intervention study also contained learning points in the conduct of the 
study that were used to improve subsequent studies. This meant that in practice the 
survey forms changed slightly over the 10 years of the study; the data in this chapter 
were coded, analysed and presented in standard form using the 2006 format (shown in 
Appendix 2). 
 
While the pharmacy at SUHT had been running intervention studies since 1979, the 
author was personally responsible for their conduct since 1989. Over this period the 
coding and questions asked were gradually refined and the amount of data collected 
increased. Within the study period from 1999 to 2006 the form had no substantive 
changes. The content of the different categories was clarified to ensure consistent 
coding, but not changed.  However in early 2007, a revision was made, after 
brainstorming between the author and senior pharmacy staff. This revision followed 
discussions with the associate dean and lead trust clinical tutor to capture data that 
would enable analysis of prescribing errors as part of a grant application. The data 
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categories remained consistent apart from a further subdivision of interface categories 
in 2007. Before 2007, inpatient (IP) drug omission was grouped with IP/TTO 
discrepancy to capture interface errors. In 2007, IP/TTO discrepancy was separated to 
identify errors of transcription. A new category ‘TTO error’ was introduced to 
identify non-transcription errors on the discharge prescription; for example: poor 
identification of the length of an antibiotic course. IP drug omission was captured 
within a new category called ‘first prescription error’. This refers to errors on the first 
inpatient chart written; it includes not only omitted drugs but also errors of detail such 
as dose and frequency.  
 
During and after 2007 there was therefore greater clarity about errors that occurred at 
the interface of primary and secondary care. The 2006 format was chosen for data 
analysis because most of the data were already in this format and it enabled consistent 
analysis of trends. The 2007-9 original forms were re-coded to enable a complete 
analysis. 
 
The intervention report form (see Appendix 2) had five main sections shown in Table 
3.2.  
 
Table 3.2 Main sections of the intervention form 
 
Space to write a description of the intervention. 
Coding of severity or potential consequence for the patient if the intervention had not 
been made. 
Categorising and subdividing the type of intervention made. 
Sorting the intervention into whether it was undertaken for financial impact or not, 
and if financial, what sort of contribution (e.g. reducing costs, formulary 
compliance). 
Sorting the outcome into positive, neutral or negative in terms of whether it was 
accepted by doctor or nurse and subsequent action undertaken in response to the 
intervention 
 
 
3.2.3 Data coding 
The intervention forms were coded in four sections:  
 
1 – Severity or potential consequence for the patient (code number 1-6) 
2 - Type of intervention (code number 7-19) 
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3 - Financial impact or motivation (code number 20-23) 
4 - Acceptance of output by doctor or nurse (code number 24-28) 
 
Each intervention could then be described by these four code numbers. The codes 
used for these four elements are described in the following sections. This coding 
formed the basis for analysis of the results. 
 
3.2.3.1 Coding for severity or potential consequences 
The intervention form was coded for severity of consequence to the patient if the 
pharmacist had not intervened. These consequences were classified using a severity 
scoring system published by an American assistant professor called Hind Hatoum and 
colleagues. 30 who conducted an economic evaluation of 1027 pharmacist 
interventions from 1985.  Twenty-five pharmacists, 12.5 whole time equivalents 
(WTE), submitted their best two interventions each day over a total of five weeks 
from a 530 bed tertiary teaching hospital in Chicago USA. They used an intervention 
ranking that scored 1 to 6:  
 
1.  Adverse significance: recommendation may lead to adverse outcome. 
2. No significance: informational. 
3. Somewhat significant: benefit of recommendation neutral depending on 
 professional interpretation. 
4.  Significant: recommendations would bring care to a more acceptable and  
 appropriate standard of practice. 
5.  Very significant: recommendation qualified by a potential or existing major 
organ dysfunction. 
6. Extremely significant: information qualified by life and death situation.  
 
The descriptors were adapted into the scoring system that is described in Table 3.3, 
which includes notes on interpretation and some examples taken from the results of 
the author’s research. 
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Interventions with a score in the range 4-6 were called serious interventions. The 
serious interventions were compiled into a report and submitted to the risk 
management department. This was undertaken at the request of the Trust risk manager 
because the severity would justify reporting to the National Patient Safety Agency 
(NPSA). The serious interventions were then analysed for type of intervention.
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Table 3.3 Severity or potential harm scoring based on the work of Hatoum et al.30
 
Score Notes on interpretation Examples 
Score 1  The pharmacist has misread the clinical situation, or is missing clinical details that make their 
intervention irrelevant. To some extent this is reliant on the doctor’s response and potential attitude 
to being challenged. It is a detrimental comment by a pharmacist, arising from incorrect advice or 
advice inappropriate for the particular clinical situation. 
For example ‘This patient has hyponatraemia, do 
you want to give Slow Sodium?’ The doctor 
explains it is an excess of water not a sodium 
deficit. 
Score 2 A straightforward information request either from memory, the BNF, or by referral to the pharmacy 
regional drug information centre (based at SUHT). The provision of data not directly connected to a 
patient or an enquiry before a prescription has been written.  
‘What is the dose of amiloride?’ 
 ‘Is atenolol a beta-blocker?’ 
 ‘How do I spell clopidogrel?’ 
Score 3 A minor or routine intervention made by a pharmacist. It is usually concerned with details and it 
delays or disrupts the drug usage process but has a lower risk to patients. These are the simple human 
error or 'slip-of-the-pen' type of event. A routine error in the quality of prescribing or administration. 
Missing signature or date.  
Theophylline S/R but no brand.  
Diclofenac 75mg BD but S/R not indicated 
Score 4 A major intervention. It is the first in the serious intervention category. It is where the pharmacist has 
contributed significantly to patient care and probably changed and improved what the patient 
receives as part of their healthcare experience Failing to intervene would have produced significant 
harm to the patient but not lethal and not as permanent as 5. 
Patient with proven heparin-induced 
thrombocytopenia syndrome, given heparin. 
Normal antihypertensives or anti-arrhythmics not 
prescribed on admission. 
Score 5 A major accident has been avoided. The prescribed medicine or dose would have significantly 
compromised liver or renal function It includes a limitation of the consequences of an adverse drug 
reaction, or caution in the licence of a medicinal product. Failing to intervene would lead to a sub-
lethal event at the level where the patient might have severely damaged an organ or body system.  
An excessive dose of an aminoglycoside that 
would have destroyed kidney function.  
Score 6 A life has been saved from inappropriate use of a medicine. It is usually where a doctor has 
prescribed a drug that is contra-indicated in a particular patient. This would be anaphylaxis to a drug 
to which the patient is known to be allergic, or an overdose of a toxic agent e.g. cytotoxics.  
Tazocin in a patient with recorded penicillin 
allergy.  
Patient prescribed aminophylline infusion and 
ciprofloxacin. 
Failure to restart narcotic post-op so possible 
aneurysm rupture from pain. 
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3.2.3.2 Coding system for types of Intervention 
 
The intervention was coded from 7 to19. The interpretation of these categories appears in Table 3.4. 
 
Table 3.4 Codings and interpretations for intervention type. 
 
Code/Title Interpretation 
 
 
07 – Documentation 
A prescription is illegible when it is badly written such that the pharmacist (who is familiar with drug 
names) is unable to read it. Doubt over the drug name due to poor handwriting can produce serious 
errors. Use of neat block capitals and generic names is recommended. An ambiguous prescription is 
where a drug name is miss-spelt and/or could be mistaken for a different medicine. Where accurate 
dispensing or administration is not possible because the prescription is not clear or lacks essential 
descriptive details An illegal prescription is usually one where controlled drug details are missing or 
not conforming to regulations. It also covers omission of details such as date, signature, dose, route, 
timing, indication, strength or form to make the prescription legal. This would also be where the 
prescription is for the wrong patient. 
 
 
08 – TTO/IP discrepancy or IP 
drug omission  error. The 
discharge prescription (TTO) does 
not match the inpatient chart (IP). 
(Interface error)  
Identification and management of a discrepancy between what has been prescribed for an inpatient (IP) 
and the proposed medication for discharge.  The pharmacist confirms with the doctor that this is 
intentional or an error. Also where what is prescribed on the first in-patient prescription is not the same 
as the PODs or the details on a repeat slip or letter or a faxed copy from the general practitioner  
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09 – Choice of / need for drug  
This could be where the drug prescribed is not licensed or indicated for the condition being treated (i.e. 
miss-selected therapeutic group). It could be that the drug chosen has an adverse side-effect profile in 
this particular patient or the pharmacist thinks that another agent in the same therapeutic group would 
be superior in some way. Or guidelines might suggest the use of a drug from a different therapeutic 
group. It may be that the symptoms have resolved and the treatment is no longer needed. It could be the 
prescription of a medicine that the patient has never received or does not need. It could be that national 
guidelines recommend a drug that has not been prescribed. 
 
10 - Choice of dose/frequency or 
timing 
Where the dose or frequency does not fit within the normal range for the drug compared with British 
National Formulary or other authoritative reference. It could be outside the normal range used in 
recognised clinical practice. The timing might not match usual practice  
11 – Choice of  form/strength or 
route 
The drug may not be available in the form prescribed or inappropriate for this patient (e.g. slow-
release) or affecting compliance or bioavailability. The strength may be unavailable, impossible or 
inappropriate in this patient. This is not the same as when the strength is omitted, because this would be 
coded under documentation. The route may be inappropriate (e.g. nil by mouth) or unlicensed/unusual 
or not match the drug name. 
12 - Drug Duration Asking about the length of therapy (especially antibiotics) to avoid prolonged or inappropriate courses 
of treatment or whether steroids need to stop. 
13 - Pharmacokinetics/TDM. Where the pharmacist has advised about the kinetics of a particular drug or undertaken a computer 
prediction of expected drug levels. Where pharmacokinetic calculations have been performed or doses 
recommended especially if a drug has a narrow therapeutic range. Dose reduction due to kidney 
dysfunction or advice related to therapeutic drug monitoring. Advice on the dose or frequency 
adjustment following a blood level result. It also includes advice to obtain a blood level and advice on 
normal ranges, timing of samples or reported data. 
14 – Drug administration 
/incompatibility/calculations 
A drug administration problem or question about how to administer in a particular patient. Identifying 
potential incompatibility or recommending how to combine or mix therapies. Checking a primary 
calculation of dose or infusion rate. 
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15 – Drug interaction / adverse 
drug reactions / side-effects / 
monitoring 
Raising awareness or managing an interaction between two or more medicines. Avoiding a potential 
interaction by choosing alternative drugs.  
An intervention may alert a prescriber to potential side-effects or how to avoid them This includes 
checking for allergies and choosing alternatives.  
Identifying symptoms that are potential adverse drug effects or drug related events and how to manage 
them.  
Monitoring pathology results to avoid or manage a side-effect. 
16 - Drug supply/storage Identifying or resolving problems of supply or storage of medicines. 
 
17 - Other drug information Providing information or education that does not fit other categories. It might include questions about 
drug availability on the hospital formulary, where no drug has been prescribed and it is not intended for 
a particular patient. It could be about the application process for inclusion on the hospital formulary. 
This includes providing financial predictions or analysis. Costing of patients or bids or pharmacy 
procedures. 
 
18 – Nutrition Drafting, advising on, or prescribing parenteral nutrition, nutrients, and vitamins. Raising awareness, 
preventing or managing refeeding syndrome. 
 
19 – Therapeutic substitution Use of a local policy that empowers pharmacists to make changes according to an agreed protocol. It is 
based on interventions previously made that were always accepted. The actions need to be written in 
the notes and subsequently countersigned by the doctor. 
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3.2.3.3 Financial motivation 
The financial impact of pharmacist interventions (codes 20-23) was notoriously 
difficult to quantify. The financial code was therefore an indication of the motivation 
of the pharmacist making it. In other words, was it undertaken to improve compliance 
with the formulary, to provide cost analysis or to save money, or was it undertaken for 
clinical reasons (mainly for patient benefit). Coding for this section appears in Table 
3.5. The non-financial interventions are discussed further in Chapter 5. 
 
Table 3.5 Financial motivation codings and interpretation. 
 
Code Title Interpretation 
20 Cost information/analysis The provision of data 
on costs, or trends or 
analysis predicting 
costs or calculating 
costs of treatments or 
annual drug usage. 
21 Formulary compliance Information about the 
contents of the 
hospital limited list, 
the process of adding 
drugs to the formulary, 
progress of a 
particular applications 
for a new drug or 
managing non-
compliance. 
22 Attempt to decrease costs Suggesting a cheaper 
drug or more 
economic use of a 
product or regime. 
23 Non-financial Where the primary 
motivation for the 
intervention was not 
financial even if the 
clinical decision 
avoids costs 
inadvertently or saves 
costs. 
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 3.2.3.4 Outcome of intervention    
The outcome of the intervention was how it was received by the healthcare team. 
Coding for this section appears in Table 3.6.  There were three main categories: 
positive (24, 25 &26), neutral (27) or negative (28). Code 24 was the most positive 
response where the doctor changed the treatment, whereas code 28 was where the 
pharmacist had inadequate information, experience or had produced the wrong 
conclusion.  
Table 3.6 Outcome of intervention codes and interpretation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Code Title Interpretation 
24 Treatment 
altered/implemented
A positive response that 
changes the treatment or 
fully accepts advice. 
25 Chart altered A positive response where 
the treatment is not 
changed but the chart is 
altered to make intention 
clear. 
26 Information 
accepted 
A positive response where 
data or advice is accepted 
but 24 or 25 do not apply. 
27 
 
Known/problem not 
pursued 
A neutral response where 
either the information is 
already known or no 
action is taken at that time. 
Provision of information 
may still be worthwhile 
included checking or 
confirming that due 
consideration has been 
given to a specified aspect 
of therapy. 
28 Treatment unaltered A negative response: 
either inappropriate, not 
relevant or total rejection 
of suggestion/advice. 
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3.2.3.5. Severity rating scale validation 
 While the rating scale is closely similar to that established by Hatoum et al. 30 shown 
in Table 3.3, it was important to investigate if the ratings assigned by the author were 
generalisable when used by other experienced clinical pharmacists in a study of this 
type. 
 
To this end, a sample of 104 events was taken by random sampling from all those 
recorded in the study, stratified to contain examples of severity grades 2 to 6 as 
judged by the author. These were then presented, along with Table 3.3, to three 
clinical pharmacists from a variety of backgrounds, who were experienced in judging 
the severity of medication errors, drug interactions and side effects. The first (Rater 
A) was a Medicines Management Risk Lead (AFC band 8b) from SUHT; the second 
(Rater B) was an experienced Medicines Information Principal Pharmacist from 
SUHT who had used the rating scale in a similar but separate study and the third 
(Rater C), an experienced lecturer in clinical pharmacy  from the University of 
Portsmouth School of Pharmacy (the author’s supervisor). 
 
Each subject was asked to rate the 104 examples in isolation from the others and to e 
mail the results for analysis. This was accomplished firstly by calculating Cohen’s 
kappa for a comparison of the author’s ratings with each of the participants.137 To 
gain a sense of the overall level of agreement between all four assessors, Kendal’s 
coefficient of concordance was calculated using Minitab Version 15. To gain an 
impression of how each rater classified the events into the two broad categories of 
minor impact (severity grades 2 or 3; there were 46 rated by the author as such) and 
higher severity (grades 4-6; there were 58 rated by the author as such), a series of Chi-
squared tests was conducted to investigate any differences in severity rating between 
the raters and the author and the four raters overall. 
 
3.2.3.6. Statistical techniques 
Results were analysed using mainly descriptive statistics. The Chi-squared test was 
employed to comparer nominal data and a level of statistical significance of p<0.05 
was accepted. 
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3.3 Results 
 3.3.1 Numbers of interventions 
Data for week-long periods conducted from 1999 to 2009 using the standardised 2006 
format are shown in Table 3.7 and Figure 3.1. There was a gap in the data between 
2002 and 2004 where the LENARD studies were undertaken; see Section 2.1.6 for 
LENARD details. There was no breakdown of interventions in 2005. Total numbers 
of interventions are presented over the last 10 years. Two years (2001 and 2007a) had 
detailed, representative, and complete data sets; these are compared in more detail, in 
Section 3.3.2.2. They illustrate the data either side of the LENARD data gap. 2000a 
covered a survey in the early part of that year and 2000b later in that calendar year; as 
did 2001a and 2001b and 2007a and 2007b. 
 
Table 3.7 Total interventions per week 
 
Week 22-28 
Nov 
28 Apr 
-4 May 
30 Oct 
– 3 Nov 
May 17-23 
Sept 
9-15 
Dec 
5-12 
may 
22-28 
Jan 
18-24 
Jun 
2-8 Jun 30 may 
-6 Jun 
Year 1999 2000a 2000b 2001a 2001b 2005 2006 2007a 2007b 2008 2009 
Total 613 492 739 425 608 1197 910 912 981 1058 777 
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Figure 3.1 Total interventions per week-long study over the period 1999-2009 
(data for 2002 to 2004 were not collected – see text for reasons). 
3.3.2  Severity or consequence coding 
3.3.2.1  Severity rating scale validation 
Cohen’s kappa can range from 0 (no agreement) to 1 (perfect agreement). Campbell 
and Machin 137 interpret a result for Cohen’s kappa of 0.4 or less as representing 
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‘poor’, 0.4-0.6 as ‘moderate’ and between 0.6 and 1, increasingly ‘substantial’ 
agreement. 
 
Values for Cohen’s kappa derived from the author’s validation experiment were 
0.505, 0.731 and 0.898 for raters A, B and C respectively, indicating moderate 
agreement in one case and good agreement in two others. 
 
Kendall’s coefficient of concordance, calculated for what is effectively weak ordinal 
data, gave a value of 0.872, which was highly significant (p<0.0001) and indicates 
good overall agreement between raters (see Section 3.4.1 for discussion). 
 
Using the author’s ratings as the comparator, there were no statistically significant 
differences in raters’ assessment of events as either minor or major (p=0.487, p=0.889 
and p=0.127 for raters A, B and C respectively) or indeed overall (p=0.321). 
  
3.3.2.2 Distribution of severity scoring 
Table 3.8 and Figure 3.2 show the data, grouping codes 1-3 together as representing 
minor or routine interventions, but reporting interventions with severity score 4, 5 and 
6 individually. 
 
Table 3.8 Distribution of intervention severity 
 
Year 1999 2000a 2000b 2001a 2001b 2006 2007a 2007b 2008 2009
1,2,3 482 377 623 323 462 552 545 806 778 518 
4 115 100 89 91 131 331 317 166 257 235 
5 16 14 26 9 13 23 45 7 22 23 
6  1 1 2 2 4 5 2 1 1 
% 1, 
2, 3 
78.6 76.6 84.3 76.0 76.0 60.7 59.8 82.2 73.5 66.7 
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Figure 3.2 Distribution of severity of all interventions per survey 
 
Table 3.9 shows the average severity results for 1999-2001 compared with 2006-2009 
and the total number of interventions for 1999-2009 
 
Table 3.9 Intervention severity distribution for selected periods 
 
Year 1999-2001 2006-2009 1999-2009 (Totals) 
1,2,3 2267(78.8) 3199 (69.0) 5466 (72.7) 
4 526(18.3) 1306 (28.2) 1832 (24.4) 
5 78(2.7) 120 (2.6) 198 (2.6) 
6 6 (0.2) 13 (0.3) 19 (0.3) 
 
 
A chi-squared analysis of data derived from the two study periods revealed the 
difference in distribution of the interventions in terms of severity was highly 
significant (X2=95.06, df=3, p<0.001) with more interventions being recorded as 
severe in the 2006-9 period, mainly at level 4 (18.3 vs 28.2%). 
 
3.3.2.3 Further analysis of the serious interventions (4, 5 & 6) 
 
Figures 3.3 and 3.4 show bar charts displaying the serious (severity 4, 5 and 6) 
intervention data from Table 3.8.  
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Figure 3.3 Distribution of severity of serious interventions 
 
Figure 3.4 is the same as Figure 3.3 except the Y scale has been truncated to illustrate, 
more clearly, the score 5 and 6 interventions. 
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Figure 3.4 Truncated distribution of severity of serious intervention 
 
3.3.2.4 Detailed results for 2001 and 2007 
There were two surveys in 2001 and 2007 with detailed and comprehensive data 
allowing a clear comparison between the early years (1999 -2002) and the later years 
(2006-2009) of the decade. These have been labelled as signal years and have been 
compared to illustrate the range and type of interventions made. In Table 3.10 and 
Figure 3.5 the two signal years have been compared. 
 
 
 
113 
 
 
Table 3.10 Distribution of severity scores for 2001 and 2007 
 
Severity 1 2 3 4 5 6 
2001 (%) 0 53 (8.7) 409 
(67.3) 
131 
(21.5) 
13 (2.1) 2 (0.3) 
2007 (%) 0 87 (9.5) 458 
(50.2) 
317 
(34.8) 
45 (4.9) 5 (0.5) 
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Figure 3.5 Percentage distribution of severity scores for 2001 & 2007 
 
An analysis of the distribution of serious (grades 4-6) and non-serious (grades 1-3) 
interventions between the two study years revealed a highly statistically significant 
difference (X2 = 42.966, df=1, p<0.001). This indicates a real increase in the 
proportion of serious interventions made in 2007. 
3.3.3 Trends in intervention types 
Table 3.11 shows the numbers for the different types of interventions for each of the 
years 2006-2009. These are then ranked overall in Table 3.12. 
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Table 3.11 Type of intervention 2006 – 2009 
 
Descriptor / Study Type 2009 2008 2007b 2007a 2006 Totals 
Documentation 7 44 
(5.6) 
100 
(9.5) 
66 
(6.7) 
29 
(3.2) 
48 
(5.3) 
287 
(6.2) 
TTO/IP discrepancy or IP 
drug omission 
8 206 
(26.5) 
196 
(18.5)
283 
(28.8)
261 
(28.6)
178 
(19.6) 
1124 
(24.2) 
Choice of drug or need 
for drug 
9 160 
(20.6) 
240 
(22.7)
163 
(1.7) 
151 
(16.6)
148 
(16.3) 
862 
(18.6) 
Choice of dose / 
frequency/timing 
10 158 
(20.3) 
249 
(23.5)
222 
(22.6)
193 
(21.5)
216 
(23.7) 
1038 
(22.4) 
Choice of form/ 
strength/route 
11 51 
(6.6) 
60 
(5.7) 
56 
(5.7) 
51 
(5.6) 
73 
(8.0) 
291 
(6.3) 
Drug duration 12 23 
(3.0) 
69 
(6.5) 
48 
(4.9) 
52 
(5.7) 
67 
(7.4) 
259 
(5.6) 
Pharmacokinetics/TDM 13 15 
(1.9) 
24 
(2.3) 
24 
(2.4) 
29 
(3.2) 
25 
(2.7) 
117 
(2.5) 
Drug 
admin/incompat/calc 
14 14 
(1.8) 
21 
(2.0) 
20 
(2.0) 
28 
(3.1) 
23 
(2.5) 
106 
(2.3) 
Drug interaction/ 
ADR/SE/monitoring 
15 60 
(7.7) 
45 
(4.3) 
52 
(5.3) 
40 
(4.4) 
85 
(9.3) 
282 
(6.1) 
Drug supply/storage 16 9 (1.2) 13 
(1.2) 
5 
(0.5) 
17 
(1.9) 
15 
(1.6) 
59 
(1.3) 
Other drug information 17 19 
(2.4) 
25 
(2.4) 
17 
(1.7) 
16 
(1.8) 
20 
(2.2) 
97 
(2.1) 
Nutrition 18 16 
(2.1) 
3 
(0.3) 
12 
(1.2) 
14 
(1.5) 
5 
(0.5) 
50 
(1.1) 
Therapeutic substitution 19 2 (2.6) 13 
(1.2) 
13 
(1.3) 
31 
(3.4) 
7 
(0.8) 
66 
(1.4) 
Totals  777 1058 981 912 910 4638 
 
 
2006-2009 yielded a total of 4638 interventions and a collective pattern shown in the 
Table 3.12 and Figure 3.6. The code numbers used in Figure 3.6 correspond to those 
used in Table 3.12. The three most common types of intervention represented 65.2% 
(3020/4638) of all interventions. 
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Table 3.12 Ranking and percentage of types of intervention 2006 to 2009 
 
Code Type Interventions % 
8 TTO/IP discrepancy or IP drug omission 1124 24.2 
10 Choice of dose/frequency 1038 22.4 
9 Choice of, or need for drug 862 18.6 
11 Choice of form/strength/route 291 6.3 
7 Documentation 287 6.2 
15 Drug interaction/ADR/SE 282 6.1 
12 Drug duration 259 5.6 
13 Pharmacokinetics/TDM 117 2.5 
14 Drug admin/incompatible/calc 106 2.3 
17 Other drug information 97 2.1 
19 Therapeutic substitution 66 1.4 
16 Drug supply/storage 59 1.3 
18 Nutrition 50 1.1 
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Figure 3.6 Ranking and percentage of types of intervention 2006-9 
* see Table 3.12 for code definitions 
 
3.3.3.1 Trends in intervention types for 2001 and 2007 
There were a total of 608 interventions in 2001and 912 interventions in 2007. This 
represents an increase of 304 or 50% in 6 years. 
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A specific comparison was made between the results for 2001b and 2007a to see if the 
data had significantly changed before or after the data gap in 2002-5. In 2005-2007 
there was a big increase in the total number of interventions, which coincided with an 
expansion of the clinical pharmacy service into a new admissions unit. This greater 
contribution to the admission phase of the hospital episode increased the pharmacists’ 
interventions on inpatient drug omissions and could have distorted coding for choice, 
dose/frequency and interaction/side-effects/ADRs. 
 
A Chi-squared test revealed a highly significant difference in the distribution of 
intervention types in 2007 compared with 2001 (X2= 101.483, df=12, p<0.0001). The 
major areas contributing to this difference are shown in bold in Table 3.13. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.13 A comparison types of intervention in 2001 and 2007. 
 
Year / 
code 
2001b 
(N=608) 
2007a 
(N=912) 
2001 
% 
2007 
% 
Type 
10 176 193 28.9 21.2 Choice of dose/frequency 
9 97 151 16.0 16.6 Choice of , need for drug 
8 78 261 12.8 28.6 TTO/IP discrepancy or IP drug 
omission 
7 51 29 8.4 3.2  Documentation 
15 51 40 8.4 4.4 Drug interaction/ADR/SE 
12 42 52 6.9 5.7 Drug duration 
11 28 51 4.6 5.6 Choice of form/strength/route 
13 26 29 4.3 3.2 Pharmacokinetics/TDM 
19 9 31 1.5 3.4 Therapeutic substitution 
18 20 14 3.3 1.5 Nutrition 
17 17 16 2.8 1.8 Other drug information 
14 6 28 1.0 3.1 Drug admin/incompatible/calc 
16 7 17 1.2 1.9 Drug supply/storage 
 608 912 100 100 Total 
 
Table 3.13 shows that in 2001, the three most frequently occurring categories were 
type 10, 9, and 8 which represented 57.7% (351/608) of the total. Table 3.13 also 
shows that in 2007, the three most frequently occurring categories were type 8, 10, 
and 9 which represented 66.3% (605/912) of the total. 
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 Table 3.13 shows that in 2001 there were higher proportions for intervention types 10, 
7, 15, 12, 18 and 17, and that in 2007 there were higher proportions for intervention 
types 9, 8, 11, 19, 14 and 16. Data are represented as a bar chart in Figure 3.7. 
 
0.0
5.0
10.0
15.0
20.0
25.0
30.0
35.0
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19
Type of intervention
P
er
ce
nt
ag
e
2007
2001
 
 
Figure 3.7 Comparison between 2001 & 2007 of the percentage of different types 
of intervention. See Table 3.13 for original data and code interpretation. 
 
 
 
Table 3.14 shows the size of the changes between 2001 and 2007. It also shows how 
the ranking of intervention categories changed between these two studies. Data are 
also displayed as a bar chart in Figure 3.8. 
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Table 3.14 Number of interventions in 2007 and magnitude of change since 2001. 
 
Code Rank 
order 
number 
of 2007 
events 
% 
increased 
or 
decreased 
from 2001 
to 2007 
Rank 
order % 
increase 
/ 
decrease 
Type of intervention 
14 10 367 I Drug admin/incompatible/calc 
19 7 244 II Therapeutic substitution 
8 1 235 III TTO/IP discrepancy or IP drug omission 
16 11 143 IV Drug supply/storage 
11 5 82 V Choice of form/strength/route 
9 3 56 VI Choice of drug or need for drug 
12 4 24 VII Drug duration 
13 9 12 VIII Pharmacokinetics/TDM 
10 2 10 IX Choice of dose/frequency 
17 12 -6 X Other drug information 
15 6 -22 X1 Drug interaction/ADR/SE 
18 13 -30 XII Nutrition 
7 8 -43 XIII Documentation 
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Figure 3.8 Percentage changes from 2001 data to 2007 based on the data in Table 
3.13.  
The order and identity of types of intervention is taken from Table 3.13. Overall there were 608 
interventions in 2001and 912 in 2007. This represents an increase of 304 or 50% in 6 years shown by 
the blue line. 
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3.3.4 Financial motivation 
Table 3.15 shows the distribution of the financial motivation of the intervention. Data 
is incomplete for 1999 but what was available is included. 
 
Table 3.15 Financial motivation of interventions 1999 to 2009 
 
Year / 
Label / Code number 
1999 
   %  
2001 
( %) 
2006 
(%) 
2007a 
(%) 
2007 b 
(%) 
2008 
(%) 
2009 
(%) 
Cost info 20  0 1 
(0.1) 
1 
(0.1) 
2 
(0.2) 
1 
(0.1) 
1 
(0.1) 
Formulary 21  26 
(4.3) 
29 
(3.1) 
56 
(6.1) 
31 
(3.2) 
47 
(4.4) 
18 
(2.3) 
Reduce cost 22  44 
(7.2) 
35 
(3.8) 
26 
(2.9) 
25 
(2.5) 
38 
(3.6) 
16 
(2) 
Financial 20+21 
+22 
11.0 70 
(11.5) 
65 
(7.1) 
83 
(9.1) 
58 
(5.9) 
86 
(8.1) 
35 
(4.4) 
Non-
financial 
23 89.0 538 
(88.5) 
845 
(92.9) 
829 
(90.9) 
923 
(94.1) 
973 
(91.9) 
743 
(95.6) 
 
Table 3.15 shows that before 2006, the financial interventions contributed about 11%,  
but after 2006 it was less than 9.1%. In other words, this shows that in 2006 to 2009 
over 90% of pharmacists’ interventions were initiated for non-financial reasons.  
3.3.5 Outcome of intervention 
 
Table 3.16 shows the distribution of the outcome or acceptance of the intervention. 
This was what happened subsequently.  
 
Table 3.16 Outcome of interventions 
 
Year / 
Label 
Code 1999 
(%) 
2001 
(%) 
2006 
(%) 
2007 
a (%) 
2007 
b (%) 
2008 
(%) 
2009 
(%) 
Treatment 
altered 
24 331 
(54) 
372 
(61.2) 
643 
(70.7)
379 
(42.2)
508 
(51.8)
451 
(42.6) 
529 
(68.1) 
Chart 
altered 
25 123 
(20) 
145 
(23.8) 
180 
(19.8)
336 
(37.1)
211 
(21.5)
423 
(39.9) 
156 
(20.1) 
Info 
accepted 
26 104 
(17) 
70 
(11.5) 
67 
(7.4) 
177 
(19.4)
213 
(21.7)
159 
(15) 
68 
(8.7) 
Known 27 37 (6) 12 
(2.0) 
14 
(1.5) 
12 
(1.3) 
33 
(3.4) 
20 (1.9) 16 
(2.1) 
Unaltered 28 18 (3) 9 
(1.5) 
6 
(0.7) 
8 
(0.9) 
15 
(1.5) 
7 (0.7) 7 
(0.9) 
Positive 
outcome 
24+25 
+26 
558 
(91.0) 
587 
(96.6) 
890 
(97.8)
900 
(98.7)
932 
(95.0)
1033 
(97.5) 
753 
(96.9) 
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Positive outcomes were where the doctor agreed with the pharmacist and either 
changed the treatment the patient was receiving, altered the chart to make their 
intentions clearer or accepted the information (when no action was required). Table 
3.16 shows that 91.0% to 98.7% of interventions received a positive response. 
 
3.4 Discussion 
 
3.4.1 Validation of the severity rating scale 
 
The rating scale used in the present study has been used by pharmacists to score the 
severity of medication errors in a variety of settings either as members of a 
multidisciplinary team.138,139,140 or by a single operator.141  Dean and Barber142 judged 
their system to be reliable, even in the absence of knowledge about specific patient 
outcomes; however,  the mean of at least four judges, scoring each error individually, 
was required to achieve a reliable score when  the judges were drawn from more than 
one discipline (i.e. pharmacy, medicine and nursing). More recently, Williams and 
Ashcroft143 cited inter-professional differences in grading the severity of medication 
errors reported to the UK National Reporting and Learning System, with nurses and 
pharmacy technicians assigning higher severity ratings than pharmacists or doctors. In 
at least one recent study, the judgement of a single, independent senior pharmacist 
appears to have been acceptable.141
 
The author’s validation study provides evidence that the rating scale, as used by the 
author, produced similar results to those obtained in the hands of other pharmacists 
experienced in the use of such rating scales, with at least moderate agreement between 
them. A high and statistically significant value for Kendall’s coefficient of 
concordance indicates that there was considerable agreement between users also. This 
was reflected in the distribution of events into minor or major categories, where 
differences between raters were insignificant. 
  
The potential severity of an event is frequently open to a degree of personal 
interpretation, often based on professional experience; but the results do provide 
evidence that the author was applying the rating scale in a realistic and clinically 
consistent fashion. Thus the author could conclude that his application of the severity 
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rating scale was validated. His assessment of every event in the study was likely to 
have avoided those minor inconsistencies which would have been introduced if 
multiple single assessors had been used, particularly if they came from disciplines 
other than pharmacy. Due to the number of events included, the use of a panel to 
reach consensus was impractical. 
 3.4.2 Number of interventions 
The first thing to discuss is the obvious change in the number of interventions made in 
the prevalence survey before 2002 and after 2004. In the period 1999-2001 the 
average number of interventions in each week long survey was 575 (SD=121) and 
during 2005-9 it was 973 (SD=144). An independent groups t-test revealed a 
statistically significant difference (t=4.97, df=8, p=0.001,with an estimated difference 
in means of 398 and a 95% CI of  212.7-581.5). As discussed in Chapter 2, there was 
a change from inpatient/discharge to an additional focus on admissions and medicines 
reconciliation. This shows that pharmacists were making a more frequent contribution 
to patient care in the later stages of the study. 
 
In addition, the author believes that pharmacists started to be more proactive based on 
their increasing confidence in their knowledge of therapeutics. This was enhanced by 
the availability of NICE guidance on a range of therapies, for example the prevention 
of ventilator associated pneumonia144 or national service frameworks, guidelines and 
audit targets such as the myocardial infarction national audit programme.145 These 
specified the treatments recommended by NICE following a diagnosis. At the time, 
there had been speculation that junior doctor knowledge of therapeutics was imperfect 
due to a lack of training in clinical pharmacology 146,147,148; this opinion has also been 
expressed more recently.149,150  and this increased, and probably still perpetuates, the 
opportunity for the pharmacist to contribute. 
 
3.4.3 Severity scoring 
3.4.3.1 Score 1 Interventions 
There were very few interventions that were allocated a severity score of one, perhaps 
because pharmacists were reluctant to report them. Since the landmark study ‘To err 
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is human: building a safer healthcare system’ published by the US Institute of 
Medicine4 which laid the foundations for interventions aimed at reducing treatment 
risks for all patients, later publications have indicated a persisting reluctance among 
healthcare professionals to report negative practice.151,152  
 
Creating a culture of safety requires changes that carers may perceive as threats to 
their autonomy and authority. Fear of accusations of malpractice may create an 
unwillingness to discuss or admit to errors. Anecdotally, from the author’s research, 
junior pharmacists were reluctant to complete an intervention form for something they 
thought had ‘gone wrong’ or where they had made a mistake; although each of these 
events was an opportunity to improve. Where this occurred, the junior should have 
discussed the scenario with a senior colleague to ensure that they undertook 
appropriate reading or learning to improve their knowledge. In addition, if their 
delivery of the message was deficient they needed to improve this by discussion of 
alternative approaches or phraseology. Where a poor communication, rather than 
content was identified, a senior pharmacist may have repeated the intervention with a 
more senior doctor, in order to protect the patient from harm.  
 
In the author’s experience there are occasions where the pharmacist to doctor 
communication does not work effectively and escalation, in the patient’s interest, is 
necessary. This might be style of message delivery, or cultural/gender issues, or 
simply contextual (e.g. it was a bad time to talk to the doctor). These can be very 
difficult situations but must be managed where patient safety is threatened.  
 
The Code 1 intervention was set up partly for completeness but also in the early days, 
to uncover those interventions that were inappropriate. For example a pharmacist 
intervened to get cefuroxime IV converted to an oral cephalosporin such as 
cephradine or cefalexin. However this was inappropriate as cultures showed the 
presence of Haemophilus influenza, and cefaclor was the only oral cephalosporin 
active against this organism. So further information was needed to advise on the most 
appropriate therapy. This category was a useful learning tool to uncover actions that 
were pharmaceutically reasonable but clinically inappropriate. 
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3.4.3.2 Score 2 interventions 
Score 2 interventions were those where information was provided to direct questions 
that did not fit into other categories. These were direct questions of fact unrelated to a 
particular patient, or questions of policy or procedure.  For example, what were the 
side-effects of a new drug that had not yet been prescribed; i.e. doctor or nurse 
education.  If the drug had been prescribed, the pharmacist might have recommended 
various biochemical tests to ensure early detection of side-effects. If monitoring had 
already revealed a side-effect, then the pharmacist might have alerted the doctor to 
this and recommended changing the drug; but this would then fall in higher score 
categories. 
 
3.4.3.3 Score 3 interventions 
Score 3 interventions formed the bulk of all interventions; they varied from 
dispensary-style documentation interventions and miss-spelt drug names to enforcing 
formulary compliance where there was no clinical consequence to the patient. For 
example, when the doctor prescribed a new sulphonylurea antidiabetic drug 
glimepiride, which was not on the formulary at Southampton, the pharmacist got this 
changed to gliclazide, which was on the formulary. Another example was when the 
prescriber wrote gliclazide 5mg (this could not be administered because the smallest 
tablets are 80mg). It was not clear initially if this was the wrong dose or the wrong 
drug; when the pharmacist investigated they found that the drug name was correct but 
the dose was incorrect. The pharmacist spoke to the doctor who changed the dose to 
5mg. The ward did not keep gliclazide as stock so it was unlikely that the patient 
would have come to any harm.  
 
Score 3 interventions formed the majority of interventions made by junior 
pharmacists. The author has discussed this with senior pharmacists who anecdotally 
report that they made these interventions but were less likely to complete an 
intervention form because they wanted to focus their time on the more serious 
interventions. These interventions were still important for the smooth running of the 
drug usage process and may have caused significant delays to medicine supply and 
administration. Individually they were often easy to resolve but collectively they also 
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consumed an appreciable amount of time. Some senior pharmacists will have been 
sufficiently confident about the situation to simply make an annotation to the chart for 
example amending ‘glipizide 4mg’, when the doctor’s intention was clearly 5mg. A 
junior pharmacist would have quite rightly, asked the doctor to change the 
prescription. In the author’s experience, junior pharmacists often took more time to 
visit a ward because of this, as well as due to their conscientious checking of 
everything. So in terms of clinical consequence to the patient, these interventions 
were relatively unimportant, apart from causing delays. However, they were 
important to the efficient running of the hospital. 
 
Score 3 interventions were often grouped with score 1 and 2 interventions (see Table 
3.8) to represent the workload of pharmacists and were an indicator of inefficiency 
rather than clinical risk. These interventions were the first to be made in a clinical area 
that was new to a pharmacist. As familiarity and confidence grew then pharmacists 
made more serious interventions. They could be considered to be an important part of 
the learning process. The average proportion of severity scores in the 1, 2, 3 group for 
the period 1999-2009 was 72.7%. In other words, three-quarters of the interventions 
could be considered to be not very serious. 
 
With reference to Table 3.8, 1999-2001 cohorts’ severity scores 1, 2, and 3 had an 
average of 78.3% (SD=3.5) and the 2006-9 cohorts had an average of 68.6% (SD= 
9.4).  A t-test showed there was no statistically significant difference (t=2.17, df=5; 
p=0.082, with an estimated mean difference of 9.7% with a 95% CI of -1.8 to 
21.25%). However, the difference in means might reflect a trend not revealed by this 
particular analysis. A chi-squared analysis of data derived from the two study periods 
revealed the difference in distribution of the interventions in terms of severity was 
highly significant (X2=95.06, df=3, p<0.001) with more interventions being recorded 
as severe in the 2006-9 period, mainly at level 4 (18.3 vs 28.2%). 
  
The1999-2001 grouping showed little variation around its mean whereas the 2006-9 
grouping was more variable, as indicated by the calculated standard deviations. The 
2006 and 2007a results showed a higher proportion, 35 to 36%, of severity 4 
interventions. Apart from 2009, all other severity 4 results were less than 25%. It was 
possible that in those two surveys the coding drifted to code 4 where previously they 
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would have been scored 3. It is also possible that fewer code 3 interventions were 
reported. The 2007a survey was a week in January and 2006 was a week in May. 
Junior doctor rotations changed in August and February, so there appears to be no 
obvious connection with the level of experience of the prescriber in a speciality.  
 
If the group of 1, 2, 3 scores were decreasing with time, this was most likely to be an 
under-reporting trend. In other words, as the number of interventions increased, 
pharmacists focussed on reporting the more serious interventions. Alternatively junior 
doctors might have been making more serious errors or pharmacists were becoming 
better equipped to detect them. 
 
3.4.3.4 Score 4, 5 and 6 interventions 
As the percentage 1, 2, 3 scores appear to decrease with time so the serious 
interventions (those scoring 4, 5, and 6) increased from 21.2% in early years (1999-
2001) to 31.0% in later years (2006-9). So not only had the total number of 
interventions increased but the proportion of high severity scores increased. This then 
prompts the question: does this mean that the proportion of serious interventions (4, 5, 
and 6 out of the total) was really increasing or was this because pharmacists were 
more motivated to report them? Certainly these were the high-impact events that were 
used to justify the service. In the author’s opinion, as pharmacists gained experience 
in participating in these surveys they also understood the importance of generating 
evidence for sustaining the service in a climate of cuts. Although not introduced 
during the time of the author’s study, It is likely that the adoption of electronic 
prescribing will eliminate many of the interventions with severity score 3, so the more 
serious events will increase by proportion in the future. 
 
The interventions that concern the provision of drug information, severity score 2, 
were important for the education of junior doctors but were less likely to impress 
managers. Finance managers often viewed education as something that professionals 
should just do. However whilst some of the drug information was the transmission of 
facts, some was also to raise awareness of issues that the doctors or nurses had not 
thought about. For example, doctors and nurse were sometimes unaware that Tazocin 
needed to be used in reduced dose in a patient with severe renal dysfunction. It is very 
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difficult for a professional to develop in areas where they are unaware that they lack 
knowledge. For patient safety, it is important that pharmacists are present, even if 
electronic prescribing eliminates some of the lower severity interventions. 
Anecdotally, at an individual level, the junior doctors were highly appreciative of the 
drug knowledge that pharmacists shared with them. 
 
Table 3.9, in Section 3.3.2, shows that the score 6 interventions increased appreciably 
between the periods 1999-2001 and 2006-2009 but, it must be remembered that the 
numbers were very small  
 
Even so, the data represent the potential for preventing serious harm (score level 5) 
coming to between nine and 47 patients a week and prevention of death (score level 
6) of between one and five patients a week. In terms of patient impact this is very 
significant. If the data from the weekly snapshots taken in this research were projected 
over the whole year this would represent a minimum of 50 lives saved each year. In 
economic terms, prevention of subsequent financial settlements following successful 
law suits against the Trust might save the costs of the clinical pharmacy service at 
SUHT (approximately £2million per year) many times over; notwithstanding the 
human/social cost and risk of adverse publicity and loss of reputation to the Trust. 
 
Table 3.10 shows data for the two signal years (2001 and 2007); the only major 
differences are a greater proportion of score 3 interventions in 2001 and more score 4s 
in 2007; the differences were statistically significant. This could represent a shift in 
coding or more likely a change to reporting more serious interventions in 2007. This 
is most likely to be due to the impact of more interventions being scored 4 in the 
admissions environment. 
 
There is further comment on interventions with severity score 5 and 6 in Section 3.4.6 
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 3.4.4 Type of intervention 
The type of intervention will now be discussed in more detail, in the rank order of the 
frequency in which they have occurred over 2006 -9. This gives a clearer picture of 
what it was that pharmacists did, and how often they did it. 
 
3.4.4.1 TTO/IP discrepancy or IP drug omission (type 8) 
Table 3.12 shows that nearly a quarter (24.2%) of interventions were in this category. 
TTO/IP discrepancy was where the discharge prescription (TTO) did not match that 
prescribed for the patient as an inpatient. Some changes on discharge would be 
normal practice such as changing intravenous antibiotics to oral and these would not 
be challenged. However where the pharmacist was unable to understand if a change 
was intentional or accidental, then an intervention was made. 
 
For example, an inpatient prescription for ramipril 2.5mg in the morning was 
compared to the matching discharge prescription that stated ramipril 2.5mg twice a 
day. There was often no obvious explanation for this and it is likely to have been a 
‘slip of the pen’ mistake. However it could have been a deliberate increase in dose as 
part of the dose escalation to a target of 10mg per day. The doctor had to be contacted 
to confirm if this was a deliberate ‘act of commission’ change or an unintended error. 
This category also described where a new drug was added on discharge or omitted 
and the doctor had to be phoned for clarification. 
 
This category of interventions also included where the patient had been consuming a 
medicine before hospital admission but had never been prescribed it in hospital. 
Sometimes this would only come to light when the discharge medicines were being 
prepared and the collection of PODs revealed the additional item. The doctor was then 
contacted to confirm if the patient was to restart all their own medicines or if an item 
had been deliberately omitted and the POD item should be removed. An example of 
this was where the GP had prescribed a proton pump inhibitor for the patient, the 
admitting doctor had forgotten to prescribe this and the patient had received no ulcer 
protection during their hospital stay. When the pharmacist found the PPI amongst the 
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PODs, they contacted the doctor. The doctor confirmed the error and authorised 
adding the drug to the discharge prescription. 
 
In 1999 this category represented 14% of all interventions and in 2001, Table 3.13 
shows that they represented 12.8%. Why has this category increased to 24.2% in 2006 
– 2009? Is it because pharmacy is detecting more anomalies or admissions in this 
category? Or less of the other types? It seems most likely to be an increased focus on 
this area due to some changes in practice. Patients are now encouraged to bring their 
own medicines (PODS) into hospital, whereas this was not the case before. 
 
Without the use of PODs in hospital, it would previously have been difficult to detect 
this error. The NPSA alert on Medicines Reconciliation 153 has also encouraged 
hospitals to contact general practitioners early in the hospital episode; so the example 
above would now be avoided. The development of the role of the PODtech and 
encouraging patients to bring in their own medicines, has revealed that (inpatient) 
drug omission was a fairly common event varying from between 30 and 70% of 
admissions.153  
 
There was always an ambiguity when the first hospital chart did not contain a 
medicine consumed prior to admission. It was not clear if the inpatient chart omission 
was an inadvertent error, or if it was an act of commission, where the doctor had 
deliberately stopped the medicine for some clinical reason. An example was a patient 
admitted with bradycardia who was consuming a beta-blocker. To the author it would 
appear logical that the first prescription chart contained all the medicines that the 
patient was taking prior to hospital admission. Those that were temporarily unsuitable 
could then be crossed out with an appropriate entry in the notes. Then if the medicine 
was to be restarted, all the details would be available. However many of the 
intervention reports showed that this did not happen; they showed that drugs were 
omitted in error. This would have been helpful for the clinical team (which may 
include a different covering doctor) when they reviewed medicines for discharge. A 
mistake like this would have been translated into poor communication to the general 
practitioner, which may also have impacted unfavourably on readmission rates. 
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3.4.4.2 Choice of Dose/frequency (type 10) 
Table 3.12 shows that the second most frequent (22.4%) interventions for pharmacists 
concerned the dose or frequency of medicines.  In 2001 this was 28.9% and in 1999 
this was 19% when this category (type 10) intervention was the most frequently 
occurring. So over the 10 years of this study, the top two intervention categories have 
changed rank positions. In the author’s opinion this represents a rise in type 8 
interventions rather than a fall in type 10, but may indicate a need to investigate type 
8 interventions in more detail in future research. 
 
This category covers doses that are different from those recommended by the BNF, 
including doses that are wrong by an order of 10 or more, those that need adjusting 
due to liver /renal dysfunction and those where the pharmacist is asked for the usual 
dose of a particular drug. Working in a dispensary makes pharmacists experts at 
checking doses; this builds an extensive memory of doses for common drugs. In 
clinical areas pharmacists are often referred to as ‘walking BNFs’. 
 
Knowledge of drug doses was a key descriptor of what pharmacists did, yet we often 
accepted it as the norm, and assumed it was trivial. In the author’s opinion, most non-
pharmacist healthcare professionals struggle to remember this data. So it is 
noteworthy that pharmacists were a source of this information. The author wonders if 
electronic prescribing will eliminate questions about normal dose ranges but leave the 
pharmacists to modify doses in unusual situations. 
 
3.4.4.3 Drug choice, or need for drug (type 9) 
The third most frequent intervention (18.6%) was concerned with the choice of drug.  
Some of these were concerned with the promotion of the hospital formulary and the 
delayed availability of drugs that were not held routinely in the pharmacy. Doctors 
were actively persuaded to change non-formulary medicines to those that had been 
approved by the Drug and Therapeutics Committee and therefore held as stock in the 
pharmacy. Some of these interventions were concerned with the choice of drug within 
the formulary for a particular patient. Some were concerned with drugs that had not 
yet been prescribed, but the patient matched criteria in a local or national guideline. 
 
130 
 
The formulary choices were made initially on evidence of efficacy and safety. This 
reduced the range of drugs that the junior doctor had to remember. This was based on 
the premise that if there was less to remember then recall was likely to be more 
accurate. The aim of reduced drug choice was to reduce the risk of errors in the drug 
use process. In addition this reduced the range of medicines held in pharmacy, 
improved efficiency of ordering and stock rotation and promoted elimination of 
duplicates or less-safe drugs within a therapeutic group. The medicines on the hospital 
formulary either intrinsically had lower adverse drug reactions or had been associated 
with reduced errors in the drug usage process. The cost-effectiveness of medicines 
was also a significant, but not dominant factor. So pharmacists enforced the adoption 
of the formulary. 
 
However in formulary management it was not always possible to choose one drug for 
a whole therapeutic group. For example, the choice of a beta blocker depended on the 
presence or absence of accompanying pathology, bioavailability and 
pharmacokinetics. Propranolol is cleared by the liver and is safe in those with renal 
dysfunction. Atenolol is cleared by the kidney and is safe in liver failure. 
Metoprolol has a mixed liver and renal clearance and is short acting; it is useful where 
both liver and kidneys are failing. There are many other beta-blockers but they offer 
no advantages over the ones mentioned here. Pharmacists had knowledge of the 
differing properties of a therapeutic group (such as beta-blockers) as well as 
information about why the different formulary choices were made. Pharmacists 
therefore increasingly became involved in the choice of drugs within a therapeutic 
group. This was usually based on the attributes of the specific drug but may be linked 
to licensed status, range of doses or available formulations. 
  
In the author’s experience, doctors no longer argue about whether a formulary is 
philosophically advisable or threatens clinical freedom. Non-formulary choices were 
only supplied by the pharmacist where a particular patient was established on a 
particular drug and unwilling to change. It was hospital policy that non-formulary 
supplies should be less than 3% of all issues. New drugs now undergo a strict 
formulary application process. Choice of drug within the formulary has become a 
more interesting development for the pharmacists.  
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As a proportion of all interventions, Table 3.12 shows the 2006-9 cohorts produce an 
average of 18.6% for drug choice (type 9). In 1999  code 9 interventions were13% of 
the total and Table 3.13 shows that in 2001 type 9 interventions were 16%. It could be 
that this reflects an increase in non-formulary prescribing; but in the author’s opinion 
a more likely explanation is the increasing role of pharmacists in advising doctors on 
therapeutic choices, either of therapeutic group, or drugs from within it on the 
formulary. 
  
In addition during the latter stages of the study, there was an increase in the 
development of guidelines and care pathways beyond local practice and acceptance of 
National Service Frameworks, where once a given diagnosis was made the therapeutic 
pathway was clearly described. Pharmacists were therefore able to justify and 
communicate both the need for further agents as well as compliance with those 
described in a care pathway. This has prompted a significant change in practice. 
Pharmacists used to advise on optimal drug choice compared to what had been 
prescribed. This might have generated a discussion about local practice and the doctor 
could have simply disagreed. Now pharmacists can request that new agents are 
needed to comply with national guidelines. For example the MINAP (Myocardial 
Infarction National Audit Programme) standards145 require 90% compliance post- MI 
with prescribing beta blockers, statins and angiotensin converting enzyme inhibitors 
or angiotensin receptor blockers. So now it is possible for pharmacists to justify the 
need for a drug; rather than comment on what has been prescribed. This category of 
intervention also included interventions where there was an unacceptable deviation 
from a nationally agreed therapeutic plan.  
 
The top three intervention types (8, 10, and 9) represented 65.2% (3020/4634) of the 
total. So nearly two thirds of pharmacists’ clinical output appears to have related to 
choice of drug, dose and frequency, and improving the communication of medicine 
details at the interface. The transfer of patient care from normal daily living (and 
primary healthcare) and the secondary care temporary loop was clearly a source of 
errors. 
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3.4.4.4 Choice of form/strength/route (type 11) 
This was a regular contribution of the pharmacists, who knew what products were 
available. Table 3.11 shows that this category remained at between 6-8% of all 
interventions throughout the study period.  
 
Many of these interventions were in clarifying details of a medicine that had been 
omitted. Today medicines come in multiple formulations partly to extend patent 
protection. This can make it impossible to complete missing data in order to dispense 
a drug when there are so many formulations to choose from (e.g. diltiazem). 
Increasingly, pharmacists were choosing the most appropriate formulation for the 
patient e.g. liquid or dispersible formulations for patients fed via naso-gastric tube. 
Examples of changes observed in the research were changes in drug (ferrous sulphate 
tablets to ferrous fumarate liquid) and formulation (sodium fusidate tablets 500mg to 
Fucidin suspension 750mg in 15ml). 
 
Details were often omitted and were added by the pharmacist (e.g. ‘N.saline’ was re-
written as 0.9% sodium chloride) or clarified (e.g. 10ml magnesium sulphate 10% 
was more clearly written as 1G/10ml). Simply writing percentages caused frequent 
problems in subsequent dose calculations.  
 
Route changes such as IV to oral switches were made wherever possible for clinical 
safety and ease of administration. These were either simple, such as IV ciprofloxacin 
to oral; or more complex, such as IV cefuroxime to cefaclor (cefuroxime axetil is 
poorly absorbed and expensive). Route change interventions altered dose (e.g. 
metronidazole IV 500mg to oral 400mg) or dose and frequency (e.g. ranitidine IV 
50mg TDS to oral 150mg BD). Some interventions involved considerations of 
variations in bioavailability, e.g. phenytoin IV 300mg to 270mg capsules or 45ml 
suspension. 
 
Increasingly throughout the study the pharmacist prompted changes or annotated the 
prescription chart to clarify what the doctor intended. 
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3.4.4.5 Documentation (Type 7) 
In 1999 this type of intervention represented 13% out of a total of 613. Table 3.13 
shows that in 2001 this type represented 8.4% and Table 3.12 also shows that in 2006 
to 2009 this type averaged 6.2%. 
 
So this type of intervention had been decreasing as a proportion of the total number of 
interventions. The reason for this change is probably that pharmacists increasingly 
focused (and reported) more on other types of intervention. The author believes that 
this shows that as clinical practice developed, it moved away from an emphasis on 
paperwork to a more clinical focus. This was a reflection of a change in practice and 
different style of thinking in ward pharmacy, from that found in the dispensary. 
 
Documentation referred to those situations where the drug chart was incomplete, such 
that it was not possible to dispense or administer the medicines because it was not a 
unique description; for example sodium chloride comes in many strengths and routes 
of administration – so this had to be explicitly stated. 
 
When a new medicine was produced it was initially available in only one form or 
strength. However, as usage patterns emerged, more strengths are produced. An 
example was ciprofloxacin tablets; initially they were launched as 250mg but later 
750mg became available. At product launch, ‘one tablet’ could only be interpreted as 
250mg, but later this became ambiguous. 
 
A prescription that was illegible meant that the drug name could have been many 
different things. The perceptions of this varied between those of the dispensary and 
ward staff because the wards would have been familiar with the one strength they 
used, but the dispensary had all the strengths used in the hospital. The formulary was 
designed to limit drug choices and therefore to reduce the risks of having to choose 
from a larger range. Poorly written prescriptions became ambiguous if patients were 
transferred to a different ward.  
 
A prescription was ambiguous where a drug name did not match dose or frequency 
and it was not clear which was correct. It was not possible to decide if the drug name 
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was wrong , or if the dose was unusual. For example there was often confusion 
between cephalosporin drugs; a prescription for ‘cefotaxime 1.5G’ could be 
interpreted as either cefotaxime 2G or cefuroxime 1.5G. 
 
A prescription was illegal if the CD regulations requirements were not completed, e.g. 
it was not signed or dated.  
 
Within the dispensary, documentation interventions remained at a stable level of 12%. 
This was because good documentation was important to ensure the right medicine was 
supplied. Dispensing from the discharge prescription was also one of the final stages 
before the hospital transferred accountability and the pharmacy staff wanted to ensure 
clarity and legality in case a complaint arose and the original prescription needed to 
be referred to. On admission, a previous discharge prescription was one of the useful 
data sources for reconciliation. 
 
3.4.4.6 Drug interaction/ADR/SE (type 15) 
Table 3.11 shows that this category represented between 5-9% of all interventions and 
the rate was stable over the study period. Table 3.12 shows an average over the period 
2006 – 2009 of 6.1%. 
 
Pharmacists are known for their extensive knowledge of drug interactions. 
Interventions in this category were often to alert the prescriber to the existence of an 
interaction. In early stages of the study, this was accompanied by advice to simply 
avoid the combination completely. In the latter stages, increased medicine complexity 
led to an appreciable proportion of interventions in this category being about how an 
interaction should be managed, rather than avoided. For example digoxin and 
amiodarone is a common pharmacological combination. The amiodarone gives early 
conversion to sinus rhythm but has many side-effects long-term. Digoxin is a poor 
converter but will hold sinus rate once established. Blood level monitoring and 
regular pulse rate checks allow the combination to be used safely.  
 
This category also included the detection and prevention of adverse drug reactions; 
for example, being alert to or detecting changes in liver function with rifampicin, or 
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clindamycin-induced Clostridium difficile infected diarrhoea. Doctors were reminded 
that Tazocin (piperacillin with tazobactam), Augmentin (amoxicillin with clavulanic 
acid) and flucloxacillin are penicillins and should not have been used in patients who 
were allergic to penicillins. Equally a patient was labelled as penicillin allergic and 
received Tazocin with no symptoms of allergy and the medical records were then  
amended.  
 
Some side-effects were unwanted, but manageable; such as red man syndrome with 
vancomycin. This was significantly reduced by a slower rate of infusion.  
3.4.4.7 Drug duration (type 12) 
Table 3.11 shows that this was a relatively small category over the study period, 
ranging from 3-7%. This category predominantly included pharmacists raising the 
question of whether a course of antibiotics was complete. However it also 
encompassed courses of steroids and their phased reduction, antiemetics and opioids. 
More latterly it also involved treatments with standard durations (e.g. terlipressin or 
drotrecogin) and cytotoxics with their repeat pulses of treatment. 
 
This category raised the question: ‘Is the drug still needed?’ This is different from 
needing to initiate a new medicine (code 9). The drug use process is often seen as a 
having three stages: prescribing, administration and supply; however it has a fourth 
stage: monitoring the effects of what has been administered. It was important to 
review whether a therapeutic target had been achieved and if this was at the cost of 
significant side-effects. This should be part of a continuous review. Drug duration was 
therefore an important category where the pharmacist asked the doctor if the medicine 
should be stopped. 
 
3.4.4.8 Pharmacokinetics/TDM (type 13) 
Table 3.13 shows that in 2001 this type represented 4.3% of interventions and a drop 
to 3.2% in 2007. Table 3.12 shows that in 2006 to 2009 this type averaged 2.5%. 
 
These interventions involved pharmacokinetic calculations, or the application of 
pharmacokinetic principles, or the requesting of drug levels or interpretation of 
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results. Pharmacists had an almost unique understanding of this subject. Most doctors 
failed to take notice of drug level results or misinterpreted them. There was great mis-
understanding of the relationship between the time the sample was taken and the time 
a dose was given. Over the study period, pharmacist behaviour changed from 
requesting the test to greater engagement with managing the whole process. This 
might explain the slight drop in this category of interventions over the study period. 
The author observed that even pharmacists who were unexcited by this subject 
contributed to patient care in this area.  
 
A greater presence in clinical areas and participation in clinical decision making 
processes made this a task that was often undertaken by the pharmacist.  
Many of the intervention reports showed that the pharmacists were involved in 
modifying the dosage of vancomycin and organising blood level monitoring. 
Over the study period, gentamicin started to be prescribed as extended interval 
dosing: 5-7mg/kg with a different timing of monitoring - 6 to 14 hours post-dose 
rather than trough levels; this created a number of problems that required intervention 
by the pharmacist. 
 
3.4.4.9 Drug admin/incompatibility/calc (type 14) 
In 1999 this type of intervention represented 2% of the total. Table 3.13 shows that in 
2001 this type represented 1.0% of the total; Table 3.12 shows that in 2006 to 2009 
this type averaged 2.3% 
 
Pharmacists often answered questions from nurses about how to administer 
medicines. This frequently followed on from a discussion about changing the route of 
administration. In addition sick patients presented new challenges where the oral route 
was unacceptable (especially vomiting or surgery). Pharmacists’ knowledge about 
what products were available and how to administer them emerged as a unique selling 
point of their role. In addition, pharmacists initiated supplies of new formulations as 
appropriate. Many pharmacists clarified intravenous diluents or converted unusual 
concentrations into something that was easy to prepare or more usually seen. This 
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standardisation of intravenous therapy was a significant contribution to managing 
risk. 
 
In general the more complex the activity the greater the risk and the more stages in the 
process the greater the number of risks. Risk management encompasses a series of 
activities including risk assessment, learning from mistakes, implementing changes as 
a result and reporting adverse events. This results in safer practice, enhanced patient 
care and possibly, reduced litigation.  It is known that complex injectable regimens 
usually are associated with error and the highest consequence for errors reaching the 
patient. This also reflects an area where pharmacists had growing confidence and the 
potential to make a real difference. 
 
Many nurses were found to be significantly challenged by mathematics and the 
pharmacist was a useful resource in checking calculations and altering infusion rates 
where inaccuracies arose. For example co-trimoxazole for Pneumocysitis carinii 
pneumonia was prescribed as 2640mg to be taken four times a day. This required the 
nurse to prepare 5.5 x 480mg/5ml amps four times a day. If the total daily dose of 
10560 mg was converted into 2 doses of 6 amps (2880mg) and 2 doses of 5 amps 
(2400mg) this was significantly easier to prepare, with no difference to the patient. 
 
Incompatibility questions were simply what diluent to use, or changing to a lower 
sodium diluent. They also included advising on a plan of how to avoid two 
incompatible drugs coming together or something more complex; for example, a 
complete reworking of how to give 10 drugs through four IV lines. The pharmacists’ 
knowledge in this area made a large contribution to how medicines were mixed 
safely. Most doctors claimed no knowledge of drug compatibility. It appears an 
anomaly of the Medicines Act 1968 that pharmacists cannot directly advise on mixing 
medicines. All mixing should legally be at the written directions of a prescriber.  
 
Pharmacists are likely to have under-reported in this category because they accepted it 
as part of their role; it commonly formed part of their daily conversations with nurses. 
There were small numbers of reports of incompatibility in these surveys and there was 
large variation between individual studies; but usually they represented 3.5% of 
intervention reports. The pharmacist’s knowledge of the supply chain, products 
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available, correct preparation and incompatibility considerations may make this the 
most significant contribution to avoiding serious harm to patients. 
 
3.4.4.10 Other drug information (type 17) 
In 1999 this type of intervention represented 2% of the total. Table 3.13 shows that in 
2001 this type represented 1.8% of the total; Table 3.12 shows that in 2006 to 2009 
this type averaged 2.1%. 
 
This catch-all category covered a wide range of questions that did not fit into the other 
types of intervention. It included provision of financial information and analysis, 
answering questions about policies such as describing the new antibiotic policy, 
describing first and second line anti-emetics, providing information about a new drug, 
explaining why liver specialists prescribe pentoxyfylline; or at what level of renal 
function was the dose of enoxaparin reduced. It also included where a GP had been 
telephoned to confirm a complex drug history.  
 
3.4.4.11 Therapeutic substitution (type19) 
In 1999 this type of intervention represented 3.5% of the total. Table 3.13 shows that 
in 2001, this type represented 1.5% of the total; Table 3.12 shows that in 2006 to 2009 
this type averaged 1.4%. 
 
This was a special category where pharmacists made changes under a trust approved 
protocol. It took junior doctors time to learn local clinical practice before their 
rotation changed in 6 months. Consequently many of the pharmacists’ interventions 
were simple and repeated. These interventions were always accepted by the doctor 
and could be grouped together as automatic actions. In 1997 the trust empowered 
pharmacists to follow this procedure. The pharmacist made changes outlined in the 
policy and the doctor signed the prescription, where appropriate, when they next 
visited the clinical area. In the last few years this was slowly being replaced by 
pharmacist prescribing. 
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For example, magnesium hydroxide was changed to a different time to digoxin, 
ciprofloxacin or tetracyclines to avoid an interaction and reduced absorption. Where 
there were obvious gaps in data, such as frequency, these were added 
These steps were simple prescribing errors that were safely changed, to avoid harm to 
patients and reduce interruption and delays to drug administration. They were a 
recognised expansion of the pharmacist’s role. 
 
3.4.4.12 Drug supply/storage (type16) 
In 1999 this type of intervention represented 2% of the total. Table 3.13 shows that in 
2001 this type represented 1.2% of the total; Table 3.12 shows that in 2006 to 2009 
this type averaged 1.3%. 
 
This type of intervention concerned problems where the supply chain was interrupted 
or there were delays. It was used to convey significant manufacturing problems such 
as the sudden lack of availability of noradrenaline. It was also used if there was a 
dispensing error or the medicine had been delivered to the wrong ward causing a dose 
to be omitted. It was used where drugs had been inadequately stored out of the fridge 
and the pharmacist was asked if a product was usable. 
  
This type of intervention was the activity that launched pharmacists onto the wards 
but soon became a very small proportion of the pharmacist’s contribution. It was still 
an activity undertaken when necessary but probably underreported. The supply chain 
was reliable compared to other medication related problems. Drug supply was a 
normal activity that was expected to be perfect and only problems were reported. 
Anecdotally, pharmacists were more motivated to report the other activities that they 
contributed to clinical care. 
 
3.4.4.13 Nutrition (type 18) 
In 1999 this type of intervention represented 3% of the total. Table 3.13 shows that in 
2001 this type represented 3.3% of the total; Table 3.12 shows that in 2006 to 2009 
this type averaged 1.1%. 
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 Pharmacists have been traditionally involved in advice on food supplements such as 
vitamins and minerals. So these interventions included ensuring that vitamin B12 had 
recently been given where folic acid was prescribed, so that a peripheral neuropathy 
was avoided. It included adding Pabrinex to the prescription of patients at high risk of 
refeeding syndrome and ensuring that phosphate supplements were prescribed for 
these patients. This also covered prescribing of parenteral nutrition by pharmacists. 
Whilst this was a low frequency intervention for most pharmacists, it was an 
important role.  
 
3.4.5 Comparison of 2001 and 2007 
There were more serious interventions made in 2007 both in number of severity 4 and 
severity 5 interventions. So it appears that pharmacists were either focussing on the 
more serious interventions, or were able to detect more serious errors. It is also 
possible that there was reporting bias toward more serious interventions. 
 
A Chi-squared test revealed a highly significant difference in the distribution of 
intervention types in 2007 compared with 2001 ( p<0.0001). The major areas 
contributing to this difference are shown in bold in Table 3.13. Between 2001 and 
2007, the top three types of interventions remained the same but the rank order 
changed. In 2001 the three most frequently occurring categories were type 10, 9, and 
8 and in 2007 the order changed to type 8, 10, and 9. In 2007 there was a higher 
proportion of type 8 (TTO/IP discrepancy or IP drug omission) interventions. This 
could be explained by the increase in failures to transcribe the discharge prescription 
from the inpatient chart accurately or an increase in errors of omission from drug 
history to the inpatient chart. It could also be explained by an increase in patient 
throughput in the hospital. This would be likely to increase errors in the admission 
and discharge processes as the time pressures increased.  
  
In 2001 the top 3 types of intervention represented 57.7% (351/608) of the total. In 
2007 the top three types of interventions represented 66.3% (605/912) of the total. It 
appears that pharmacists had focussed more on the top three types because they had 
less time to contribute and record all interventions. Time spent on the wards was not 
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recorded but the total number of interventions increased from 608 to 912, an increase 
of 304 or 50.0%. 
 
The biggest increase in type of intervention between 2001 and 2007 was type 14 
(Drug admin/incompatible/calc -367%); followed by type 19 (Therapeutic substitution 
- 244%; then type 8 ( TTO/IP discrepancy or IP drug omission -235%). Type 14 and 
type 19 were a small proportion of the total interventions so the absolute changes 
were small. However type 8 interventions were the third most frequent intervention 
type in 2001 and the most frequent in 2007. Thus type 8 interventions showed one of 
the biggest changes in both percentage and absolute terms. 
 
3.4.6 Financial motivation (20-23) 
The data for 1999 was incomplete in that only the percentage of non-financial 
interventions was retained. Table 3.15 shows that the non-financial category (type 23) 
in 1999-2001 represented nearly 90% of the interventions made; by 2006-9 this 
exceeded 90% to a varying degree. This shows that the vast majority of interventions 
were motivated by a patient benefit agenda rather than for saving money. 
 
This category was concerned with the reason for initiating an intervention. Although 
not studied in this research, many will have undoubtedly saved money, but the reason 
for initiation was not financial. It was possible that pharmacists undertook more 
activities of a financial nature but did not report these as interventions. 
 
The pharmacist was seen as the ‘marketing arm’ of formulary implementation and 
acceptance. It was certainly true that clinical pharmacists made the formulary work in 
practice by bringing the evidence into the discussion about alternatives. So 
pharmacists were also agents of introducing evidence-based medicine. 
 
Hatoum et al. 30 found 58.5% of interventions impacted on quality, 16.1% impacted 
on cost and 25.6% impacted on both. Savings came from reduced drug costs, reduced 
laboratory monitoring, reduced complications and therapeutic failures and reduced 
length of stay in hospital.  
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 However changes made for patient benefit can reduce the cost of patient harm, 
complaint and litigation. In addition they can avoid unnecessary costs and even save 
money. So whilst the motivation was non-financial, the effect could have been a 
substantial saving. Pharmacists did not change medicines to cheaper, inferior products 
that would decrease the quality of care. Thus the contribution of the pharmacist in 
making cost saving interventions (category 22) contained a component of improving 
patient care – the essence of the mantra ‘safe and cost-effective’.  
 
This category also illustrated work that pharmacists undertook away from clinical 
areas, such as writing and implementing consensus guidelines. This took significant 
time to prepare and gain agreement. Pharmacists then conducted significant ‘change 
management’ projects in order to make this work in practice. These projects and 
interventions were directed at saving money but always had a minimum standard of 
‘first do no harm’. The majority of guidelines were still introduced for patient benefit 
rather than just saving money. Simple standardisation of practice should reduce 
practitioner error and so avoid patient harm. 
 
Pharmacists also undertook financial analyses and a number of reports (category 21) 
were prepared for managers who were responsible for drug budgets. It was quite clear 
that hospital managers were unable to manage these budgets without the contribution 
of the pharmacist. Whilst it was an everyday reality for pharmacists, many managers 
struggled with the patterns of drug pricing that often appeared not to withstand logical 
analysis. 
 
Some pharmacist activities were focussed on saving money but these represent less 
than 10% of the interventions that were made. The vast majority was focussed on 
non-financial patient benefit. The pharmacist was the custodian of evidence based 
practice in the use of medicines. The pharmacist was also a repository of knowledge 
about safe use of medicines and avoiding practices that were ‘risk laden’. 
 
So whilst pharmacists made interventions for clinical reasons, it was likely that 
significant savings were made. It has been estimated that pharmacists saved their 
salaries each year in terms of drug costs and that the avoided costs of litigation were 
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approximately 50 times larger than the costs of providing the service. This ignores, or 
did not value the avoidance of patient harm through the work undertaken. 
  
3.4.7 Outcome of intervention (24-28) 
When pharmacists first ventured into clinical areas there were many examples of 
hostility. Nurses were the first to accept the support of pharmacists in facilitating 
medicines supply and information about drug administration. Doctors were slower to 
win over. During the study period, many doctors had developed with a pharmacist 
supporting their practice.  
 
Table 3.16 shows that during 1999 to 2009 on average, 56% of interventions resulted 
in treatment being altered and 26% produced changes to drug charts. This suggests 
that pharmacists’ interventions were positively received. It is possible that 
pharmacists did not report interventions with negative responses or that they only 
intervened when they were positive about their facts.  
 
‘Treatment altered’ (code 24) was the most positive outcome of the pharmacist 
intervention because what had been prescribed had clearly changed from something 
harmful or less ideal. However altering a chart (code 25) to make it safer, clearer or 
more complete was also positive in that potential harm had been avoided. Providing 
information that was accepted (code 26) was also a positive outcome in that the 
answer or information had satisfied the questioner. 
 
The positive outcomes collectively increased from 91% in 1999 to an average of 
97.2% in the 2006-9 studies. It appeared that pharmacist interventions were more 
relevant and readily accepted than in the past. However it is also probable that there 
was a bias towards reporting the positive events.  
 
‘Information - known/problem not pursued’ (code27) was a neutral outcome in that 
the pharmacist’s contribution was not accepted, either because the doctor was already 
aware and it added no value, or the doctor decided not to act on it because it had been 
included in the decision making process. The incidence of this type of intervention 
remained very low throughout the study. 
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 ‘Treatment unaltered’ (code28) meant that the doctor did not agree with the 
pharmacist’s concern because it was not relevant for that particular patient. This could 
be an error of judgement on the pharmacist’s part or that they were not aware of 
additional clinical information possessed by the doctor. However the lack of negative 
outcome may have been due to a reluctance to report those interventions where the 
pharmacist had made a mistake. The negative coding was a reflection of the doctors’ 
response, which may reflect a personality clash or reluctance to accept that an action 
(or error) was an unintended event. Again, the reporting in the category remained low 
throughout the study. 
 
3.4.8 Serious interventions 
The severity of an intervention was coded and recorded as the likely clinical 
consequence if the pharmacist had not intervened. Using the modified Hatoum et al. 
30 scoring system, those scoring 4, 5 or 6 were classed as ‘serious’ and the details 
recorded in a separate report that was sent to the Clinical Risk department of the 
Trust.  
 
The serious interventions constituted about a fifth of the interventions made. The 
majority of all interventions were minor, but occurred frequently as new junior 
doctors were trained in the hospital. Although minor in severity, the quantity of work 
involved represented a significant contribution to patient safety made by the 
pharmacy team. 
 
It might be assumed that education would reduce the number of minor interventions 
and printed cards of guidelines were prepared for the doctors to carry with them. A 
series of safer prescribing lectures had also been prepared, but their impact was 
difficult to evaluate. The occurrence of errors is clearly complex and whilst this work 
has tried to describe and quantify this, there has been no evaluation of why errors 
occur locally. 
 
The EQUIP study72 identified the need for just-in-time training - a method of 
providing training when it is needed. The problem with formal education is that the 
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learner quickly forgets knowledge that they cannot use immediately after initial 
training. The study found that doctors considered rewriting drug charts or discharge 
prescriptions as an automatic processes,  requiring little conscious thought. 
This will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 5 which is specifically focussed on 
prescribing errors. 
 
This section will look at an analysis of severity score 5&6 that have been reported to 
the risk management team during 2005-9 in relation to the intervention category codes 
identified in Table 3.4. The analysis is summarised in Table 3.17. Some of the 
severity score 5 interventions were not reported to the risk management team, so the 
overall count is lower than that shown in Table 3.8. 
 
Table 3.17 Cohorts 2005-9, severity score 5 & 6 distribution variation with 
intervention type. 
Intervention 
Type 
15 7 9 14 10 13 8 18 16 12 Total 
6 5 3 2 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 13 
5 17 13 39 1 11 10 9 3 2 1 106 
Total 5 & 6 
(%) 
22 
(18.5) 
16 
(13.4) 
41 
(34.4) 
3 
(2.5) 
12 
(10.1) 
10 
(8.4) 
9 
(7.6) 
3 
(2.5) 
2 
(1.7) 
1 
(0.8) 
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Table 3.17 shows that more than half (52.9%) of these interventions were represented 
by type 9 (choice of or need for a drug) and type 15 (interaction/ADR/SE). Incorrect 
choices of drug, need for drug or combinations and side-effects were likely to be 
associated with serious consequences. 
 
Type 9 can be further divided as follows:  18/41 (43.9%) involved the need to start a 
drug, 11/41 (26.8%) involved the need to stop a drug and 12/41 (29.3%) involved 
poor drug choices for the particular patient (e.g. contra-indications). These represent 
the most frequently occurring serious medication related consequences to patients. 
 
Poor drug choices for a particular patient were made because of contra-indications or 
cautions that were not assimilated by the doctor when they made their decision about 
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what drug to prescribe. This may have been knowledge-based in that they did not 
know enough about the individual agent or therapeutic group; alternatively it may 
have been skill based, in that they did not detect the relevant characteristics of the 
patient. Equally, as the patient’s condition changed it was important to know when to 
stop a drug and then review frequently to detect relevant changes quickly. The 
pharmacist had often intervened to ask for monitoring of biochemical signs of 
toxicity. It appears that delays in stopping medication occurred frequently and could 
be important. It is often the pharmacist that asks for antibiotics to be stopped even 
though it is known that extended courses select out resistant bacteria.  
 
Over two fifths of the type 9 serious interventions were the need to start a drug. The 
author believes this was a relatively new development where the pharmacist 
understands the therapeutic pathway and is able to prompt initiation of treatment. 
National guidelines on preventing VAP144 and VTE154and treatment post myocardial 
infarction155 are important here. 
 
Type 15 can be further divided into: 9/22 (40.9%) allergy, 7/22 (31.8%) serious side-
effect, 5/22 (31.8%) interaction and 1/22 (4.5%) monitoring. These represent the 
second most frequently occurring serious medication related consequences to patients. 
 
3.4.9 Educating healthcare practitioners 
Initially when junior pharmacists visit a ward they are accompanied by a senior 
pharmacist who introduces them to key nursing staff and demonstrates the activities 
they are to undertake. After a short period they are assessed as competent or further 
training is undertaken. They have to understand the dynamics of interaction between 
their roles and the clinical activities of other healthcare professionals and how the 
ward is managed. This is learnt through observation and discussion with the nurses. 
After a while they are accepted into the clinical team and nurses ask frequent 
questions about the medicines being used. They may be asked to give formal lectures, 
but most education occurs informally as the need arises. The pharmacist is seen as a 
valued resource to ensure nurses, and other healthcare staff are kept informed about 
the medicines commonly used on the ward. Clinical pharmacists are highly accessible 
as they speak to patients and nurses during their daily visits. Whilst the nurses value 
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the informal education, the pharmacists often see this as a by-product of their clinical 
activities and not the ‘raison d’être’. Consequently most informal educational 
answers to questions were not reported on intervention forms. Most interventions by 
pharmacists were accompanied by an explanation of the reasoning behind the action. 
This may educate doctors and nurses but it was seen as keeping the team ‘up to date’. 
It was only specifically reported under ‘other drug information’ where there was no 
specific intervention involved. 
 
Anecdotally, in the author’s hospital the pharmacist has increasingly been seen 
primarily as a source of information with medicines supply as a secondary role. The 
education role has been recognised as important by others.156,157  
 
3.5 Conclusions 
The interventions that pharmacists made have been recorded and analysed in this 
chapter. The main conclusions that may be derived from this work appear below. 
 
• In the period 1999-2001 the average number of interventions in each week 
long survey was 575 and during 2005-9 it was 973. This was a statistically 
significant increase. 
 
•  A chi-squared analysis of data derived from the two study periods revealed 
the difference in distribution of the interventions in terms of severity was 
highly significant with more interventions being recorded as severe in the 
2006-9 period, mainly at level 4. 
 
• Analysis of the most serious interventions produced small numbers. Even so, 
the data represent the potential for preventing serious harm (score level 5) 
coming to between nine and 47 patients a week and prevention of death (score 
level 6) of between one and five patients a week. In terms of patient impact 
this is very important. 
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• If the data from the weekly snapshots taken in this research were projected 
over the whole year this would represent a minimum of 50 lives saved each 
year. 
 
• Nearly a quarter (24.2%) of interventions were in the category: TTO/IP 
discrepancy where the discharge prescription (TTO) did not match that 
prescribed for the patient as an inpatient, or the first prescription did not match 
the drug history. 
 
• The second most frequent (22.4%) intervention for pharmacists concern the 
dose or frequency of medicines. 
  
• The third most frequent intervention (18.6%) was concerned with the choice 
of drug.  Some of these will be concerned with the promotion of the hospital 
formulary and the delayed availability of drugs that were not held routinely in 
the pharmacy. Doctors were actively persuaded to change non-formulary 
medicines to those that had been approved by the Drug and Therapeutics 
Committee and therefore held as stock in the pharmacy. Some of these 
interventions were concerned with the choice of drug within the formulary for 
a particular patient. 
 
• In 1999, interventions on documentation represented 13% out of a total of 613. 
In 2006 to 2009 this type averaged 4.7%. This shows that this type of 
intervention had decreased, to be replaced by interventions of a more clinical 
type. 
 
• Some pharmacist activities were focussed on saving money but these 
represented less than 10% of the interventions that were made. The vast 
majority was focussed on non-financial benefits to patients. 
 
• The positive outcomes collectively increased from 91% in 1999 to an average 
of 97.2% in the 2006-9 studies. It appeared that pharmacist interventions were 
more relevant and readily accepted than in the past. 
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• Although numbers were small, an analysis of interventions with severity score 
5&6 during 2006-2009 showed that more than half were represented by 
decisions around choice of, or need for, a drug and drug interactions and side 
effects. Incorrect choices of drug, need for drug or combinations and side-
effects were more likely to be associated with serious consequences. Important 
interventions, in terms of serious consequences prevented, occurred where 
there was a need to either start or stop a drug or where the choice of drug for 
an individual patient was poor, due to unrecognised contraindications. These 
represented the most frequently occurring serious medication related 
consequences for patients. 
 
Key finding 
Not only has the number of interventions increased, but the severity of potential 
consequence has also increased (Score 4,5&6 now represent 31% of total). Each week 
during 2006-9 clinical pharmacists prevented between 9 and 47 highly significant 
events (Score 5) and between 1 and 5 deaths avoided (Score 6). The interventions 
related to the most serious consequences avoided (Score 5&6) are related to choice of 
drug, need for drug or interactions. 
 
Chapter 2 described the range of activities that are encompassed by the term clinical 
pharmacy. This chapter has reported a detailed analysis of the interventions that 
pharmacists made. Chapter 4 reports a specific study aimed at characterising the 
contribution made by a pharmacist to try to decrease the occurrence of prescription 
anomalies.  
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Chapter 4 Medication error and adverse events 
detected in the A&E department.  
 
4.1 Introduction 
The third strand of the author’s research was a study of the admission process through 
the Accident and Emergency (A&E) department prior to admission to a hospital bed. 
This was to see if a pharmacist could contribute to the admission process, by 
documenting a medication history and drafting the first inpatient prescription. To 
complement this research, participants were asked about the medicines they had 
consumed prior to the hospital episode. This is referred to as the side-study in the 
following text. 
 
So far, the author has described how the pharmacy had been dispensary-based and 
focussed on problems arising on discharge. Clinical pharmacy emerged to find out 
how medicines were used in the clinical areas during the inpatient stage of the 
hospital episode. In 2001, the author formed an hypothesis that many of the anomalies 
and errors detected during the inpatient stay may have originated during the admission 
process. It had not previously been considered feasible for a pharmacist to contribute 
to the admission phase.  
 
As the lead pharmacist for Critical Care, the author liaised frequently with the A&E 
department. Many of the doctors worked in intensive care as well as A&E and the 
author was well known to them. Two specific incidents encouraged the author to 
consider that maybe involvement of the pharmacist during the admission phase of the 
hospital episode would be beneficial to patients and this forms the basis for this 
research. These incidents are described below. 
 
4.1.1 Key incident one 
An elderly man had seen his GP who had commenced him on trimethoprim for a 
suspected urinary tract infection (UTI). Two days later he was admitted to hospital for 
investigation of his abdominal pain. However his symptoms resolved and he was sent 
home within 48 hours. On this first hospital admission, no trimethoprim had been 
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given because it was not part of his usual medication, he did not mention it and he had 
not brought any medicines with him. When he went home he recommenced his 
‘trimethoprim’ 200mg BD. He was also taking digoxin 250 microgrammes and by 
chance a blood level had been requested. 
 
He was admitted for a second time, after three days with the same abdominal cramps. 
The doctors investigated to no avail and then paged the author to see if it was 
medication related. The author investigated the patient’s medication history and 
examined the medicines he brought in. The author discovered that on his first 
admission his digoxin level had been high and his creatinine had been raised. 
Discussion with the doctors was that maybe his UTI had caused deterioration in his 
renal function and accumulation of his digoxin; therefore his first admission was due 
to digoxin toxicity. However, it appeared that there had been a mistake at the 
community pharmacy and the generic digoxin 250 microgrammes had been labelled 
one to be taken TWICE a day and the generic trimethoprim (in a similar box) ONE in 
the morning. In hospital the ‘trimethoprim’(digoxin) had not been given and his 
symptoms resolved. On restarting his home medication he had become digoxin toxic 
again.  This really ignited the author’s interest in admissions subsequent to a 
medication related adverse reaction (termed AMRARs in the following text). 
 
4.1.2 Key incident two 
In 2001, the author spent several afternoons in the A&E department following the 
progress of patients through the system. During that time the doctors frequently asked 
the author about problems that arose. On one occasion the author was asked about a 
man who was admitted following a fall. Several days before he had seen his GP who 
changed his ACEI (angiotensin converting enzyme inhibitor) to doxazocin (an alpha 
blocker). Whilst ACEIs can produce hypotension with the first dose and are 
associated with falls, alpha blockers can frequently produce postural hypotension and 
are associated with falls in the elderly. The patient had obtained his new medicine and 
taken the first dose that morning at 8.30. On his way to the local shops he collapsed 
and was brought into hospital by ambulance. The doctors and the author concluded 
that the alpha blocker had decreased his blood pressure dramatically and caused his 
collapse. His blood pressure recovered over the next few hours and he was sent home 
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on his original ACEI for further review by his GP. This appeared to be an admission 
associated with a medication-related adverse event (termed AMRAE in the following 
text). 
 
These two incidents caused the author to wonder how often these events occurred and 
whether anything could be done to reduce harm to patients and the number of 
admissions to hospital. There appeared to be two types of medication related 
admissions, described in the following paragraph. 
 
The admission was medication related due to an adverse reaction (AMRAR).For 
example a non-steroidal anti-inflammatory drug causing a gastric bleed. The events 
that caused the admission were linked to a drug effect (AMRAE). For example an 
alpha blocker causes postural hypotension that then caused a fall and admission for 
hip fracture. 
 
A meta-analysis published in 1998, found an overall incidence of ADRs in patients 
being admitted to, or already in hospital  of 6.7%.158  Predictable, Type A reactions 
represented 76.2%; which implied that good monitoring could possibly prevent them. 
 
The author was also aware that a significant number of medication histories taken by 
admitting doctors and nurses in the A&E department were limited to drug names 
without details, suggesting that there may be room to improve the quality of 
prescription writing and drug history recording in A&E. The pharmacy at 
Southampton collaborated with the local Drug Safety Research Unit in previous 
research into surveillance of the otherwise un-trapped (or undetected) drug related 
adverse events.159.  In addition Wills123 had studied the incidence of drug related visits 
to A&E that required follow-up research. 
 
On the admitting ward the first prescription did not include medicines stopped in the 
A&E Department or withheld temporarily on the admitting ward. This led to the 
discovery of drug omissions during the checking of discharge prescriptions. 
Discharge was a time-pressured process and discovery of mistakes caused delays, was 
inefficient and allowed insufficient time for detailed investigation. If these omissions 
could have been discovered during the admission process it could have prevented the 
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admission (as with key incident two – see above) or prevented readmission (as with 
key incident one). It was also possible that early intervention could have shortened the 
hospital episode by identifying AMRARs & AMRAEs rather than exploring a new 
diagnosis 
 
This study was designed to actively engage with the admission process and assesses 
the potential for the pharmacist to improve healthcare in this setting. 
 
4.2 Aim of the study 
The aim of this study was to investigate if a pharmacist could contribute to the 
admission process, by documenting a medication history and drafting the first 
inpatient prescription. 
 
4.3 Objectives 
Initially it was proposed to get a pharmacist to work an eight hour shift matched with 
an A&E nurse and conduct drug histories on all admissions. However even with 
randomisation, this was thought to be logistically challenging. So it was decided to 
recruit all patients, and then eliminate those taking less than three medicines, to 
produce a manageable workload. It was anticipated that this would halve the 
anticipated workload and select a cohort where interactions and errors were more 
likely. The objectives were therefore as follows: 
• A - to determine the distribution of the number of medicines consumed on 
admission; 
• B - to quantify the current rate of medication related admissions at 
Southampton General hospital; 
• C - to quantify prescribing anomalies that occurred within the admission 
process; 
• D – to determine  if drug histories conducted by a pharmacist contain fewer 
omissions, errors and interactions than those conducted by junior doctors;  
• E – to assess if the intervention had an impact on the prevalence of adverse 
events and medication errors after the admission phase of the hospital episode; 
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• F – to determine if the pharmacist transcribed this data into the first hospital 
prescription, ready for the doctor to sign; did this reduce mediation errors, 
potential interactions and ‘adverse drug related events’ and facilitate the 
admission or discharge process? 
• G – to examine if it was logistically feasible for a pharmacist working in the 
A&E department to conduct drug histories; 
• H – to explore the patients understanding about the purpose of their 
medication; 
• I - to determine how many patients bring their own medicines(PODS) into 
hospital; and 
• J – to explore the patient’s understanding of adverse effects and allergies. 
 
4.4 Method 
This was a medium scale, randomised, prospective UK study of medication review 
and event resolution by a pharmacist based in A&E.  Participants were from a cohort 
of hospital emergency department admissions who were consuming three or more 
medications at the time of presentation. 
 
This study was designed to detect errors or miscommunications that occurred from 
primary to secondary care and particularly during the transition into the hospital 
system.  It was to determine whether subsequent errors were prevented by the 
pharmacist in A&E transcribing the patient’s current medication on the in-patient 
prescription chart. 
 
The main project was in three phases and involved three groups of practitioners 
• Consent – conducted by two nurses (SJ & KC) who were established members 
of A&E staff and were trained by the author in the research methodology. 
• Capture of drug histories and drafting of first prescriptions – conducted by the 
research pharmacist (JT). 
• Analysis of medical notes for events and errors – conducted by the author. 
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In addition there was a pilot study to determine the distribution of the number of 
medicines taken by patients presenting at A&E. There was also a sub-study 
questionnaire to identify what patients understood about the medicines they were 
consuming or had taken 
 
4.4.1 Main study 
A protocol was drafted for the main study, by the author and discussed with the 
research team (consultant nurse in A&E and medical consultant in A&E). It was 
decided that two nurses who worked in A&E should be used to obtain consent from 
patients.  The protocol is illustrated below in Figure 4.1. 
 
Nurse Triage
Ward Dr Drug History
Side-study Questionnaire
A&E Dr Drug History
Ward Dr writes 
first chart
Pharmacist Drug History
Pharmacist writes first chart
Ward Dr checks & 
signs first chart
Randomisation
Patient discharged
 
Figure 4.1 The admission process including additional pharmacist research arm. 
 
 
4.4.1.1 Patient recruitment 
 
When the patient attended A&E, a research nurse ascertained the number of 
medicines being consumed, and administered a questionnaire about the medicines 
patients were taking. The nurses also provided an information sheet about the project 
and obtained patient consent to participate in the study if they were admitted to the 
hospital. These forms are included in Appendix 3. 
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 If the doctor (in A&E) who saw the patient decided they were to be discharged 
immediately, the patient was excluded from the study. The A&E nurses routinely 
asked this doctor if the patient was likely to need admitting. If the patient was 
expected to be admitted the research nurse then randomly allocated the patient to one 
of two groups. 
 
4.4.1.2 Inclusions 
• All patients admitted to hospital via the Emergency Department, who were 
seen by the research nurses, who met eligibility criteria  
• Participants may have been seen in A&E, minors, majors and attendees who 
became admissions to the hospital and gave consent to participate in the 
research project. 
• Participants must have been taking 3 medications or more, and latterly in the 
study, two medications or more. 
• Patients presenting between 9am and 5pm whilst the pharmacist was available 
in A&E. 
 
4.4.1.3 Exclusions 
• Spoke insufficient English to understand interview without need (cost) of 
interpreter. 
• Those patients under 16 years of age. 
• Unconscious patients (GCS<15) The Glasgow coma score (GCS)160 provided 
an objective measure of consciousness. The patient needed to score 15 out of 
15 to have the capacity to consent for a research study. This was used to 
exclude patients who were unable to participate in the study. 
• Those patients who were too unwell to participate. This description referred to 
patients whose clinical condition meant that, in the opinion of the research 
nurse, it would have been inappropriate to seek their participation in the 
research study. 
• Patients undergoing emergency resuscitation. 
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• Patients omitted because research nurses were busy processing other 
participants. 
• Those assessed by research nurses as mentally not competent to consent. 
• Those who declined consent for participation. 
 
4.4.1.4 Randomisation 
The randomisation was computer generated by an external statistician in blocks of six. 
Allocation was to either control (normal pathway A) or intervention pathway B (drug 
history by pharmacist) in equal numbers.  See Section 4.4.1.1 for a description of the 
control and intervention care pathways.  
 
The randomisation schedule was known only to the nurses obtaining the patient 
consent, who would introduce the pharmacist to the relevant patients. The junior 
doctors were only told that the pharmacist was asking patients about their knowledge 
of the medicines they were taking.  
 
The research nurses KC and SJ conducted a structured interview  following consent 
(see Section 4.5 side study). The allocation was not known by either JT or the author. 
The patients in the control group saw the pharmacist who visited the admitting ward 
and reviewed their prescription in the normal way. The patients in the intervention 
cohort saw the research pharmacist as she undertook a drug history and the 
pharmacists on the admitting ward.  
 
The pharmacists visiting the admitting ward were asked to proceed as normal but 
would clearly see the prescriptions written by JT (the research pharmacist-see Section 
4.4.1.7 for a role description), and those written by the usual junior doctors. The 
junior doctors on the ward, who would sign the pharmacist’s draft first prescription, 
were different from those in A&E. So only the junior doctors in A&E were blinded to 
the pathway allocated to a particular patient. The consultants in the A&E Department 
and the admitting wards were notified that the research was being conducted and 
agreed to the process, and the blinding of the junior doctors in A&E. The junior 
doctors in the A&E department were therefore unaware of the true purpose of the 
study and to which cohort the patient had been allocated. 
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4.4.1.5 Control arm of the study 
The traditional process of hospital admission was studied in detail and a process map 
constructed (see Appendix 4). This was then modified to include the consent process 
and the point at which the pharmacist could conduct drug histories (see Figure 4.1 in 
Section 4.4.1). The control arm (process A) of the study was the traditional process 
where the patient would initially encounter a pharmacist on the admitting ward after 
the first inpatient chart had been written by a doctor. The experimental arm (process 
B) involved a band 7 pharmacist (JT) determining a drug history and transcribing this 
onto the first inpatient prescription chart to the ward doctor to check and then sign. 
. 
Patients who attended A&E reception were asked some basic identification questions 
(such as name, date of birth, address and name of GP) before entering a nurse triage 
system. Here, a basic assessment determined whether patients would go to the ‘minor’ 
or ‘major’ part of the A&E department. 
 
In the control arm, the patient was attended by a junior hospital doctor in A&E where 
the first consideration was whether the patient needed to be admitted for inpatient care 
or whether they could be discharged after treatment in A&E. It was common that 
patients were discharged following some immediate care or after some simple advice 
had been given. Local hospital monitoring data showed that only 21% of patients 
attending the A&E department were actually admitted. In this respect the junior 
doctor was acting as a gatekeeper to the Trust. It was estimated that if this ratio 
exceeded 23% of patients, then the hospital would probably exhaust the availability of 
unfilled beds. Managing the daily bed situation consumed considerable staff 
resources. 
 
It therefore followed that the A&E doctor had a primary function to assess whether 
the symptoms described, or identified on examination, represented something that was 
significant and needed an admission to be evaluated, or was something minor where 
the patient could be safely discharged. 
 
In addition the A&E department received ‘walking wounded’ from ambulances as 
well as ‘blue light’ emergencies and road traffic accidents. ‘Walking wounded’ 
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included patients who had suffering a myocardial infarction (MI). Such patients were 
seen by specialist nurses before being sent directly to the Coronary Care unit. 
 
It was therefore not surprising that junior doctors in A&E provided only an outline of 
drugs consumed (e.g. therapeutic groups). For those patients who were admitted to 
hospital the details of medication were initially recorded in the notes by the A&E 
doctor before the patient was sent to a ward area. On the ward a separate admitting 
doctor wrote the first prescription chart from the notes made by the doctor in A&E 
and from their initial interview with the patient. If the patient was unable to give a 
clear history of medication, the junior doctor could contact the GP surgery for a 
verbal or faxed list of medications. The focus for the doctor was largely one of 
ordering tests and establishing a preliminary diagnosis before the medical consultant 
reviewed the case. A ward pharmacist visited the ward and reviewed the first inpatient 
prescription. This could be two hours or two days after the patient reached a hospital 
bed. 
 
4.4.1.6 Experimental arm of the study 
In the experimental arm, the A&E doctor recorded the medication as usual, unaware 
that the pharmacist also interviewed the patient and recorded the drug history. The 
research nurses paged the pharmacist and introduced them to the patient after the 
doctor had conducted their initial interview. 
 
The research pharmacist interviewed the patient and discussed the medication taken at 
that time and any previous medication including non-prescribed, over the counter and 
herbal medicines. This was then compared with any patient repeat slips from the GP 
and the PODs.  JT recorded the medication details and any problems on a history 
sheet. If problems were identified the GP surgery was contacted for further 
clarification. JT then completed an inpatient drug chart and documented any 
medication related problems.  
 
On the admission ward (a different) junior doctor talked to the patient and signed the 
prescription chart, drafted by the pharmacist. So the junior doctor working in A&E 
was unaware of the research pharmacist’s involvement. If they wanted to amend the 
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details or stop or start medication they could do so. Ward nurses had been instructed 
not to give any of these medicines until the ward doctor had signed the inpatient 
prescription. Both control and experimental pathways converged at this point and all 
patients underwent routine supervision on the consultant ward round at the end of the 
day of admission. 
 
4.4.1.7 Study personnel 
The research pharmacist (JT) covered additional wards as part of her regular 
employment but on certain shifts could be paged by the research nurses when a 
suitable patient entered the study. The research pharmacist was a band 7 Pharmacist 
who had been qualified for four years. She had worked at Southampton for two years 
as a rotational pharmacist who covered medical, surgical and cardiac wards. The 
previous year she had joined the critical care team to cover high care areas as a grade 
D/band 7. She had conducted drug histories as part of her routine clinical activities 
but received no other training in this role. She was trained in the research 
methodology of this project but was representative of band 7 pharmacists at 
Southampton. This was to demonstrate that any findings would be generalisable to all 
band 7 post holders in UK acute hospitals. 
 
The author provided the additional clinical pharmacy cover to release JT when she 
was paged by SJ or KC. The author was actively excluded from all recruitment, 
randomisation and blinding. After the data collection phase, the notes were reviewed 
by the author to look for incidents and anomalies that occurred in the care of these 
patients through their secondary care loop, i.e. throughout admission, inpatient and 
discharge phases. 
 
The research nurses (SK and JC) were seconded part-time to this project. The 
remainder of their time was allocated to routine A&E shifts. They had previously 
worked in A&E for at least two years each. 
4.4.1.8 Ethics 
The initial proposal was refined and formed the basis of the Ethics submission. At that 
time the author was a member of the NHS Local Research Ethics Committee (LREC). 
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The LREC was just changing from a paper based local system to a centralised 
electronic format. This research project was to be one of the first cohorts reviewed by 
the committee to detect problems in the ethics process. This delayed the Ethics 
submission process and made it more complex. 
 
One of the requirements of LREC was that when recruiting for a study, the patient 
should be given sufficient time to read and reflect on the patient information leaflet, 
provided before giving informed consent. This was to avoid any coercion or bias in 
obtaining consent. This was difficult in the A&E department where staff were also 
trying to process patients within four hours to meet the government target. To 
overcome this, posters were placed in the patient triage waiting areas where the junior 
doctors in A&E would not be present 
 
This was because in this study, junior doctors needed to be unaware that the study was 
being undertaken. This was one of the reasons why the research nurses were regular 
employees in the A&E department and not noticeably different from other nurses 
working in A&E.  
 
The LREC considered the application 293/03/t and gave a favourable opinion on 19th 
November 2003. The author provided additional information to the committee about 
the study as would any other researcher; but was excluded from the decision making 
process. The University of Portsmouth Biosciences Research Ethics Committee also 
gave approval on 3rd February 2004. 
 
Following the one-month (May 2004) data collation and analysis, it was clear the 
project would recruit insufficient patients for the statistical power calculation. So a 
modified application was made to the LREC to recruit patients consuming two or 
more medications.  On 5th July 2004 the project received ethics approval to amend the 
protocol to two drugs or more. 
 
4.4.1.9 Statistical calculations 
The statistical power calculation to determine sample size, assumed a continuous 
normal distribution of medication errors, and using data from a pilot study of clinical 
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pharmacy interventions on wards. A two-group continuity Chi squared test with a 
0.05 two-sided significance level was envisaged. This would have 80% power to 
detect the difference between the groups when the sample size in each group was 151. 
This gave a sample size of around 300 which would take approximately 4 months to 
collect.  
 
Results from both studies were analysed using mainly descriptive statistics. Where 
data from the control and intervention arms of the study were compared, the Chi-
squared test was employed for nominal data. A level of statistical significance of 
p<0.05 was accepted. 
 
4.4.2 A&E side-study Questionnaire 
In addition to the main study, the author decided to add a side- or sub-study where the 
research nurses administered a questionnaire to patients who met the inclusion 
criteria, immediately after the consent process and before randomisation for the main 
study.  
 
The questionnaire (see Appendix 5) was designed to obtain data concerned with what 
participants knew about their medicines and understood about allergies and adverse 
effects. It also quantified how many patients brought PODS into hospital and verified 
the number of medicines being consumed. 
 
The questionnaire was discussed with and managed by the research nurses. There was 
no pilot and interpretation was decided collaboratively with the nurses. It was semi-
structured in that the nurses asked the patient the questions and recorded their answers 
on the questionnaire. Most of the questions were open as the author wanted narrative 
of patients’ understanding. The questionnaire was brief containing only 12 questions 
on one side of A4 paper. 
 
4.4.2.1 Justification for the side-study 
The side-study formed part of the submission to the local research ethics committee. 
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Part of the justification for the side-study was to ensure that those patients who gave 
consent for the research would contribute or gain information even if they were 
allocated to the control arm of the main study.  
 
There was concern in the A&E department that patients avoided taking pain killers, 
before hospital admission because they were frightened that it might confuse the 
diagnostic process or cause the doctor to dismiss their symptoms as minor and 
discharge them, when they needed to be admitted. It was hoped that the answers 
would enable an appropriate information sheet to be produced. 
 
Some of the errors and anomalies were likely to be associated with adverse effects 
and allergies. It was possible that the patient’s understanding and explanations of 
these would be different from those of healthcare professionals. This might have 
caused confusion in communicating true allergy status. Patients have received 
medicines, such as antibiotics, when they have a documented allergy to them (see 
Chapter 3). However this did not always produce anaphylaxis. Therefore there is 
likely to have been a mis-understanding about adverse and allergic reactions. If this 
could be understood it may have been possible to produce an information sheet about 
this whilst the patient was waiting to see a doctor, and therefore improve the quality 
of documentation connected with allergies and adverse effects. 
 
The patient’s recollection of the number, name and purpose of the medication they 
consumed was important in obtaining an accurate drug history. This could be verified 
if they actually brought in their PODs. This was important to medicines reconciliation 
with the first inpatient drug chart. The questions might have identified why patients 
did not bring in their own medicines to hospital. This information might have 
highlighted different types of errors or verified the data on the number of medicines 
consumed.  
 
4.5 Results 
In the following sections, the results of the side-study are discussed first, followed by 
the results of the main study. This order has been chosen because some of the findings 
of the side-study provide useful explanations of the main study. Also the side-study 
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fills some of the gaps in the main study concerned with the number of medicines 
being consumed prior to admission. 
 
4.5.1 Results from the side-study questionnaire 
One hundred and seventy-seven patients were recruited to this study whereas only 115 
were recruited into the main study. The difference of 62 comprises patients who were 
either not admitted or those who were missed by the pharmacist. 
 
The results of the side-study are presented in the same order as the questions appeared 
in the questionnaire. 
Question 1 
 A: How many different prescribed/non-prescribed medicines do you take? 
 
177/177 (100%) patients responded to this question, but 6 were unable to give an 
exact number. Table 4.1 shows the distribution of the number of medicines consumed, 
and Figure 4.2 illustrates the data as a bar-chart.  Excluding those who were unsure; 
161/171 (90.0%) were taking three or more medicines and 76/171 (42.9%) were 
taking six or more and 113/171 (66.1%) were taking five or more.  
 
Table 4.1 -Frequency distribution of the number of medicines taken 
 
Number  unsure 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
Frequency 6 10 19 29 37 16 18 14 12 6 3 5 1 1 
 
Table 4.1 shows that the mode was 5 medicines and a total of 1000 medicines 
consumed. These were consumed by 171 patients so this gives a mean of 1000/171 
(5.8 medicines per patient).   
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Figure 4.2 – Frequency distribution of number of medicines taken in side-study 
 
B- How many different tablets do you take each day? 
 
All  patients responded to this question, but 28 were unable to give an exact number. 
Table 4.2 shows the distribution of the number of medicines consumed, and Figure 
4.3 illustrates the data as a bar-chart. The answers show at least 1327 tablets (doses) 
were taken in total by 177 patients. Excluding those who were unsure; nearly half 
638/1327 (48.1%) were taking eleven or more tablets and 1162/1327 (87.6%) were 
taking six or more tablets per day. 
 
 
Table 4.2- Frequency distribution of number of tablets (doses) taken each day in 
side-study 
 
Number Frequency 
Unsure 28 
2 4 
3 9 
4 15 
5 14 
6 13 
7 15 
8 12 
9 15 
10 11 
11 6 
12 6 
13 2 
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14 6 
15 5 
16 3 
17 1 
18 4 
19 2 
20 1 
22 3 
24 1 
30 1 
 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
us 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30
Number of tablets (doses) per day
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
 
 
Figure 4.3 Frequency distribution of number of tablets (doses) taken each day in 
side-study. us= patient unsure 
 
 
Question 2 
At what times do you find it easier to take medicines? 
 
All patients responded to the question; it was not clear how many answered a different 
question of when they actually took them, rather than expressing a preference. The 
five most popular responses were morning; morning and evening; morning lunch and 
evening; night-time and as prescribed. 
 
Question 3 
Which medicines, if any, do you most frequently forget to take? 
 
167 
 
All patients responded and Table 4.3 shows the answers to this question. However, 
only 9% identified a particular tablet and only 3.4% identified a time of day. 
 
Table 4.3 Answers to question 3, most frequently forgotten medicines 
 
None Carer gives Named tablet Time of 
day 
Occasionally Yes all tabs 
127 12 16 6 11 5 
71.8% 6.8 9.0 3.4 6.2 2.8 
 
Question 4 
Does taking medicines disrupt your daily routine? 
 
All patients responded and Table 4.4 shows that 88.1% gave a simple negative 
response. 
  
Table 4.4 Answers to question 4, disruption to daily routine 
 
No sometimes Part of 
routine 
Only if on 
holiday 
side effect Yes 
156 2 8 1 3 7 
88.1% 1.1 4.5 0.6 1.7 4.0 
 
 
Question 5 
Can you remember the names of any prescribed medication that you take? 
 
The response was 174/177 (98.4%) and Table 4.5 shows that 69.5% were able to 
name some. Where names could be provided these have been quantified in Table 4.6.  
 
Table 4.5 Answers to question 5, names of prescribed medicines 
 
Cant 
recall 
All on 
a list 
Only 
what 
they 
were 
for 
All in 
pill 
box 
All on a 
prescription
Only 
by 
colour 
No all 
new 
Able 
to 
name 
some 
36 8 3 2 2 1 1 121 
20.7 4.6% 1.7 1.1 1.1 0.6 0.6 69.5 
 
A total of 520 could be named. This is 520/1327 (39.2%) of that found in question 1. 
This data is illustrated by a bar-chart in Figure 4.4 
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Table 4.6 Answers to question 5, where the respondent could provide names 
 
Number of 
named 
medicines 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
Frequency 10 18 22 22 19 13 7 2 2 4 1 0 1 
Percentage 
N=121 
8.3 14.0 18.2 18.2 15.2 10.7 5.8 1.7 1.7 3.3 0.8 0 0.8
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Figure 4.4 Frequency distribution of medicines named in side-study 
 
 
Question 6 
Do you know what they are for? 
 
All patients responded and Table 4.7 shows that 9/177 (5.1%) could not recall what 
their medicines were for. 91.0% could name the condition or describe the part of the 
body that was affected and the responses are shown in Table 4.8 
  
Table 4.7 Answers to question 6, did patients know what their medicines were 
for 
 
Response no Have a 
list 
Cant 
recall 
Yes Named conditions or parts of 
body 
Frequency 4 1 4 7 161 
Percentage 2.3 0.6 2.3 4.0 91.0 
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Table 4.8 Answers to question 6 where a condition was named 
 
Number of conditions named 1 2 3 4 
Frequency 24 46 40 51 
Percentage (N=161) 14.9 28.6 24.8 31.7 
 
 
Question 7 
Have you taken any medication such as painkillers before coming here today 
(particularly if injury related)? 
 
All patients responded with 50/177 (28.2%) responding in the affirmative. Table 4.9 
shows the distribution of reasons given for patients who did not take any painkillers. 
 
It was not ascertained how many patients had pain as part of their presenting 
symptoms although 12 actively declared this 
 
Table 4.9 Answers to question 7 where patients did not take painkillers 
 
Category Not 
relevant 
Reluctant Didn’t 
think 
Felt 
sick
Came in 
sudden 
Named 
a drug 
Usual meds 
Frequency 12 5 7 7 15 36 45 
% N=127 9.4 3.9 5.5 5.5 11.8 28.3 35.4 
 
The ‘not relevant’ category refers to patients who did not come to hospital with pain 
as one of their symptoms. The reluctant category refers to those patients who thought 
that they should not take pain killers because it would confuse the doctor working out 
what was wrong with them. The ‘felt sick’ category refers to those patients who were 
nauseous. The ‘came in sudden’ category refers to those patients who were rapidly 
admitted and did not have access to pain killers before they came to hospital. The 
‘named a drug’ category refers to those patients who specified the pain killer taken 
and the ‘usual meds’ category refers to patients who replied that thy only took their 
usual medication; it is not clear how many of these included pain killers. 
 
Question 8 
Do you have any allergies to drugs? 
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All patients responded and Table 4.10 shows that 74.6% did not have allergies to 
drugs. It was not possible to validate this with the notes because the questionnaire was 
not designed to do this; so identifiers were not correlated. 
 
Table 4.10 Answers to question 8 – allergies to drugs 
 
Q8 No Yes Unsure 
177 132 41 4 
100% 74.6% 23.2% 2.3% 
 
Table 4.11 shows the descriptions of reactions given by the 45 patients who declared 
they were allergic or were unsure whether the reaction was true allergy. 
 
Table 4.11 Answers to question 8 descriptions of possible allergic reactions 
 
Allergy 
descriptor 
Symptoms of 
illness 
Side-effect of 
drug 
Named a drug 
or told allergic 
without 
description 
Allergic 
symptoms 
described 
Frequency 3 14 17 11 
% N=45 6.7 31.1 37.8 24.4 
 
The ’symptoms of illness’ category refers to patients who described the illness that 
the drug was being used to treat rather than descriptors of allergy; for example ‘iodine 
causes pus in wounds’. The ‘side-effect of drug’ category refers to descriptions of 
drug side-effects rather than descriptors of allergy; for example aspirin produces 
‘funny tummy’. The ‘named a drug’ category refers to patients who were told they 
were allergic to a drug but could not remember or were not given a description of 
their allergy symptoms.  
 
Question 9 
If you have taken antibiotics before, have you ever had any form of reaction to them? 
 
All patients responded and Table 4.12 shows that 82.5% had not had reactions to 
antibiotics before; 28/ 31 (90.3%) supplied further information and these answers are 
shown in Table 4.13. The responses are classified in the same way as Table 4.11. 
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Table 4.12 Answers to question 9, reactions to antibiotics 
 
Q9 No Yes Unsure 
177 146 28 3 
100% 82.5 15.8 1.7 
 
 
Table 4.13 Answers to question 9 where further information was supplied 
 
Descriptor Symptoms of 
illness 
Described 
side-effect of 
drug 
Named a drug 
or told 
allergic 
without 
description 
Allergic 
symptoms 
described 
Unclear 
Frequency 1 4 12 5 3 
% N=25 4.0 16.0 48.0 20.0 12.0 
 
Question 10 
 
Do you often take antibiotics? 
 
All patients responded and Table 4.14 shows that 80.2% did not often take antibiotics. 
Table 4.15 shows the reasons why antibiotics are often taken in the 31 patients who 
supplied further information. 
 
Table 4.14 Answers to question 10, taking antibiotics often 
 
 
Q10 No Yes Unsure 
177 142 31 4 
100% 80.2% 17.5% 2.3% 
 
Table 4.15 reasons why patients often took antibiotics 
 
Q10b Chest infections Recurrent 
infections 
UTI 
31 18 9 4 
100% 58.1% 29% 12.9% 
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Question 11 
If you take medication regularly have you brought them with you? 
 
All patients responded and Table 4.16 shows that 39% did not bring any of their own 
medicines with them, and 42.9% brought all of them. 
 
Table 4.16 Answers to question 11, did patients bring their own medicines into 
hospital. 
 
Q11 No Only 
some 
No run 
out 
No but 
list 
Out of 
house 
Yes 
177 69 6 1 22 3 76 
100% 39% 3.4% 0.6% 12.4% 1.7% 42.9% 
 
 
Question 12 
Have you ever used somebody else's prescribed medication because you have a 
similar problem? 
 
All patients responded and Table 4.17 shows that 93.8% had not used somebody else's 
prescribed medication. 
 
Table 4.17 Answers to question 12, use of someone else’s medicines 
 
Q12 No Yes same 
meds 
Yes same 
symptoms 
Yes but 
problems 
177 166 5 5 1 
100% 93.8% 2.8% 2.8% 0.6% 
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4.5.2 Results from randomised study 
 
4.5.2.1 Recruitment to pilot study to determine the distribution of 
the number of medicines taken by patients presenting 
at A&E. 
 
Objective A - To determine the distribution of the number of medicines 
consumed on admission  
 
Table 4.18 shows that 346 patients were admitted between 5th and 27th of May 2004, 
on the days worked by the research nurses. 
 
Table 4.18 Initial recruitment distribution to the pilot randomised study 
 
Total Resuscitation Missed 3 or more meds Less than 3 meds 
346 33 22 125 166 
 
Twenty-two patients were missed because the research nurses were occupied 
processing other participants and 33 went straight into A&E emergency resuscitation - 
a separated area of the A&E department. When occupied, the access to this area is 
restricted to essential personnel only. Thus 55 were unable to be considered for 
consent. Out of the 291 remaining, 43% were consuming three or more medicines. 
 
Table 4.19 shows the distribution pattern for patients entering the consent process 
from the 125 patients who were consuming three or more medicines. 
 
Table 4.19 Distribution of patients for consent to the pilot randomised study 
 
Total GCS*<15 Too unwell Declined Missed Recruited 
125 36 27 29 9 24 
*GCS - Glasgow coma score 
 
‘Declined’ means those patients who refused to consent to participate in the study. 
‘Missed’ means patients who were discharged or admitted before the pharmacist 
could attend A&E. 
 
So from 125 patients who were eligible to enter the consent process, in only 24 was 
consent obtained. Although only 29 patients actually declined consent for the study, 
this means that out of 346 patients per month presenting, only 24 per month could be 
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recruited for the main study. This means that the original target of 300 patients would 
have taken 12.5 months to recruit compared to the initial projection of 4 months. 
However the pharmacist may not have been able to see all 24 because of logistics of 
rotas and time taken to interview patients. 
 
The funding for the nurses would have run out by the end of August, so it was decided 
to seek an amendment to the study from the LREC. On 5th July 2004 the Ethics 
Committee approved an amendment to change the protocol to two or more medicines. 
 
 
4.5.2.2 Patients with and without events, results from randomised 
study 
 
The remainder of the results refer to participants recruited on three or more medicines 
from May to July, and on two or more medicines from July to September; this only 
recruited an additional 10 patients. Over 4-5 months of research, 151 patients were 
recruited to the project and randomised for the main study. Thirty-six out of the 151 
who were planned for admission were then discharged without actually being 
admitted to a ward. This left 115 for analysis. Randomisation produced 76 patients 
allocated to the control arm (doctors only), and 75 patients allocated to intervention 
arm (pharmacist obtaining drug histories and writing first prescriptions), as shown in 
Table 4.20. 
 
Table 4.20 Distribution of patients between control and intervention arms 
 
 Patients Not admitted Analysed 
Doctor history 
i.e. control 
76 17 59 
Pharmacist 
history i.e. 
Intervention 
75 19 56 
Totals 151 36 115 
 
Nineteen patients were randomised but not admitted; this included 13 who went to the 
ward before the research pharmacist (JT) was able to take a drug history, leaving 115 
to be analysed. Three patients were seen twice on separate admissions and were 
treated independently. 
 
175 
 
Table 4.21 shows the numbers of patients who had a medicine related event at some 
stage in their hospital visit. In terms of patients, the difference was not statistically 
significant. 
 
Table 4.21 Patients with or without events throughout hospital episode 
 
Patients Analysed Patients with 
no events 
Patients with 
events 
Doctor history 59 25 34 
Pharmacist 
history 
56 31 25 
 Totals 115 56 (48.7%) 59 (51.3%) 
             Chi-squared=1.939, DF=1, p=0.164 (so no sig. diff. between pharmacists and docs)  
 
The 34 patients who had events in the doctor history cohort had a total of 58 events. 
The 25 patients who had events in the pharmacist history cohort had a total of 32 
events. 
 
4.5.2.3 Medication related admissions (MRAs) 
 
Objective B- To quantify the current rate of medication related 
admissions at Southampton General hospital 
 
There were 11 patients in the control arm who had 13 events where medication was 
possibly linked to reason for admission. There were 14 patients in the intervention 
arm who had 14 events where medication was possibly linked to reason for 
admission. In terms of patients, there was no statistically significant difference 
between the two groups (Chi-Sq = 0.105, DF = 1, p = 0.745). 
 
This gives a total of 25/115 (21.7%) patients where 27 medication related events were 
possibly linked to the reason for admission. These events are listed in Table 4.22 with 
an explanation linking the side-effect of the drug with an event that caused the patient 
to be admitted. 
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Table 4.22 Medication anomalies detected that may be related to the reason for 
admission (27 events in total). 
 
Cohort Reason for admission Drug Mechanism 
Dr* 
Admission with suspected 
head injury or stroke. captopril 
Captopril has side-effect of 
postural hypotension that may 
have led to a fall and head injury. 
Dr 
Admission due to acute 
left ventricular heart 
failure. atenolol 
Atenolol may have accumulated 
and decreased heart rate and 
cardiac output, so worsening heart 
failure. 
Dr Admission with shortness 
of breath (SOB), 
confirmed as active Non-
ST elevation myocardial 
infarction (NSTEMI). nifedipine 
Nifedipine stopped on admission 
as it produces vasodilatation and 
low blood pressure that may 
decrease coronary perfusion 
during heart attack. 
Dr 
Admission with symptoms 
of increasing heart failure. ibuprofen 
Addition of ibuprofen four months 
previously may have contributed 
to altered cardiac output. Doctors 
added ACEI and calcium channel 
blockers on this admission. 
Dr 
Patient with fatty liver 
admitted with chest pain, 
possibly myocardial 
infarction (MI). celicoxib 
Celicoxib is known to increase risk 
of heart failure and MI. 
Dr 
Admission with weakness 
and fatigue attributed to 
low sodium and 
hypokalaemia. 
bendroflum
ethiazide 
Bendrofluazide is a diuretic that 
may decrease sodium and 
potassium. 
Dr 
Admission with 
dehydration, constipation 
and abdominal pain. 
Unable to pass urine due 
to abdominal distension. frusemide 
Frusemide can produce 
dehydration, constipation and 
abdominal pain. 
Dr 
Diabetic patient with 
problems controlling 
blood sugar. 
Mixtard 
insulin 
Recent change in Mixtard insulin 
dose from 38 to 50 units BD. 
Dr 
Epileptic patient with 
increased seizure activity. 
sodium 
valproate 
Sodium valproate 400mg BD 
changed to 400mg mane and 
600mg nocte. 
Dr 
Asthmatic patient admitted 
with SOB and wheeze. 
asthmatic 
inhaler 
Patient ran out of inhalers so 
unable to control symptoms. 
Dr 
Epileptic patient with 
possible fit leading to 
collapse and causing 
fractured neck of femur. 
carbamazepi
ne 
Patient ran out of medicines and 
had not taken carbamazepine for 
four days. 
Dr 
Admission with SOB and 
wheeze.  ibuprofen 
Patient ha recently taken ibuprofen 
400mg TDS. Ibuprofen is known 
to worsen asthma in some patients. 
Dr Patient collapsed with ramipril Ramipril can cause postural 
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possible postural 
hypotension. 
hypotension. 
Ph 
Patient with diabetic keto-
acidosis caused by insulin 
problem. insulin 
Poor control of blood sugars with 
insulin can cause diabetic keto-
acidosis. 
Ph 
Patient with worsening 
heart failure, possible 
following myocardial 
infarction. digoxin 
Digoxin started five months prior, 
but stopped this admission. 
Digoxin accumulation or poor 
response. 
Ph 
Patient collapsed with loss 
of consciousness, possibly 
secondary to dehydration. 
diuretics 
and nitrates 
Diuretics and nitrates stopped on 
admission because diuretics can 
cause dehydration and nitrates can 
cause low blood pressure. 
Ph 
Admission with SOB, 
raised blood pressure and 
recently treated 
bradyarrhythmias. 
Thyroxine recently 
reduced. 
diclofenac 
and digoxin 
Hypothyroidism can cause 
bradycardia. Diclofenac can cause 
water retention; SOB and raised 
BP. Digoxin can accumulate with 
water retention causing 
bradyarrhythmias. 
Ph 
Admission with vision 
problems and muscle and 
ligament pain. 
amiodarone 
and 
simvastatin 
Amiodarone can cause corneal 
deposits. Simvastatin and 
amiodarone interact with increased 
risk of muscle and ligament pain. 
Patient also taking bezafibrate. 
Ph 
Admission with dizziness, 
visual disturbance, chest 
pain haematuria, 
hypertension and anxiety. 
fluoxetine 
and 
nifedipine 
Recently started fluoxetine can 
cause visual disturbance. 
Dizziness could be related to 
nifedipine. 
Ph 
Admission with chest pain 
and possible heart attack. celicoxib 
Celicoxib can causer water 
retention and MI 
Ph 
Patient with urinary tract 
infection, confusion, 
decreased urine output, 
and collapse (also possible 
septic dilatation) atenolol 
Atenolol can accumulate in renal 
dysfunction causing bradycardia 
and heart failure 
Ph 
Patient admitted and died 
of heart failure. GP 
increased ramipril from 
5mg to 10mg but patient 
said made feel worse so 
only took 5mg  ramipril 
The increased dose of ramipril 
may have decrease blood pressure 
and made patient feel weak. 
Reducing dose back from 10mg 
could decrease cardiac output. 
Ph 
Doctor rewrote chart. 
Pharmacist noted increase 
in MTX toxicity. 
Readmitted three weeks 
later with NSTEMI. celicoxib 
Possibly extra doses of 
methotrexate. Celicoxib can cause 
heart failure. 
Ph 
Patient admitted following 
fall, maybe caused by 
dehydration or change in 
cardiac output. 
allopurinol 
and 
amlodipine 
Diuretics can cause dehydration 
and renal dysfunction. No dose 
reduction for allopurinol despite 
raised creatinine. Atenolol and 
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enalapril replaced by amlodipine 
could change cardiac and renal 
function. 
Ph 
Osteoporotic patient with 
recent manipulation by 
osteopath, admitted 
following a fall. 
co-
proxamol 
and 
amitriptyline 
Co-proxamol can cause dizziness 
and confusion. Amitriptyline is 
associated with falls. Manipulation 
may have affected gait. 
Ph 
Previous admission with 
hypoglycaemia. Glipizide 
stopped on discharge. 
Patient re-admitted after a 
fall. Metformin taken 
twice a day at home but 
doctor prescribed daily on 
first chart.  
glipizide 
and 
metformin 
Fall possibly related to blood sugar 
control.  
Metformin first prescription error.  
Ph 
Problems with gait leading 
to a fall compliance 
compliance history and gait may 
contribute to fall 
 
*Dr – doctor; Ph - pharmacist 
Table 4.23 summarises the 27 medication-related admissions in five categories and 
identifies those events that were potentially avoidable. 
 
Table 4.23 Distribution of medication-related admissions by type 
 
 Side 
effect 
Cardiac Dose 
change 
Fall Supply 
Frequency 8 9 3 5 2 
Avoidable 5 4 0 3 2 
 
The ‘side-effect’ category refers to a patient who was consuming a medicine with a 
recognised side-effect that matched their presenting complaint. For example, a patient 
admitted with weakness and fatigue attributed to hyponatraemia and hypokalaemia 
who was consuming bendroflumethiazide. The ‘cardiac’ category refers to the 
patient’s presenting complaint that could have been caused or worsened by a drug. 
This could be a sub group of the side-effect category. For example a patient admitted 
with worsening anginal pain was consuming celicoxib, which can cause water 
retention and precipitate myocardial infarction. 
 
The ‘fall’ category refers to a patient admitted after a fall that could have been caused 
by a drug. An example was a patient admitted following a fall, who was consuming 
captopril that is associated with postural hypotension. The ‘dose change’ category was 
where symptom control was lost following a dose change or corrected by a change in 
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dose of their medication. For example a diabetic patient admitted because of problems 
controlling their blood sugar following a recent change in Mixtard insulin dose from 
38 to 50 units twice daily. 
 
A patient may be admitted with worsening symptoms of a pre-existing condition for 
which they had been prescribed medication, but had not taken them because they had 
not collected further supplies. For example, an asthmatic was admitted with shortness 
of breath and wheeze that the patient had previously controlled with inhalers, but they 
had emptied and not replaced them. 
 
4.5.2.4 Events during the admission phase 
Objective C - To quantify prescribing anomalies that occurred within the 
admission process. 
 
During the admission process there were 13 patients in the control arm who had 22 
events, and four patients in the intervention arm who had seven events. Table 4.24 
lists the 29 events that occurred (some patients had more than one event). The 
difference between groups in terms of events was not statistically significant (Chi-Sq 
= 0.518, DF = 1, p = 0.472). In terms of patients, the difference was significant (Chi-
sq = 10.006, DF = 1, p = 0.002). 
 
 
Table 4.24 Patients experiencing events detected during the admission process 
 
Pt. Cohort Event 
I Dr* Patient on cruise admitted with confusion due to UTI, now 
treated with trimethoprim. Also leg swelling & Shortness of 
breath, possible congestive cardiac failure. Drug history on 
quetiapine but not on clerking nor first chart. 
I Dr Patient on cruise admitted with confusion due to UTI, now 
treated with trimethoprim. Also leg swelling & Shortness of 
breath, possible congestive cardiac failure. Confusion over 
Sinemet dose and Entacapone dose. 
II Dr Glipizide on TTO but not given during 5 day inpatient stay 
III Dr Seretide omitted on admission clerking added two weeks later 
as patient using own without doctors being aware. 
IV Dr Patient with stroke and epilepsy admitted following fall. 
Transferred to orthopaedics. Alendronate in drug history but 
not on drug chart so added by pharmacist. 
V Dr Patient admitted with suspected stroke. PODs revealed 
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ibuprofen omitted. This was added to the inpatient chart by 
the pharmacist. 
V Dr Patient admitted with suspected stroke. PODs revealed 
hypromellose eye drops omitted. This was added to the 
inpatient chart by the pharmacist. 
V Dr Patient admitted with suspected stroke. PODs revealed 
fybogel sachets omitted. This was added to the inpatient chart 
by the pharmacist. 
VI Dr Montelukast omitted from the inpatient chart so they were 
added by the pharmacist  
VI Dr Seretide omitted from the inpatient chart so they were added 
by the pharmacist  
VI Dr Omeprazole omitted from the inpatient chart so they were 
added by the pharmacist  
VII Dr Sulfasalazine prescribed on inpatient chart but enteric coated 
formulation required so added by pharmacist. 
VII Dr Methotrexate prescribed as weekly. Pharmacist discovered 
that patient takes on Thursdays, so they added this to chart and 
crossed out other days. 
VII Dr Patient prescribed Hydroxychloroquine BD but pharmacist 
discovered this was only Monday to Friday and not at 
weekend. This was clarified on the chart by the pharmacist. 
VIII Dr Salbutamol prescribed as metered dose inhaler but the patient 
actually used a breath actuated autohaler. This was changed 
on the chart by the pharmacist. 
VIII Dr Beclomethasone inhaler prescribed without a strength. The 
lowest strength would normally be used but pharmacist 
discovered that 100microgram per puff was normally used. 
The chart was amended. 
IX Dr Candesartan prescribed as 8mg but POD was for 16mg. The 
chart was then changed to 16mg. 
IX Dr Simvastatin prescribed in the morning. However it is more 
effective when taken at night so pharmacist amended drug 
chart. 
X Dr Diltiazem MR 90mg prescribed as BD but patient usually 
takes once a day. It was subsequently changed to daily 
XI Dr Ezetimibe was stopped 3 weeks prior to operation but 
atorvastatin was added on admission. Ezetimibe was usually 
chosen due to intolerance of statins, but it was not clear in this 
case the original indication and why changes had been made.  
XII Dr Patient was admitted on warfarin and co-proxamol. The Co-
proxamol was changed to co-dydramol, probably to avoid 
interaction. 
XIII Dr Allopurinol changed from 300mg to 100 due to acute renal 
failure. Documented in notes by pharmacist. 
XIV Ph Patient prescribed diltiazem on inpatient chart. Pharmacist 
noted that patient had stopped taking their diltiazem. 
XIV Ph A patient on warfarin reported to the pharmacist that they 
were also taking cod liver oil capsules. 
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XV Ph Doctor ignored pharmacist’s chart and wrote a new 
prescription chart but omitted diazepam. This was added at a 
later date by another doctor. 
XV Ph Doctor ignored the pharmacist’s chart and wrote a new 
prescription chart but regular paracetamol that the patient was 
taking. This was added at a later date by another doctor. 
XV Ph Doctor ignored the pharmacist’s chart and wrote a new 
prescription chart but omitted timolol eyes drops. This was 
added at a later date by another doctor. 
XVI Ph Pharmacist added that patient takes alendronate on Mondays. 
XVII Ph On the previous admission the pharmacist had made lots of 
changes on the discharge prescription. On the previous 
admission the patient was taking sodium valproate 400mg in 
the morning and 600mg at night. However on this admission 
they were prescribed 400 BD. There was no documented 
record of a change in dose. 
*Dr= doctor; Ph = pharmacist 
Objective D – To determine and quantify if drug histories conducted by a 
pharmacist contain fewer omissions, errors and interactions than those 
conducted by junior doctors.  
 
A total of 17 patients had 29 events occur during their admission process. These 
events have been categorised in Table 4.25. 
  
Table 4.25 distribution of errors during the admission phase 
 
Patients 
Prescribing 
errors on 
admission 
Clerking 
drug 
omission
Error 
of 
detail 
Inapprop 
drug 
choice 
Dose 
adjust 
for renal 
dysfunc. 
Interaction 
Doctor 
history 
22 (75.9%) 10 9 2 1 0 
Pharmacist 
history 
7 (24.1%) 4 2 0 0 1 
Totals 29 14 11 2 1 1 
 
The ‘clerking drug omission’ category means that the first inpatient chart had a whole 
drug omitted, when compared to the drug history. The ‘error of detail’ category means 
that a detail of prescribing (dose, frequency, timing, route or formulation) did not 
match the drug history. The ‘inappropriate drug choice’ category means the drug was 
contraindicated or otherwise unsuitable for an individual patient. The ‘dose adjust for 
renal dysfunc.’ category means that the dose or frequency of the medication had not 
been adjusted for level of the renal dysfunction.  
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Objective E – To assess if the intervention had an impact on the 
prevalence of adverse events and medication errors after the admission 
phase of the hospital episode. 
 
This objective examined the inpatient and discharge phases of the hospital episode to 
see if there is a connection with the intervention made during the admission phase. 
 
4.5.2.5 Events during the inpatient phase  
Eight patients had nine events during the inpatient phase of the hospital episode. They 
were all from the doctor cohort and are listed in Table 4.26. The inpatient events have 
been categorised in Table 4.27. 
 
 
Table 4.26 Events detected during the inpatient phase 
 
Cohort Event 
Dr The conversion of IV metronidazole to oral, except the IV dose is 
500mg TDS and the oral is 400mg TDS. The doctor prescribed 
oral 500mg TDS so the ward pharmacist changed to 400mg 
Dr An alcoholic was prescribed IV Pabrinex, but could have taken 
oral medication because they were already on a reducing dose of 
chlordiazepoxide. After 48 hours the ward pharmacist got the 
doctor to change to oral thiamine 100mg daily  
Dr Patient with oesophageal varices and history of gastric bleeding 
was prescribed diclofenac. The ward pharmacist cautioned against 
this because diclofenac can cause gastric bleeding 
Dr A patient on meloxicam was prescribed aspirin for cardiac 
protection. This would negate the selective effect of the low dose 
aspirin  
Dr Co proxamol changed to codydramol in a patient with 
uncontrolled pain 
Dr Patient presented with shortness of breath, confirmed as NSTEMI. 
Enoxaparin prescribed 1mg/kg BD pharmacist changed to 70mg 
to ensure that something was administered 
Dr Clexane 1mg/Kg clarified to 80mg dose by pharmacist 
Dr Chest pain Clexane 1mg/kg BD changed to 80mg by pharmacist 
Dr Patient developed rash after three doses of Augmentin. There 
were no previously documented events 
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Table 4.27 Distribution of inpatient anomalies in control group 
 
Inpatient 
anomalies 
Details Drug 
appropriate 
Procedure ADR 
9 2 3 3 1 
 
The ‘details’ category refers to dose, frequency, or route that did not match those 
listed in the BNF for a particular drug. The ‘drug appropriate’ category refers to the 
selection of a drug that is either sub-optimal or harmful for a particular patient. The 
‘procedure’ category refers to poor completion or lack of adherence to a Trust 
recognised procedure. 
 
4.5.2.6 Events during the discharge phase 
 
Ten patients in the control (doctor) cohort had 14 events during the discharge phase 
and eight patients in the intervention (pharmacist) cohort had 11 events on discharge 
with the pharmacist; these events are listed in Table 4.28. The discharge phase 
contributed 25/45 (55%) of all the events in the hospital episode. The difference 
between groups was statistically significant in terms of events (Chi-Sq = 4.834, DF = 
1, p = 0.028). 
 
These 18 patients had 25 events that are summarised in Table 4.29. Some patients in 
the main study had more than one event; this is illustrated in Table 4.32. 
 
Table 4.28 Events detected during the discharge process 
 
Pt Cohort Event 
I Dr Admission with SOB confirmed as NSTEMI. Clopidogrel started 
on inpatient chart but omitted from discharge prescription (TTO). 
II Dr Admission with suspected stroke. Simvastatin prescribed daily on 
TTO but pharmacist changed to at night to improve efficacy. 
II Dr Citalopram started on inpatient chart but omitted from TTO. 
III Dr An admission with alcoholic liver disease, cirrhosis, jaundiced, and 
very unwell was prescribed vitamin K on the TTO. This would 
imply phytomenadione that requires bile salt secretion for its 
absorption. The pharmacist changed the prescription to menadiol, 
which is more water soluble and has good absorption even with 
cholestasis.  
IV Dr Folic acid prescribed on the inpatient chart but omitted from TTO. 
IV Dr Tiaprofenic acid prescribed BD on admission but unintentionally 
changed to daily on discharge. 
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V Dr Dihydrocodeine 30mg QDS prescribed on inpatient chart but 6mg 
QDS on TTO. 
V Dr Diclofenac MR BD prescribed on inpatient chart but plain tablets 
prescribed daily on TTO.  
VI Dr A steroid reducing schedule was prescribed ambiguously on the 
TTO, so the pharmacist clarified the details with the doctor. 
VII Dr A patient with a history of deep vein thrombosis was admitted on a 
Friday ready for bladder tumour resection and removal of bladder 
polyp and stones on the next Monday. On the Friday they were 
started on both enoxaparin and warfarin. The INR was due to be 
checked on Monday morning following three loading doses of 
warfarin.  The patient would require therapeutic enoxaparin 
(1.5mg/kg) until the INR was 2 to 3. However the patient had to be 
urgently discharged on the Saturday and was only prescribed 40mg 
enoxaparin on the TTO. After discussion with the pharmacist the 
junior doctor changed the dose back to the 120mg that had been 
given on the Friday.  
VIII  Dr Patient was using their own Flixonase nasal spray on the ward but 
omitted from TTO. 
VIII  Dr Patient was using their own Otrivine nasal spray on the ward but 
omitted from TTO. 
IX Dr Lansoprazole prescribed as 2mg daily on the TTO. 
X Dr Amiodarone was prescribed TDS on the inpatient chart but daily 
on the TTO. The pharmacist changed to BD for 1 week, then daily 
in accordance with usual dosing schedule. 
XI Ph Isosorbide mononitrate dose ambiguous so clarified by pharmacist. 
XI Ph Antibiotic course prescribed for 28 days was confirmed with 
doctor that only two days were required to complete the course. 
Patient was readmission within 2 days of discharge and 
subsequently died of congestive heart failure and atrial fibrillation. 
There was no clear link to any medication. 
XII Ph Patient was prescribed QVAR for regular use, said he only used it 
when required. The pharmacist counselled the patient and wrote a 
compliance chart. Subsequently the pharmacist screened the TTO 
that stated that Becotide was required; because the pharmacist 
knew the patient they changed the TTO to QVAR. 
XIII Ph Patient was taking diltiazem on a previous admission, when it was 
stopped. However on this admission it was prescribed on TTO. 
Doctor confirmed this was unintended. 
XIV Ph Ranitidine prescribed as 200mg at night on TTO so pharmacist 
changed to usual dose of 300mg. 
XIV Ph A patient was admitted for surgery taking warfarin. In accordance 
with normal practice this was changed to therapeutic doses of 
enoxaparin around the time of the operation. However on discharge 
there was no warfarin prescribed on the TTO, so the pharmacist 
wrote that the GP could restart anticoagulation when wound drains 
had been removed (in accordance with instructions on the 
operation note. 
XV Ph Nicorandil prescribed as 20mg BD on the inpatient chart but on the 
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TTO it was written as 30mg BD. The pharmacist confirmed this 
was an unintended change. 
XVI Ph A patient was taking zolpidem when required at night. However 
the TTO stated that it should be taken regularly, every night. 
XVI Ph A patient was prescribed simvastatin 60mg at night on the inpatient 
chart, but 600mg on the TTO. 
XVII Ph A salbutamol inhaler was prescribed in a dose of 2.5mg (nebuliser 
dose) on the TTO. The pharmacist changed this to the usual 100 
microgram inhaler dose. 
XVIII Ph A patient was admitted to intensive care with a respiratory tract 
infection. They were started on steroids and a proton pump 
inhibitor. On the ward the steroids were reduced progressively. On 
the TTO the steroid reduction was continued without a clear 
indication to stop either steroids or proton pump inhibitor. 
 
 
Table 4.29 Summarised events detected during the discharge phase 
 
 Drug omission Details Failure to 
finish 
procedure 
Total 
Control 5 8 1 14 
Intervention 0 10 1 11 
 
 
4.5.2.7 Patients with multiple events 
 
Table 4.30 Distribution of patients throughout main study with number of events 
 
Patients Analysed pts with 
1 
events 
pts with 
2 events
pts with 
3 
events 
pts with 
4 
events 
pts with 
5 
events 
Total 
pts with 
events 
Doctor 
history 
59 22 8 2 1 1 34 
Pharmacist 
history 
56 19 5 1   25 
Totals (%) 115 41 
(35.6) 
13 
(11.3%)
3    
(2.6) 
1    
(0.9) 
1        
( 0.9) 
59 
(51.3) 
 
Just over half, (59/115; 51.3%) had events in the main study (MRAs and events in 
hospital); 41/115 (35.6%) patients had one event; 13/115 (11.3%) patients had two 
events and 5/115 (4.3%) patients had more than two events. However because only 
115 patients could be analysed, this study is underpowered to prove a statistically 
significant difference. The small difference gives chi-squared = 1.939, DF=1, 
p=0.164. These results therefore do not show a statistically significant difference – 
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although there is a trend. The study power is only 0.23 and to show a statistically 
significant difference would have required recruitment of 231 subjects in both arms of 
the study. If the medication related admissions are disregarded this leaves just events 
that occurred within the hospital processes (representing 37/115 = 32% of patients). 
To show the numbers of patients with multiple events Table 4.30 becomes Table 4.31. 
 
Table 4.31 Distribution of patients with multiple events within the hospital 
episode. 
Patients Total 
Patients 
Analysed 
pts 
with 1 
events
Pts 
with 2 
events
pts 
with 3 
events 
Pts 
with 4 
events 
pts 
with 5 
events 
Total pts with 
events 
(corrected for 
duplicates) 
Doctor 
history 
59 21 8 1 0 1 31 (25) 
Pharmacist 
history 
56 7 4 1*   12 (12) 
N (%) 115 28 
(24.3 
12 
(10.4) 
2  
(1.7) 
0     
(0) 
1  
(0.9) 
43 (37) 
* This event was because the doctor rewrote the pharmacist’s chart; the pharmacist’s 
chart did not contain these events. 
 
4.5.2.8 All events within hospital processes  
 Objective F – To determine if the pharmacist transcribed this data into 
the first hospital prescription, ready for the doctor to sign, does this 
reduce medication errors, potential interactions and ‘adverse drug 
related events’ and facilitate the admission or discharge process. 
 
Table 4.32 summarises all 63 events that occurred in hospital across the admission, 
inpatient and discharge phases. Some patients had events in more than one phase of 
the hospital episode or journey that causes some double counting. Within one phase, 
some patients had more than one event.  
 
Table 4.32 Summary of events during the complete hospital episode 
 
Cohort  Prescribing 
events on 
admission 
Prescribing 
events as 
inpatient 
Prescribing 
events on 
discharge 
Total 
events 
within 
hospital 
Patient 13 8 10 31 Doctor 
(control) Event 22 9 14 45 
Patient 4 0 8 12 Pharmacist 
(Intervention) Event 7 0 11 18 
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A total of 63 events occurred within hospital processes and 45/63 (71.4%) occurred 
within the control cohort. Seventeen patients had 29 events during the admission 
phase with 22/29 (75.9%) events occurring in the control cohort.  Eight patients had 
nine events during the inpatient phase with all events in the control. Eighteen patients 
had 25 events during the discharge phase with 14/25 (56%) events occurring in the 
control cohort. In the control arm 22/45 (48.9%) prescribing errors occurred on 
admission, 9/45 (20.0%) during the inpatient phase and 14/45 (31.1%) during 
discharge. In the intervention arm 7/18 (38.9%) prescribing errors occurred on 
admission and 11/18 (61.1%) during discharge. There were no anomalies during the 
inpatient phase.  
 
Table 4.33 shows a summary of events that occurred before and during the hospital 
episode and Table 4.34, the events occurring throughout the whole hospital process, 
including discharge. 
 
Table 4.33 Summary of events that occurred before and during the hospital 
episode. 
 
Cohort  Medication related 
admissions 
Events within 
hospital  
Total  (corrected for 
double counting) 
Patients 11 31 42 (34) Control 
(doctor) Events 13 45 58 
Patients 14 12 26 (25) Intervention 
(pharmacist) Events 14 18 32 
 
Almost three quarters of patients (31/42;73.8%) in the control arm had events that 
occurred within the hospital processes, but the double counting of patients introduces 
a notable discrepancy; 12/26 (46.2%) patients in the intervention arm had events that 
occurred within hospital processes. The majority of events (45/63;71%) that occurred 
within the hospital process occurred in the control (doctor) pathway. 
 
Table 4.34 Summary of events that occurred within hospital processes. 
 
Cohort  Total events 
during hospital 
episode 
No events 
during hospital 
process 
Number of 
patients in 
cohort 
Patients 25 34 59 Control 
Events 45 0  
Patients 12 44 56 Intervention 
Events 18 0  
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There was a statistically significant difference between the control and intervention 
cohorts in terms of patients affected (Chi-sq.=5.775, DF=1, p=0.016). 
 
 
4.6 Discussion  
 
4.6.1 Part 1 - side-study questionnaire  
The recruitment to this side-study (177) is greater than the main study (151) because it 
was conducted immediately after consent to participate in research; 26 patients were 
not admitted or missed by the pharmacist. The frequency distribution gives an 
interesting insight into the distribution of the number of medicines consumed in the 
main study – although the total numbers do not match. Firstly, increasing the 
recruitment to those taking 2 medicines or more only added a maximum of 10 
patients. So this does not explain the lower than expected recruitment rate in the main 
study. It may be that the rate of recruitment increased as the researchers became more 
familiar with the routine.  
 
The range of medicines taken by the subjects in this study varied from two to 14. 
It was interesting how many medicines were consumed; half the patients were 
consuming 5 or more and a quarter, 7 or more. 
 
Question 1 (see Appendix 5 for questions) 
This question was divided into two parts: part A asked about the number of medicines 
and part B asked about the number of tablets.  Part B was to review how patients often 
describe the number of tablets taken and to correlate to part A. It was hoped that by 
asking the question in two different ways an internal correlation could be achieved 
and still achieve the goals of brevity and clarity.161,162 However it revealed a 
deficiency in the question, which should have read: ‘how many doses per day?’. Some 
patients included inhalers and creams, some did not. Some patients in their answers 
showed that they thought of medicines as mixtures and different from tablets. GTN 
spray and inhalers also caused confusion. The nurses recorded more detail as the 
study progressed and they learnt a simple number was inadequate. So it is not possible 
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to analyse this rationally. Suffice it to say that many patients were taking a lot of 
medicines and a lot of doses. It is hardly surprising that medication errors occurred. 
 
Question 2 
This did not reveal the most convenient time of day to take a medicine. The question 
was deficient, or too complex. 
 
Question 3 
This found that 127/177 (71.8%) stated they never forgot a medicine, but this could 
have been to try to say what they thought the nurse wanted to hear. Twelve said their 
carer ensured they did not forget, increasing the alleged compliance to 139 
/177(78.5%).  Table 4.3 shows that the remaining 38 (21.5%) admitted to frequently 
forgetting their medicines. The 38 patients gave a variety of answers, from forgetting 
‘all of them’, ‘just occasionally’, ‘those at a particular time of day’, or named a 
particular tablet. There were also those who took a specifically missed tablet later in 
the day.  
 
Question 4  
This gives some insight into how patients perceived medicine taking, but it is really 
only hypothesis generating, like much of the data from this questionnaire.156/177 
(88.2%) stated that it did not disrupt their daily routine and a further 8 stated it was 
part of the routine.  
 
Question 7  
This originated from a perception that patients who consumed pain killers would not 
be admitted because the doctor would be misled by their level of pain. The answers 
showed only five patients who expressed this concern. It is not clear out of the 127 
(who had taken no pain killers), how many were not in any pain. However a more 
conditional question (like question 10) demonstrated that patients had difficulty 
understanding a more complex question. Forty-five patients just took their normal 
medication but it was not always clear in how many cases this included an analgesic. 
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Questions 8 and 9  
These questions explored the complex subject of intolerance due to side effects and 
perceptions of allergy. Question 8 asked about allergies to all drugs and 74.6% said 
they did not have any and 2.3% were unsure. Out of the 45 patients who provided 
further information (following an affirmative answer) three described symptoms of 
illness and 14 described a side-effect of the drug to which they were ‘allergic’. In the 
author’s opinion, this can be interpreted as 14/177 (7.9%) were intolerant. If the 
unsure and uninformed were included, then it could be assumed that 10% of patients 
might benefit from a medication review, prior to classification as having a drug 
allergy. 
 
Seventeen patients stated that they were allergic but were unable to describe the 
symptoms. Some were told by the anaesthetist that they had an allergic reaction, but 
they were otherwise unaware. Others accepted a statement by a healthcare 
professional that they were allergic to a particular drug without asking for details; 
28/177 (15.8%) said they were truly allergic to a medicine they have been given. This 
shows the importance of this question when taking a medication history 
 
Question 9  
Nearly all patients had had antibiotics and 82.5% (146/177) had had no adverse 
reaction. Out of the 25 who had, 8/25 (32%) were either unclear, described symptoms 
of illness or side effect of a drug i.e. intolerance; and 17/25(68%) described allergic 
symptoms or stated they were allergic. In other words 17/177 (9.6%) appeared to be 
truly allergic to an antibiotic they had taken. 
 
Question 10 
This looked at those patients who were regularly or frequently prescribed antibiotics; 
31/177 (17.5%) fell into this category. The three main indications were 18/31 (58.1%) 
chest infections (particularly in winter), 9/31(29.0%) recurrent infections (notably 
oncology patients) and 4/31 (12.9%) urinary tract infections. 4/177 (2.3%) were 
unclear how to respond because they had been prescribed antibiotics for gut 
decolonisation or splenectomy prophylaxis. The majority (142/177; (80.2%) did not 
take regular antibiotics. 
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Question 11 
This was asked to explore how many patients brought in their medicines to aid the 
admission history taking process; 42% brought in their medicines and a further 12.4% 
only brought in a written list. The 39% who brought in nothing gave no reason and it 
is not clear if they were told not to, or simply forgot. This presents a challenge to the 
A&E department; a decade ago, hospitals wanted patients to either not bring in their 
medicines or return the medicines to home within 24 hours. Anecdotally many 
medicines were mislaid as patients transferred between wards and the pharmacy has 
to re-dispense them. In the author’s opinion, many hospitals now use PODS wherever 
possible; but previous hospital experience may make patients reluctant to bring in 
their medicines. 
 
Question 12 
The author initially expected all patients to deny taking someone else’s medicines; but 
only 166/177 (93.8%) did this; 11/177 (6.2%) of patients declared they took someone 
else’s medicines and volunteered their justification for this. 
 
4.6.2 Part 2­ main study 
 
4.6.2.1 Randomisation & exclusion 
The nature of this project in the A&E department produced anticipation that there 
would be a large drop out rate due to attendee patients being very ill and unable to 
consent to a research project. However the size of the other exclusion categories was 
somewhat surprising. 
 
Twenty-two patients were missed before the research nurses could discuss the study. 
This was despite the fact that the nurses were familiar with the flow of patients. They 
were missed because the nurses were obtaining consent from other patients. This 
demonstrates the rapid throughput of patients in the A&E department and the 
difficulties of conducting research in this area. The total number of patients possible 
for recruitment (the denominator) was obtained from a booking record for the hours 
that the nurses were working. So an initial screening loss of 55 patients out of a 
possible 346 represents unavoidable 16% omissions to recruitment. 
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 The project design was a compromise between analysing all patients, and the 
workload involved. A previous project in Portsmouth Hospital123 had suggested that 
half the patients attending A&E were taking two or less medicines. So in this study 
three or more medicines were chosen as the cohort most likely to have problems of 
prescribing, interactions and polypharmacy. 
 
4.6.2.2 Objective A - To determine the distribution of the number 
of medicines consumed on admission. 
In May 2004, 291 patients (346-55) were recruited and 43% (125/291) were 
consuming three or more medicines. Out of the 125 captured, a further 9 were missed 
by the pharmacist, and 61 excluded (according to criteria) because they were too 
unwell. Only 29 declined consent and 24 were recruited to the study. This gives an 
elimination of 81 %( 101/125). This high a proportion would be of concern in a 
normal randomised controlled trial of an investigational medicinal product. However 
there is no reason to presume that the exclusion was other than by the initial criteria 
set. It would therefore form a standard error or proportion each month. This 
demonstrates the difficulty of running a research project in the A&E and impacts on 
the number of pharmacists that would be needed to conduct a drug history service for 
all patients admitted during daylight hours of weekdays. 
 
The level of three medicines or more was chosen to optimise capture of drug 
interactions and polypharmacy. It could be argued that patients could have an 
AMRAE or AMRAR from one drug alone. However right from the start if a 
pharmacist intervention service were to be provided, it would be likely to focus on 
those taking multiple medicines. This criterion of recruitment is likely therefore, to 
under-estimate the true incidence of medicine related admissions. 
 
An analysis of the results in May indicated that the researcher would be unable to 
recruit a sufficient number of patients to satisfy initial power calculations before 
funding for the research nurses was exhausted. In hindsight, the constraint on 
recruitment was the time of the nurses as they filtered out the patients. To conduct this 
again it would probably be necessary to increase the number of nurses to at least 
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three. At the time, there were no funds to do this. It had proven difficult to obtain 
funding of any sort. The nurses’ start date could have been delayed, but planning and 
ethics applications had to coincide with the availability of two nurses who could be 
recruited to do this work.  
 
This also had to be matched with the logistical availability of the research pharmacist 
JT and her ability to conduct drug histories. Although the allocated pharmacist time 
was underused, recruitment could only have been increased by two pharmacists 
working on drug histories at the same time. This is because there were times when 
several patients were recruited and ready but the pharmacist was already occupied 
conducting a drug history with the first patient. This was a feature of the research 
methodology in that patients were not recruited in an even pattern and some clustering 
was inevitable. This would have introduced a new variable into the conduct of the 
drug history that is crucial to the consistency of this research. A key feature of this 
research is that one pharmacist was conducting the intervention (JT) and a different 
single pharmacist (the author) was searching the notes, to give consistency and 
reliability. 
 
The end result of this was that after 5 months of patient recruitment, only 151 patients 
had completed randomisation and consent. From this, 36 were lost because they were 
discharged before being admitted to a ward. Often this was discovered when the 
medical notes were retrieved and reviewed and there was no entry of an admission 
clerking or no first hospital prescription. This left 115 patients for analysis. At 
inception, this project was known to be ambitious; however it was not anticipated that 
such a high rate of attrition would occur.  
 
The randomisation produced a balanced allocation to each arm of the study. 76 
participants were allocated to the control pathway (doctors making their traditional 
notes of the medicines consumed) and 75 allocated to the intervention pathway 
(pharmacist conducting detailed drug history). 
 
After randomisation there were 36 patients who were not admitted. This comprised 17 
in the control cohort and 19 (includes 3 missed by the pharmacist) in the intervention 
cohort. This left a total of 115 patients where the notes could be analysed: 57 in 
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doctor cohort and 56 in pharmacist cohort.  The ‘not admitted’ category is part 
supposition, in that the notes were reviewed but no entry nor prescription chart could 
be found for these dates; so it can only be assumed that they were discharged before 
they were admitted. 
 
4.6.2.3 Objective B - To quantify the current rate of medication 
related admissions at Southampton General hospital . 
Table 4.22 (Section 4.5.2.3) lists the medication related events that may have 
contributed to the patient being admitted. 
 
The results (Section 4.5.2.3) show that there were 25 patients (11+14) who had events 
or symptoms that contributed to the admission that could be explained by the 
medicines they were consuming. This means that 25/115 (21.71%) of admissions 
were medication related. They were approximately evenly divided between the 
control (11) and intervention (14) cohort. The difference was not statistically 
significant. This was not surprising, because no intervention had been made at this 
point; the control and intervention cohorts were effectively the same group. Some 
patients had more than one event; two patients in the control cohort had two events.  
 
A review of publications from 1966-2001 showed that 28% of emergency department 
visits (attendees) were drug related163 and 70% were preventable yet 24% produced 
hospital admissions. The data were captured either by recording the admission as 
‘medication related’ or following a review of the charts. One study in the review 
attributed non-compliance as representing 58% of cases. Up to 70% of drug-related 
visits to A&E were deemed preventable. Recommendations included involving 
pharmacists to help identify and resolve drug-related problems and prevent 
recurrence.  
 
A Dutch study in 1997 showed that 102 admissions of over 70 years of age were 
consuming an average of 5.9 drugs; 24% of the admissions had severe ADRs.164 A 
UK study in 2004 in a medical admissions unit, showed that 8-18% of admissions 
were medication related.165 It also showed that 39% of GP letters contained 
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inaccuracies in drug histories. The pharmacists in MAU made 150 interventions per 
week of which 42% were highly significant. 
 
The author’s finding is higher than the 5-7% reported by other workers.163 This might 
be because the author was drawing this conclusion independent of the admission 
process. Many studies have used either preliminary screening by a nurse, or a 
consensus panel. Many studies have entered into an evaluation after the doctor has 
eliminated other possible diagnoses. The 22% found in this study illustrates that the 
presenting complaint could have been explained by drug effects. Clearly the patient’s 
condition could have deteriorated independently of the drugs being consumed. 
Alternatively, inadequate dosing may produce symptoms that are undertreated 
(unlikely to be detected in this study). This was underestimated, apart from the two 
patients who ran out of the medicines they normally consumed. 
 
Table 4.23 (Section 4.5.2.3) summarises the medication related admissions (MRAs) 
and estimates those that were potentially avoidable. The ‘avoidable’ row in Table 4.23 
refers to events that in the author’s opinion, could have been avoided by not taking 
one of their medicines, with more careful monitoring or maintaining a supply of the 
medicine. For example a patient admitted with dehydration, constipation, abdominal 
pain and an inability to pass urine was taking furosemide, which can produce 
dehydration, constipation and abdominal pain. Better advice about side-effects and 
more frequent monitoring by the GP could have prevented this admission, although it 
may have required more participation from the patient. In total 14/25 (56%) events 
may have been avoidable. This is comparable to the 70% found in other studies.163  
 
From a total of 31 drugs implicated in admissions, the most frequent therapeutic 
groups were non steroidal anti-inflammatory agents (six cases) and diuretics (4 cases). 
These are common culprits in other studies and could perhaps be categories to which 
particular attention is paid when taking a drug history and quizzing the patient about 
side-effects. 
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4.6.2.4 Objective C - To quantify prescribing anomalies that 
occurred within the admission process. 
Table 4.24 (Section 4.5.2.4) lists the events that occurred during the admission phase. 
Table 4.25 shows the total numbers of events during the admission process and the 
number of patients involved and seeks to classify the events.  
 
The control cohort contained 14 out of 59 patients (23.7%) who had 22 prescribing 
anomalies in the admission phase. The intervention cohort contained 4 out of 56 
patients (7.1%) who had 7 prescribing anomalies in the admission phase; 22/29 
(75.9%) of all the prescribing anomalies occurring during the admission phase were in 
the control cohort. 
 
The control group had more patients (14 versus 4) who experienced prescribing 
anomalies during the admission phase compared to the intervention cohort. The 
control group experienced more prescribing anomalies (22 vs. 7) during the admission 
phase compared to the intervention cohort. The intervention produced fewer 
anomalies in terms of events, but the difference in numbers of patients affected was 
not statistically significant. 
  
4.6.2.5 Objective D - To determine if drug histories 
conducted by a pharmacist contain fewer 
omissions and errors than those conducted by 
junior doctors  
Table 4.25 shows the events during admission sorted into five categories. 
 
The control (doctor only) cohort contained six patients who had 10 drugs omitted.  
One patient had ibuprofen, Fybogel and hypromellose omitted. Another patient had 
Seretide, omeprazole and montelukast omitted. The remainder had single drugs 
omitted, which were alendronate, Seretide, glipizide and quetiapine. All of these 
omissions could be classified as important; they would score 4 as interventions (see 
Table 3.3, Section 3.2.3.1). 
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The control cohort had five patients who had nine anomalies of prescribing details, 
such as omitting enteric coating where there was a choice of product, or confusion 
over the precise dose needed. There were two inappropriate drugs prescribed: 
atorvastatin instead of ezetimibe, and co-dydramol instead of co-proxamol. There was 
one inappropriate dose: allopurinol 300mg in a patient with acute renal failure 
 
The intervention (pharmacist) cohort contained two patients where the independent 
doctor clerking in A&E omitted 3 drugs (diazepam, paracetamol timolol eye drops) in 
one patient compared to the pharmacist’s drug history. In a further patient, whilst both 
doctor and pharmacist noted that the patient had been consuming diltiazem, the 
pharmacist noted that the patient had recently stopped taking this medicine. These 
events have been counted as they occurred within this cohort. However the 
pharmacist history noted the diazepam, paracetamol and timolol and the doctor did 
not. The doctor on the ward ignored the pharmacist’s prescription and wrote a new 
chart, omitting these three drugs. In the second case, the doctor added the diltiazem to 
the pharmacist’s first prescription. It could be argued that these were not omissions 
attributed to the pharmacist’s drug history. 
 
Both doctor and pharmacist noted that the patient taking alendronate was on a weekly 
rather than a daily dose. However the pharmacist also recorded the day of the week to 
increase the chance that this cycle would be continued and blocked off the days when 
the medicine would not be taken to lessen the risk of a mistake being made.  As 
above, this was counted in the cohort but could be seen as non-attributable to the 
accuracy of the pharmacist’s drug history.  
 
One patient was taking sodium valproate 400mg BD but at the last discharge, the dose 
had been increased to 400mg mane and 600mg nocte; but the patient had not been 
taking this new dose. This was a genuine event, and not detected by either pharmacist 
or A&E doctor. 
 
One patient was taking an inappropriate over-the-counter medicine that interacted 
with the warfarin they were taking. 
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It can be seen that most of the events in the pharmacist cohort were not the result of 
the intervention. The diltiazem event was noted and the other drugs omitted were 
because the doctor rewrote the chart written by the pharmacist. The interaction was 
discovered by the pharmacist and the detail was an addition rather than something 
incomplete. So the pharmacist cohort could reduce to one interaction and one detail. 
 
The pharmacists drug histories and first prescriptions contained fewer medication 
anomalies than the doctors’. However the study was underpowered to demonstrate if 
this was statistically significantly different. This study also showed that the admission 
phase is an important source of errors. 
 
4.6.2.6 Objective E – To assess if the intervention had an impact 
on the prevalence of adverse events and medication 
errors after the admission phase of the hospital 
episode. 
The inpatient events (Section 4.5.2.5) are listed in Table 4.26 and are summarised in 
Table 4.27. These show that during the inpatient phase, the control cohort produced a 
further nine prescribing errors whilst the intervention cohort had none. These nine 
events did not relate to previous medication history; so although the accurate drug 
history on admission was associated with reduced medication anomalies throughout 
the patient journey, this was an association by chance and not causal. 
 
The discharge events (Section 4.5.2.6) are listed in Table 4.28 and summarised in 
Table 4.29. These data show that on discharge, in the control cohort 10 patients had 
14 events. Four patients had five drugs omitted including two for the whole inpatient 
episode, i.e. only discovered during discharge. There were seven patients who had 
eight details that were incorrect (including two who had omitted drugs). There was 
one failure to complete procedure that concerned warfarin management. This looks 
like 12 patients due to an apparent double counting (see discussion of Table 4.31). 
 
On discharge, in the intervention cohort there were eight patients who had 11 events.  
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Eight patients had 10 incorrect details and one patient had an additional failure to 
complete procedure. The procedural event was a failure to re-prescribe warfarin after 
an operation. It is not clear whether the fact that this cohort had no drug omissions 
was chance or linked in some way to the clearer drug history.  
 
4.6.2.7 Objective F - Does the pharmacist writing the first 
prescription reduce adverse events and medication 
errors on the patient’s journey through the hospital? 
Table 4.25 (Section 4.5.2.4) shows that the admission phase produced 22/45 (48.9%) 
of all the anomalies found in the control cohort during their hospital episode and 7/18 
(38.0%) of all the anomalies found in the intervention cohort; 29/63 (46%) events 
occurred in the admission phase of the hospital episode. The control group 
experienced a greater percentage of their prescribing anomalies (48.9% vs. 38.0%) 
during the admission phase of their hospital episode compared to the intervention 
cohort. The control group contributed 22/29 (75.9%) of the errors during the 
admission phase. Table 4.34 shows that the difference between the two groups was 
statistically significant. 
 
The author has shown in Section 4.5.2.4, objectives C and D, that the pharmacist 
taking a drug history in A&E and drafting the first drug chart will reduce omissions 
and anomalies in prescribing during the admission phase. However does this have an 
impact on the remainder of the patient journey? 
 
In this research, the notes of patients were inspected to look for anomalies throughout 
the hospital journey (admission, inpatient and discharge). However in conducting this 
research it was noticeable that pharmacists did not appear to write in the notes. Most 
of the pharmacist’s input, if recorded, was written on the drug chart. Notation in green 
pen was the only indication that some events had occurred. However it was evident 
from the changes made to the drug charts that the pharmacist had made interventions 
to correct anomalies. Why do pharmacists not write in the notes? Do pharmacists not 
want to be seen to criticise the doctor? Surely entries could be made in the notes that 
could positively describe the action and input made without criticism. 
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Table 4.30 (Section 4.5.2.7) shows the distribution of patients who had multiple 
events throughout the main study. In the control cohort, 34 patients had up to 5 events 
and in the intervention arm, 25 patients had up to 3 events. Some patients were 
admitted because of medication related events and went on to experience further 
events at different phases of their admission. This might be because they were on 
complex medicines, but the patient who had five events had one drug omission error 
(minor), three minor details and one important detail. The patient who had three 
events in the intervention cohort did not have these events introduced by the 
pharmacist. They occurred because the doctor ignored the chart written by the 
pharmacist and the doctor rewrote a new chart. 
 
Table 4.30 includes MRAs and events in hospital. However the MRAs would not be 
influenced by the intervention made. Therefore, Table 4.30 has been reconstructed 
with the MRAs removed to produce Table 4.31. This table shows a similar pattern to 
Table 4.30 but the double counting in the control cohort is more pronounced. Patients 
who had events in more than one phase of their hospital episode produced a total of 
31 events in the control cohort. However, correction of double counting reduces this 
to only 25. 
 
Table 4.32 (Section 4.5.2.8) summarises the events that occurred during hospital 
processes. It combines data from Tables 4.25, 4.27 and 4.29 to show that in the 
control cohort, a total of 45 events occurred within hospital processes and in the 
intervention cohort, there were 18 events. However, some patients had multiple events 
within one phase and between phases. This introduces the double counting illustrated 
in Table 4.31. 
 
Table 4.33 summarises all the events that occurred during the main study. It combines 
data from Tables 4.21 and 4.30 with data about the MRAs. This table shows that the 
double counting in the control cohort appears as 42 patients but is in fact only 34. 
That is, 11 patients had MRAs and 25 patients had events within hospital processes. 
In the control cohort, two patients had two MRAs and two patients with MRAs had 
further events. This double counting reduces the apparent 36 (11+25) to a figure of 34 
patients. 
 
201 
 
Table 4.33 also shows the double counting; the total in the intervention cohort appears 
as 26 patients but is in fact only 25. That is 14 patients had MRAs and 12 patients had 
events within hospital processes. In the intervention cohort one patient with an MRA 
had further events. This double counting reduces the apparent 26 (14+12) to 25 
patients. 
 
One of the objectives of this research was to determine if the pharmacist transcription 
of the first hospital prescription, ready for the doctor to sign, reduced medication 
errors, potential interactions and adverse drug related events early in the admission 
process, as well as throughout the patient journey. 
 
It is not clear if this objective has been achieved since none of the inpatient anomalies 
related to a prior drug history. However there were fewer anomalies in the 
intervention cohort on admission, inpatient and discharge phases of the hospital 
episode. Tables 4.32 and 4.33 (Section 4.5.2.8) show a total of 45 events in the 
control group and only 18 in the intervention group.  
 
Table 4.34 (Section 4.5.2.8) makes this clearer as it summarises all the patients who 
experienced events within the hospital processes and accounts for the double 
counting. It shows that out of 59 patients in the control cohort, 25 experienced events 
from within hospital processes and 34 had no events. The corresponding figures for 
the intervention group were 12 and 44 – a statistically significant difference.  
 
4.6.2.8 Objective G – To examine if it is logistically feasible for a 
pharmacist working in the A&E department to conduct 
drug histories. 
Within the constraints of this research, it has been shown that some patients could 
have drug histories taken by a pharmacist. In the author’s opinion, if this was a funded 
service it would be significantly easier to achieve. However to do this for all patients 
would require more pharmacists and 24/7 cover. This is unlikely to be achievable.  
 
The data capture period for this research ended in September 2004. In 2007 the 
hospital developed an initial assessment area and funded two pharmacists to provide a 
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clinical pharmacy service in this area. These pharmacists work an early or a late shift. 
They participate in the post-take ward round where many interventions are made.  
 
The first prescription written should contain the totality of medication that the patient 
is consuming on admission. Subsequently changes are made to reflect treatment of 
new symptoms, a new diagnosis or discontinuing medications that are no longer 
needed or causing further problems. 
 
However in reviewing the charts and notes, it appears that doctors did not prescribe 
medication that they consider no longer necessary without making clear notes to 
describe their actions. It is therefore not possible to determine if a drug was actively 
omitted or changed (an act of commission) or inadvertently omitted (an act of 
omission). 
 
During the inpatient stay or on discharge, it may be appropriate to re-commence the 
initial medications. Without an accurate initial dug history, this is not possible and 
causes delays and errors in the discharge communication with the ongoing care of the 
patient. The recording of an accurate drug history and comparison with the first 
prescription is now called medication reconciliation and forms part of an NPSA 
alert.153 This required that by December 2008, all Trusts would have policies in place 
for medicines reconciliation on admission. It recommended that pharmacists should 
be involved in medicines reconciliation as soon as possible after admission. 
 
Anecdotal feedback from the ward doctors was that they liked the pharmacist drafting 
the first prescription, as it helped their workload. However it was noticeable that 
many of the ward doctors rewrote the drug charts after the pharmacist had written it. 
No data were collected on this and it is not clear why this happened; it was probably 
lack of information about the process. If this was a service being implemented, much 
more support would be provided and this problem would be removed. Anecdotally, 
ward pharmacists remarked that it was easier to read the pharmacist’s prescriptions 
and deliberate pausing or stopping of medicines was more clearly indicated 
 
No data were collected on whether the nurses also found the pharmacist first 
prescription useful or if this reduced administration errors. 
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4.7 Study critique 
This was a single site study that had to be completed within four months. Initial 
estimates suggested that this would easily recruit over 300 participants. However in 
practice only 151 were recruited and only 115 could be analysed. This means that the 
numbers for detailed analysis are small. The differences across the whole hospital 
episode were statistically significant different. However the study was under-powered 
to determine this for each phase of admission, inpatient and discharge. 
 
Pharmacists do not record their actions in the medical notes, so more events may have 
occurred but were not detectable by the time the notes were reviewed. Doctors do not 
always record why changes are made on drug charts, so more events could have 
occurred than were detected. 
 
4.8 Suggestions for future research 
It would be interesting to quantify more accurately the number of medicines 
consumed on admission to hospital. This would include details of those taking less 
than three medicines and would in turn need clearer definitions or explanation about 
what counts as a medicine, given the confusion discovered with author’s 
questionnaire. 
  
Medicines reconciliation is facilitated if patients bring their own medicines into 
hospital. It is possible that positive encouragement is required from general 
practitioners and ambulance crew to increase the proportion of patients with PODs. A 
study could be conducted where a lecture, or other awareness intervention could be 
used to attempt to increase the number of PODs brought into hospital. 
 
Hospital pharmacists have tried to contribute to a review of medication prescribed as 
patients move from admission to hospital discharge. This is independent of the 
primary reason (e.g. surgery) for the hospital episode. Community pharmacists have 
been commissioned to conduct medication usage reviews and pass their 
recommendations on to the patient and general practitioner. It would be interesting to 
examine if this has an impact on hospital admissions.  
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 To provide a useful service, the pharmacist must conduct the drug history and attend a 
post-take ward round (often within 24 hours of admission). It is also likely that a pre-
admission clinical MUR would detect MRAs. Pharmacists contributing to pre-
admission clinics have now been shown to produce positive benefits.166
 
Some future work could analyse what pharmacists write in the medical notes and 
make recommendations about what should be written. This could be undertaken by 
asking the pharmacists to submit date and patient details when they write in the notes 
and then get someone to photocopy and analyse all the entries.  
 
4.9 Conclusions 
  
4.9.1 Questionnaire sub-study 
The questionnaire results provided useful information about the frequency distribution 
of patients entering the main study and A&E in general. There was some information 
about compliance and perceptions of medicines but although the nurses administered 
the questionnaire personally, there was still some ambiguity. 
 
• From the questionnaire study it can be seen that many patients were ill 
informed and lacked knowledge about the medicines they had taken. 
• Just over half (54%) facilitated medication history taking by bringing in their 
medicines or a written list. 
• Many patients entered hospital on multiple medications; in the preliminary 
survey, almost two thirds (64%) reported taking five or more medicines from a 
range of two to 14 medicines. 
• Almost half (42.9%) of the patients taking six or more tablets were consuming 
nearly nine-tenths (87.6%) of all the tablets 
• In May 2004, 291 patients were recruited as potential admissions through the 
Emergency Department and 43% (125/291) were consuming more than three 
medicines. 
• 38/177(21.5%) admitted to frequently forgetting their medicines. 
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• 121/177 (68.4%) were able to name some of their medicines. However, in 
total only 520 (39.2%) out of a total of 1327 could actually be named. 
• 161/177 (91.0%) knew the name of the condition their medicine was treating 
or described the part of the body that was affected. Up to four conditions could 
be named 
• 50/177 (28.2%) patients took painkillers before coming to hospital, although it 
was not clear how many had pain as a symptom of their presenting complaint. 
• 132/177 (74.6%) of patients declared they did not have allergies to drugs. 
However some of the ‘allergic’ symptoms described drug side-effects or 
symptoms of their illness. 
• 15% claimed to have experienced true drug allergies and should have had 
good documentation of this on their records. 
• 146/177 (82.5%) declared that they had not had reactions to antibiotics before. 
Only 17/177 (9.6%) described allergic symptoms or were told they were 
allergic. 
• 31/177 (17.5%) took antibiotics frequently, more than half (58.1%) were for 
chest infections. 
• 69/177 (39%) did not bring any of their own medicines with them, and 76/177 
(42.9%) brought all of them 
• 11/177 (6.2%) admitted they had used somebody else's prescribed medication 
 
4.9.2 Main Study 
• The randomisation achieved the desired balance between control and 
intervention cohorts. 
• 25 out of 115 (21.7%) admissions were medication related. In other words 25 
patients had events or symptoms that contributed to the admission that could 
be explained by the medicines they were consuming. They were fairly evenly 
divided between the control (11) and intervention (14) cohort. Some patients 
had prescription charts with more than one anomaly. 
• In addition to any medication related events, during the admission phase alone 
the control (or traditional) cohort revealed 14 out of 59 patients (23.7%) who 
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had 22 prescribing anomalies. This represented 22/45 (49%) of anomalies 
found in this cohort as they completed their hospital journey. 
• During the admission process, the pharmacist (intervention) cohort revealed 4 
out of 56 patients (7.1%) who had 7 prescribing anomalies in the admission 
phase. This represents 7/18 (38.9%) anomalies found in this cohort as they 
completed their journey through hospital. Therefore drug histories conducted 
by a pharmacist contained fewer omissions and errors than those conducted by 
junior doctors and this was a statistically significant reduction. 
• During all three phases of the hospital episode (admission, inpatient and 
discharge) 34 patients in the control (doctor) cohort of 59 patients experienced 
a total of 45 medication anomalies. 
• During all three phases of the hospital episode, 25 patients in the intervention 
(pharmacist) cohort of 56 patients experienced a total of 18 medication 
anomalies during their hospital stay.  The reduction seen in the intervention 
cohort reached statistical significance in terms of patients affected, but 
recruitment numbers were low. 
• Involving a pharmacist in the admission process was associated with reduced 
medication risks to patients – a significant difference was noted, in terms of  
patients affected. 
• The intervention included not just taking a drug history but also getting the 
pharmacist to transcribe this data onto the first hospital prescription, ready for 
the doctor to sign. This reduced errors in the admission process and was 
associated with reduced mediation errors. However it is not clear if there was a 
causal relationship since none of the inpatient nor discharge anomalies related 
to a prior drug history 
• It was logistically feasible for a pharmacist working in the A&E department to 
conduct drug histories. However it would require more than one pharmacist to 
provide sufficient input to review the majority of patients admitted. 
 
Key finding 
This research has focussed on patients who are admitted on weekdays between 9am 
and 5pm, through A&E, who are over age of 16, who are consuming three or more 
medicines. If a pharmacist conducts a medication history and drafts the first hospital 
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inpatient chart, this produces a statistically significant reduction in the number of 
patients who experience adverse drug related events or errors. Although the numbers 
were low (115) the implication for clinical practice is that hospitals that adopt this 
innovation and employ pharmacists to write the first hospital prescription should see a 
reduction in errors generated throughout the hospital episode. This has implications 
for process efficiency, will decrease junior doctors hours allocated to this task and 
reduce risks to patients that should in turn impact on complications, complaints, 
litigation and the costs associated with this.  
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 Chapter 5 - Prescribing errors and interventions 
5.1 Introduction 
A hospital prescription is a primary communication device that translates the 
prescriber’s thoughts into what they want the pharmacist to supply and what they 
want the nurse to administer. Pharmacists look at prescriptions whether on the wards 
or in the dispensary; they do not routinely observe what nurses administer; their focus 
is on what has or will be supplied and what the doctor’s intention was when they 
wrote the prescription.  Experience shows that in many cases, what was intended is 
not exactly what was written; this is called a technical prescribing error. However if 
the doctor’s choice of treatment was inappropriate, or did not take account of all 
relevant clinical information this would be a clinical prescribing error. 
 
5.1.1 Nature and classification of prescribing errors 
Technical prescribing errors are failures to execute a plan. These are often acts of 
omission;  for example, the prescriber forgot to sign or date the chart. However they 
can also be acts of commission, such as prescribing the wrong drug completely (e.g. 
amiloride instead of amlodipine) or miss-spelling a drug name such as to introduce 
ambiguity (e.g. disopyramide instead of dipyridamole).  
 
A clinical prescribing error is a planning failure. It could be prescribing a drug that is 
licensed for the patient’s condition but contra-indicated for that particular patient (e.g. 
an antibiotic to which the patient is allergic); or prescribing slow sodium to a patient 
with heart failure and hyponatraemia, where the problem is more likely to be water 
excess (needing a diuretic) rather than salt deficit. These are acts of commission; in 
other words, something is prescribed but it is inappropriate for some reason. Planning 
errors can also be acts of omission where the prescriber fails to undertake an action 
described in a national or local guideline. In general, clinical prescribing errors are 
more difficult to detect than technical prescribing errors.  
 
These are fundamental problems that arise in the dispensary. Detection in the 
dispensary is largely limited to technical prescribing errors. In the clinical areas, 
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because of greater access to data, it is possible to detect clinical prescribing errors. 
Pharmacist interventions prevent prescribing errors (PEs) reaching the patient. They 
act as a filter or barrier to prevent PEs translating into patient harm. So it is possible 
that recorded pharmacist interventions may be a data source for PEs. In this case PEs 
were a subset of interventions. Clearly there will be other PEs not detected (or not 
reported) as pharmacist interventions. For example it is likely that nurses also detect 
PEs and they are corrected before administration of medicines can proceed. Medical 
consultants supervise junior doctors in their team and will detect clinical PEs through 
clinical supervision. 
 
Several authors have raised the issue of inadequate training of junior doctors on 
pharmacology and therapeutics 147-150 as a reason why PEs occurred. However we 
shall see data in this chapter that suggest that this is only part of the problem. 
 
In 2007, the General Medical Council (GMC) offered funding support for research 
into PEs. In Southampton University the Dean of the School of Medicine was 
interested in pharmacists’ reporting of PEs in order to improve teaching. The clinical 
supervisors of junior doctors at Southampton General Hospital were interested in 
pharmacists reporting individual poor prescribers to improve performance of junior 
doctors in practice. The author and the pharmacy risk lead worked collaboratively 
with the Associate Dean and lead clinical supervisor to produce a bid to conduct a 
research project to capture PEs using the same systems used for pharmacist 
interventions. In practice this meant conducting an intervention study but coding those 
interventions that were the end of a process that was initiated by PEs.  
 
This was different from the methodology defined in Chapter 3 (intervention data) 
because it focused specifically on PEs and excluded interventions that were not PEs.  
Definitions of non-prescribing errors (NPEs) are given in Appendix 6, but include 
mainly the following: 
 
1. When the prescription is safe, but not in accordance with hospital policy or 
formulary e.g. Gaviscon instead of Gaviscon Advance; 
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2. When the doctor seeks advice about how to do something before initiating the 
process; 
 
3. When a prescription is intrinsically safe but the pharmacist  makes it safer (IV 
to oral conversion or adding a maximum dose) or more effective (statins at 
night) or cheaper (esmolol to labetolol), or easier to administer (changing from 
oral tablets to liquids). Where a pharmacist makes a prescription or treatment 
safer, more cost-effective or easier to administer, it is termed optimisation; or 
 
4. When there is detection of a nurse administration error. 
 
5.1.2 Objectives of the study 
The study reported in this chapter had the following objectives. 
 
• To determine what proportion of interventions are related to prescribing errors 
(PEs). 
• To determine what proportion of prescribing errors were acts of omission 
(omission prescribing errors or OPEs) or commission (commission prescribing 
errors or CPEs). 
• To discover what proportion of OPEs and CPEs occurred on admission, 
discharge or inpatient phases of the patient journey through hospital. 
• To describe how the intervention data were changed when PEs were 
eliminated and what was left of interventions that were not PEs. 
 
5.2 Method 
The project had two parts: firstly a specific analysis of the 2007 interventions 
conducted in anticipation of winning the GMC research funding referred to in section 
5.1. The second part of this study was a collective review of the 2005-9 interventions 
that were coded as PEs. 
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5.2.1 Method (part 1) 2007 Project  
The intervention study scheduled for June 2007 was set up prospectively to capture 
data that would enable analysis of PEs. Data fields were added to the intervention 
form (see Appendix 7) to aid the identification of prescribers (recording pagers and 
GMC number), grade of doctor, patient hospital number and an indication of PE or 
NPE. The Dean and clinical tutors instructed all junior doctors to sign prescriptions 
and add GMC and bleep numbers.  
 
Each intervention form (primary data) from June 2007 was analysed and coded as PE 
or NPE. If it was a PE it was sorted into errors of omission (OPEs) or commission 
(CPEs). Non-compliance with the hospital formulary was considered not to be a 
prescribing error (NPE). The prescribing errors were further sorted into those that 
occurred on admission, during the inpatient episode or on discharge. 
 
Each category (OPE or CPE) and phase of hospital episode (admission, inpatient, 
discharge) were then sorted into categories relevant to prescribing. For example, 
categories such as failure to follow/finish procedure, failure to review, or dealing with 
thromboprophylaxis, whole drug omissions, or details (e.g. dose, frequency, and 
route). Different categories naturally emerged from the different phases of hospital 
episode e.g. on discharge, unclear indication of treatment course completion, or 
addition of a new drug. 
 
The main descriptors for various categories of prescribing errors are shown in Table 
5.1. 
 
 
The data collection forms were then summarised into a matrix (Table 5.2, section 
5.3.1.1) with three columns: admission, inpatient and discharge; and three rows: CPE, 
OPE and NPE. 
 
 
  
212 
 
Table 5.1 Descriptors for different prescribing errors 
Descriptor Explanation 
POD whole drug This is where The PODtechs discovered that the 
PODS include a medicine that the doctor had 
completely omitted from the first prescription. 
Inpatient dose/freq or detail 
mismatch 
Where the dose, or frequency or other detail did 
not match the previous data (e.g. TTO did not 
match that prescribed as an inpatient). 
Ph drug or combo 
incorrect/inappropriate 
Where the pharmacist had identified that the 
drug was incorrectly prescribed, or inappropriate 
in the particular patient. It also referred to where 
a combination of drugs might be inappropriate 
when combined. 
Renal or liver or TDM Where a drug dose had not been adjusted or 
discontinued in renal or liver dysfunction. It also 
referred to dose adjustments following 
therapeutic drug level monitoring. 
Prophylactic Where prophylactic agents recommended in 
guidelines had been omitted or prescribed 
incorrectly. E.g. anticoagulants in atrial 
fibrillation or to prevent harm from blood clots 
or stress ulcers or peri-operative infections. 
Dose outside normal range A dose was too high  or low, compared to that 
recommended in standard text (e.g. BNF) or 
local and national guidelines. 
Pt/chart/drug details wrong Where there were inaccuracies in the 
documentation, such as prescribing a drug on 
another patient’s drug chart. Alternatively where 
the dose did not match the route prescribed. 
Failure to follow plan or finish 
procedure 
A procedure/policy/guideline existed but had 
been executed incorrectly or not completed. E.g. 
not prescribing antiplatelet drugs following 
cardiac stenting. 
Failure to review As the patient’s condition changed medication 
had not been adjusted. For example failure to 
discontinue potassium supplements despite a 
normal serum level. 
Allergy Failure to record a penicillin allergy; or 
prescribing a statin when a patient had been 
noted to be allergic. Some of these may have 
been false label, but some could be very 
significant anaphylactoid reactions. 
Unusual drug selection / 
combination 
Where the drug choice in a particular patient 
was inappropriate or outside the usual pattern. 
Drug combinations may also have been unusual. 
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5.2.2 Method (part 2) 2001-2009 Project 
This was a retrospective re-coding of intervention forms. The forms from 2001 to 
2009 were retrieved from storage. Intervention forms where a PE had not occurred 
(NPE), were then excluded. The PEs were sorted into those that were an act of 
commission (CPE) and those that were an act of omission (OPE).  
 
The prescribing errors were then further sorted into a number of categories in the 
same way as the June 2007 data (see Section 5.2.1 Table 5.1). This was summarised 
as findings over the 9 years (8 studies) as a collective view. The results were 
presented as CPE and OPE as well as analysed by phase of hospital episode 
(admission, inpatient, discharge). The errors were described as technical prescription 
writing errors or clinical choice/judgement prescribing errors. 
 
5.3 Results 
5.3.1  Results for 2007 Project (part 1) 
The doctors were poor at recording their identifiers (GMC and pager numbers) on the 
prescription charts, but that was not crucial to this analysis. One week in June 2007 
the pharmacists reviewed charts from 2,050 patients involving over 17,000 items and 
produced 996 intervention report forms. This was one intervention per 5.7% items or 
one every 4.8 patients. These are summarised in Table 5.2. 
 
Table 5.2 Summary of interventions and errors in June 2007 
 
Number of patients reviewed 2050 
Number of newly prescribed items 17,313 
Number of interventions 996 
Number of errors 529 
Ratio of errors to interventions 0.53 (529/996) 
Error rate 0.03 (529/17,313) 
Number errors with severity score >4* 21.2%      (112/529) 
*Severity scores are described in Table 3.3, Chapter 3  
 
In 2007, prescribing errors represented just over half (53.1%) of the forms submitted 
and 45.0% (238/529) of prescribing error forms related to the initial inpatient drug 
chart. Almost one quarter (22.3%; 118/529) of the prescribing error forms related to 
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where the dose or frequency did not match that normally consumed by the patient, or 
was outside BNF recommendations. 
 
5.3.1.1 Recalibration 
After reflection about the conduct and preliminary review of study results, the author 
decided a recalibration was required. All of the intervention data were based on the 
number of forms. Often a form for an admission intervention would cover several 
items that had been omitted. However for the patient, each item that was incorrect or 
omitted was important to them. So in this chapter, all of the prescribing error data 
were based on the number of items that were incorrect, rather than the number of 
forms. This recalibration for prescribing errors changed the data; each item omitted 
was considered to be a prescribing error that could harm the patient. The results of 
recalibration are shown in Table 5.3 
 
Table 5.3 Distribution of PEs vs. hospital phase after recallibration 
 
Type of error/ 
hospital phase 
Admission Inpatient Discharge 
NPE 46 (8.6%) 275 (42.6%) 20 (16.9%) 
PE 492 (91.4%) 370 (57.4%) 98 (83.1%) 
Total errors 538 645 118 
 
A statistical analysis of the differences between the proportions of NPEs and PEs in 
the three different phases showed a statistically significant difference (Chi-squared = 
181.96, DF=2, p<0.001). This was largely accounted for by the greater proportions of 
prescribing errors occurring during the admission and discharge phases (see Table 
5.3).  The recalibrated prescribing error rate from the number of items prescribed was 
5.5% (960/17313). On average, this represented 2.1(2050/960) patients per 
prescribing error. Alternatively, this represented an average of a prescribing error 
every other patient. 
 
The recalibrated events totalled 1301. This changed the 2007 data so that prescribing 
errors represented 73.8% (960/1301) of the events that were reported; 538/1301 
(41.3%) of all events occurred during the admission phase. There were a total of 960 
prescribing errors consisting of 292 CPEs and 668 OPEs. A small majority of PEs 
(51.3%; 492/960), occurred during admission; 370/960 (38.5%) prescribing errors 
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occurred during the inpatient phase and 98/960 (10.2%) occurred during discharge. 
These data are summarised in Table 5.4. 
 
Table 5.4 Distribution of type of prescribing error across phase of hospital 
episode. 
 
Type of 
prescribing error / 
hospital phase 
Admission Inpatient Discharge 
CPE 110 (37.7%) 145 (49.6%) 37 (12.7%) 
OPE 382 (57.2%) 225 (33.7%) 61 (9.1%) 
Total PE 492 370 98 
 
Most prescribing errors of commission occurred during the inpatient phase, whilst 
most errors of omission occurred during the admission phase. This produced a 
significant statistical difference (X2=31.04, df=2, p<0.001). 
 
5.3.2  Results for 2001-2009 Project (Part 2) 
5.3.2.1 All prescribing errors collectively 
Over the period 2001 and 2009, eight studies were evaluated. The PEs represented an 
average of 73.9 % (5151/6966) of all interventions. Tables 5.5, 5.6 and 5.7 show a 
breakdown of PEs into subgroups (OPE and CPE) and phases of hospital episode. 
Table 5.5 shows the distribution of all prescribing errors across admission, inpatient 
and discharge phases. 
 
Table 5.5 Distribution of all prescribing error across phase of hospital episode 
 
 Admission Inpatient Discharge 
Total PE 2334 2207 610 
% 45.3 42.8 11.8 
Table 5.6 shows how the division of prescribing errors into OPEs and CPEs. 
Approximately two thirds of all PEs are OPEs. 
 
Table 5.6 Distribution of all prescribing errors between those of omission and 
commission 
 Number of PEs % of all PEs 
OPEs 3457 67.1 
CPEs 1694 32.9 
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Table 5.7 categorises the PEs using the descriptors from Table 5.1 with a sub-
categorisation of technical, clinical or technical/clinical. 
 
Table 5.7 Distribution of type of prescribing errors across phase of hospital 
episode 
 
PE descriptor Admission* 
(% column) 
IP 
(%) 
TTO 
(%) 
Total 
(%) 
Type PE+ Total 
% 
POD whole drug 572 (24.5) 0 207 
(33.9) 
779 
(15.1) 
Technical 
IP dose/freq or detail 
mismatch 
651 (27.9) 0 152 
(24.9) 
803 
(15.6) 
Technical 
Dose abnormal  27 (1.2) 289 
(13.1)
39 
(6.4) 
355 
(6.9) 
Technical 
Details incorrect 0 614 
(27.8)
115 
(18.9) 
729 
(14.2) 
Technical 
2666 
(51.8) 
Ph Drug or combo 
incorrect/inappropriate 
946 (40.5) 176 
(8.0) 
46 
(7.5) 
1168 
(22.7) 
Technical 
& clinical 
1168 
(22.7) 
Interaction 8 (0.3) 87 
(3.9) 
1  
(0.2) 
96 
(1.9) 
Clinical 
Fail to follow plan, 
finish procedure or 
review 
86 (3.7) 717 
(32.5)
47 
(7.7) 
850 
(16.5) 
Clinical 
Renal or liver or TDM 24 (1.0) 137 
(6.2) 
0 161 
(3.1) 
Clinical 
Prophylactic 20 (0.9) 187 
(8.5) 
3  
(0.5) 
210 
(4.1) 
Clinical 
1317 
(25.6) 
Total 2334 2207 610 5151  5151 
*Admission refers to the first hospital prescription; IP = inpatient drug chart; TTO = 
discharge prescription. 
 See Table 5.1 for definitions of descriptors.  
+The division of all prescribing errors into either clinical or technical errors was 
incomplete because some errors were a combination of both types. 
 
A technical prescribing error was a failure to correctly execute the writing of a 
prescription. This was an incomplete, illegible or illegal prescription. It also referred 
to omitted or miss-spelt drug names or inappropriate combinations of route, frequency 
and dose. A clinical prescribing error was a planning failure where the drug or detail 
was inappropriate for an individual patient. This was often a failure to review the 
treatment as the patient’s condition changed, but also included prescribing a drug that 
was contra-indicated in a particular patient. 
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 Table 5.8 shows how a breakdown of types of prescribing errors was distributed 
between prescribing errors of omission and those of commission. It shows that about a 
third (36.6%) of prescribing errors were connected with details and about a third 
(32.0%) were the omission of regular medicines. However the largest category 
(47.7%) of OPEs was drug omissions. The largest category (70.4%) of CPEs was 
incorrect details. 
 
Table 5.8 Detailed distribution of prescribing errors into those of commission 
and those of omission 
 
PE category Total (%) OPE (%) CPE (%) 
Regular meds omitted 1649 (32.0) 1649 (47.7) 0 
Details (inc dose/freq) mismatch or 
inappropriate 
1887 (36.6) 695 (20.1) 1192 (70.4) 
Drug or combo incorrect, inappropriate, 
or interaction 
394 (7.6) 17 (0.5) 377 (22.3) 
Fail to follow plan, finish procedure, or 
review 
850 (16.5) 808 (23.4) 42 (2.5) 
Renal or liver adjustment or TDM 161 (3.1) 126 (3.6) 35 (2.1) 
Prophylactic 210 (4.1) 162 (4.7) 48 (2.8) 
Total PE 5151 3457 1694 
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5.3.2.2  Prescribing errors of Commission (CPE) 
Tables 5.9, 5.10, 5.11 and 5.12 show the distribution of 1694 CPEs across the 
admission, inpatient and discharge phases of the hospital episode: 
 
Table 5.9 CPE distribution across phases of hospital episode 
 Admission Inpatient Discharge 
Total CPE 557 916 221 
100% 32.9 54.1 13.0 
 
Table 5.10 CPEs during the admission phase sorted into 7 categories 
Prescribing errors of commission Events % 
Admission categories 557 100.0 
admission IP dose or freq or details mismatch 405 72.7 
Drug or combo incorrect or inappropriate 76 13.6 
dose outside normal range 27 4.8 
pt/chart/drug details wrong 22 4.0 
renal or liver or TDM 12 2.2 
Allergy 8 1.4 
fail to follow plan or finish procedure 7 1.3 
 
Table 5.11 CPEs during the inpatient phase was sorted into 9 categories 
 
Prescribing errors of commission Events % 
Inpatient categories 916  
dose/freq unknown inappropriate 280 30.6 
Details of route, formulation etc 274 29.9 
Drug or combo inappropriate 163 17.8 
Interactions 85 9.3 
DVT prophylaxis 48 5.2 
fail to follow plan or finish procedure 24 2.6 
renal or liver or TDM 23 2.5 
fail to review 11 1.2 
Allergy 8 0.9 
 
Table 5.12 CPEs during the discharge phase was sorted into 8 categories 
 
Prescribing errors of commission Events % 
Discharge categories 221  
IP/TTO dose mismatch 91 41.2 
unusual drug selection/ combination 36 16.3 
unusual or mismatched frequency 23 10.4 
Duration 23 10.4 
CD 18 8.1 
dose outside normal range 16 7.2 
incorrect route or formulation 13 5.9 
Interaction 1 0.5 
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 5.3.2.3 Prescribing errors of Omission (OPEs) 
Tables 5.13, 5.14, 5.15 and 5.16 show how the 3457 OPEs were distributed across 
admission, inpatient and discharge phases of the hospital episode. 
 
Table 5.13 OPE distribution across phases of hospital episode 
 
 Admission Inpatient Discharge 
Total OPES 1777 1291 389 
100% 51.4 37.3 11.3 
 
 
 
Table 5.14 OPEs during the admission phase categorised as to type.  
 
Type Events % 
Total OPEs in this phase 1777  
Ph whole drug incorrect or inappropriate. 870 48.9 
POD whole drug 572 32.2 
Admission IP dose or freq or details mismatch 224 12.6 
Fail to follow plan or finish procedure 46 2.6 
Fail to review 30 1.7 
Thrombo-prophylactic 19 1.0 
Renal or liver or TDM 12 0.7 
Wrong plan 3 0.2 
Prophylactic 1 0.1 
 
 
 
Table 5.15 OPEs during the inpatient phase categorised as to type. 
 
Type Events % 
Total OPEs in this phase 1291  
fail to review 559 43.3 
Details 340 26.3 
fail to follow plan or finish procedure 123 9.5 
renal/liver or TDM 114 8.8 
thrombo-prophylactic 109 8.5 
Prophylactic 30 2.3 
dose unknown inappropriate 9 0.7 
Drug or combo inappropriate 5 0.4 
Inter- action 2 0.2 
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Table 5.16 OPEs during the discharge phase categorised as to type 
. 
Type Events % 
Total OPEs in this phase 389  
Regular meds omitted 207 53.2 
IP/TTO dose mismatch 61 15.7 
Duration 43 11.1 
fail to review 27 6.9 
fail to follow plan or finish procedure 20 5.1 
Details 18 4.6 
new drug or unusual selection/ combination 10 2.6 
thrombo-prophylactic 3 0.8 
 
5.3.2.4 Non-prescribing errors (NPEs) 
When prescribing errors were removed from the intervention database there were 
1,849 non-prescribing errors. These are categorised by type in Table 5.17. 
 
Table 5.17 remaining NPEs categorised by type. 
 
NPE type Events % 
(N=1849)
Choice or need for drug or regimen 578 31.3 
Choice of dose/freq/timing 359 19.4 
Interaction or SE or ADR or monitoring 159 8.6 
Admin or calc or compatibility 128 6.9 
Choice of form or strength or route 119 6.4 
Documentation 101 5.5 
Pharmacokinetic or TDM 101 5.5 
Drug Duration 80 4.3 
Nutrition 79 4.3 
Supply or storage 74 4 
Other DI 71 3.8 
 
 
5.4 Discussion 
 
5.4.1 Discussion (part 1) 2007 Project 
From the counting of forms it can be seen that 53% (529/996) of the interventions 
were classified as PEs.  From the counting of items we find that 73.8% (960/1301) of 
the interventions were classified as PEs. This shows that however the tallying is done, 
PEs represented more than half of all interventions made. This reflects the fact that 
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pharmacists tend to focus on prescription forms rather than administration errors; they 
are often not in a position to detect the latter anyway.  
 
From the counting of forms we find that 3% (529/17313) of the total items prescribed 
were classified as PEs. From the more informative counting of items it can be seen 
that 5.5% (960/17313) of the total items were classified as PEs.  
 
About one fifth (21%; 112/529) had a severity score of four or more in terms of 
consequence to the patient. This shows that the bulk of the errors were minor in likely 
consequence. There is a perception that it is unlikely that a nurse would give a grossly 
inaccurate dose or that minor dosage errors are unlikely to cause patient harm. This 
also contributes to the culture of errors being ubiquitous but not harmful to patients, 
thus trivialising errors and building an acceptance that they will always occur no 
matter what is done to try and prevent them. 
 
In terms of hospital phase, total events were distributed into 41.3% admission, 49.6% 
inpatient and 9.6% discharge whereas  PEs were distributed as 51.3% admission, 
38.5%inpatient, 10.2%discharge. This suggests that a greater proportion of PEs occur 
on admission to hospital whereas NPE interventions occur later in the patient journey. 
Alternatively the pharmacists who work in admission areas were so busy correcting 
prescribing errors they had relatively less time to make NPE interventions. It might be 
argued that NPE interventions require a more reflective process to detect that takes 
time and is therefore more likely to occur later. This also suggests that if PEs could be 
decreased, the pharmacist could be involved in more optimisation throughout the 
hospital journey. 
 
A research study could investigate if additional pharmacist time in A&E or 
admissions wards would increases the NPE interventions to optimise therapy rather 
than just correct PEs. Alternatively, as budgets get squeezed and pharmacists’ time on 
the wards reduces, the number of interventions in total will decrease and the NPEs 
should reduce until all interventions are just prescribing errors. A third option might 
be the introduction of electronic prescribing. If electronic prescribing reduces the 
documentation errors (often severity 3) this should release more time for the higher 
level NPE interventions.  
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 What is apparent is that most inpatient activity is invisible to the dispensary. The 
dispensary staff only saw charts sent to them for non-stock supplies. One of the 
reasons why pharmacists emerged from the dispensary into clinical areas was to 
reduce problems and delays on discharge. Yet this is now a small proportion of the 
PEs seen.  
 
Clinical pharmacy has increased the detection of clinical rather than technical errors 
and the inpatient phase has progressively grown. More recently PEs on admission 
have emerged as the most significant phase of the hospital episode.70, 121, 167  
5.4.2 Discussion (part 2) 2001-2009 project 
Moving to the broader historical data, we see that PEs represented 73.9 % 
(5151/6966) of all interventions. Again this reflects the pharmacists’ focus on 
anomalies in prescriptions themselves. Nurse administration errors are reported in the 
adverse event forms that are sent to the NPSA, but these are not observed by 
pharmacists. Over 5,000 (5,151) PEs errors required pharmacist intervention over 8 
study periods of one week. This is an average of 644 PE per week, or 2,576 per 
month. There are some data variations, but the last four studies (2006-9) gave an 
average of 10,400 items per week, or a prescribing error rate of 6.2 % (644/10391). 
These were still large numbers of events, occurring on a regular basis.  
 
In comparison, Table 5.18 shows the annual number of the medication related adverse 
event forms submitted to the NPSA from Southampton University Hospitals NHS 
Trust, divided on the basis of health care profession. 
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Table 5.18 Medication adverse event forms from SUHT submitted each year to 
NPSA, by healthcare profession. 
 
Job Title / 
year 
2004 
(%) 
2005 
(%) 
2006 
(%) 
2007 
(%) 
2008 
(%) 
2009 
(%) 
2004-9 
total (%) 
Nurse 779 
(65.9) 
547 
(57.3) 
517 
(51.6) 
600 
(76.2) 
445 
(65.5) 
601 
(66.5) 
3336 
(61.1) 
Pharmacist 32  
(2.7) 
34   
(3.6) 
82 
(8.2) 
96 
(12.2) 
87 
(12.8) 
87   
(9.6) 
843 
(15.4) 
Other 300 
(25.4) 
240 
(25.1) 
111 
(11.1) 
21 
(2.7) 
25 
(3.7) 
22   
(2.4) 
267   
(4.9) 
Doctor 3    
(0.3) 
4     
(0.4) 
3  
(0.3) 
10 
(1.3) 
22 
(3.2) 
20   
(2.2) 
108   
(2.0) 
Not 
recorded 
68  
(5.8) 
130 
(13.6) 
288 
(28.8) 
60 
(7.6) 
100 
(14.7) 
174 
(19.2) 
908 
(16.6) 
Total 1182 955 1001 787 679 904 5462 
 
This shows that over the six years 2004-2009, nurses completed the majority (61.1%) 
of the reports. There were 908 forms where the reporter did not declare their 
professional group. Apart from the unknown reporter category, pharmacists were the 
next most frequent reporter. Although the average number of total reports per year 
(918) is about the same as the number of interventions reported in the annual 
pharmacy survey, it is clear that pharmacists reported appreciably less often than this 
to the NPSA.  
 
5.4.2.1 Phase of the hospital episode 
Table 5.5 shows a breakdown of the types of PE that occurred during the three phases 
of the hospital episode. Overall the largest portion 45.3% (2334/5151) of PEs 
occurred during the admission phase of the hospital episode. This is interesting 
because prior to 2005, most of PE detection was during the inpatient (2207, 42.8%) 
and discharge (610, 11.8%) phases. So by adding in the detection of PEs during 
admission, the pharmacists had nearly doubled (2817 to 5151) the number of detected 
PEs. 
 
Table 5.6 shows that 67.1% of all PEs related to something that had not been done 
(OPE).  How can the pharmacist detect these errors? The active collection of drug 
histories and the availability of national and local guidelines are probably important 
and will be further explored later in this section. 
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 Table 5.7 shows the distribution of all PEs across the different phases of the hospital 
episode. This table also shows a crude division of PEs into those that related to the 
technical aspects of writing a prescription and those that related to clinical decisions 
about what to prescribe. Over half (2,666/5151; 51.8%) were technical - a failure to 
prescribe completely and accurately from the data available; 1317/5151 (25.6%) were 
clinical - a failure to follow a clinical guideline or review medication consistent with 
the changing clinical status of the patient; 85.6% (1128/1317) occurred during the 
inpatient phase; 1168/5151 (22.7%) were a combination of the two types. Junior 
doctors were still in training and needed to learn the clinical guidelines (i.e. the 
therapeutic plan) and practise skills in prescribing safely whilst at the same time 
learning how to diagnose. Pharmacists who were allocated to a ward area were first 
instructed in the relevant therapeutics so that they understood what should happen 
following a given diagnosis. 
 
 
 
5.4.2.2 Technical prescribing errors 
In section 5.3.2 Table 5.7, technical errors were described by five categories: ‘POD 
whole drug’, ‘IP dose/freq or detail mismatch’, ‘dose abnormal’, ‘detail incorrect’, 
and an ambiguous portion of ‘Ph Drug or combo incorrect/inappropriate’. The first 
four categories represented 2666/5151 (51.8%) of the total PEs, so technical 
prescribing errors contributed to more than half of all PEs. 
 
A proportion (15.1%; 779/5151) of all PEs was categorised under ‘POD whole drug’. 
This was where the POD technician found that the patient had brought in their own 
drugs but they did not match what was written on the first hospital prescription 
(admission phase) or on the discharge (TTO) prescription;  572/779 (73.4%) of these 
related to an incomplete transfer of data from drug history to first prescription. It is 
unclear why the doctor did not do this, then cross out those drugs that were to be 
temporarily with-held or changed with an explanation in the notes. The POD 
technician could detect the anomaly but was unable to judge if this was deliberately 
omitted or not. Where there was uncertainty, the POD tech informed the pharmacist. 
If the pharmacist intervened, this would be categorised under ‘Ph Drug or combo 
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incorrect/inappropriate’.   In many cases it was an error. In those cases where it was a 
deliberate deletion it is likely that no intervention record was made. In the author’s 
opinion, pharmacists have for many years detected a failure to accurately transfer 
medication from the inpatient chart to the discharge prescription. 
 
A proportion (15.6%; 803/5151) of all PEs were where dose or frequency (and related 
details) on the inpatient chart did not match what was taken before admission or on 
discharge; 651/803 (81.1%) occurred on admission. These were usually simple 
transcription errors, but the consequence for patients varied from the trivial to very 
serious. 
 
A small proportion of PEs (6.9%; 355/5151) were where the dose was outside the 
normal range; 289/355 (81.4%) occurred during the inpatient phase of the hospital 
episode. This included doses that did not match the drug and doses that were just 
outside the BNF range. For example cefuroxime 2G (products available as 750mg or 
1.5G); it included greater than 10 fold errors, such as digoxin 0.625milligramme 
rather than 62.5microgramme. 
 
A proportion of PEs labelled as ‘details incorrect’ (14.2%; 729/5151) were where the 
route, rate, concentration or formulation were impossible to achieve, did not match 
dose or drug, or were simply incorrect. They were also omitted details that were 
essential. A large proportion (84.2%; 614/729) occurred during the inpatient  phase, 
because this was where new medication was added to the regimen. 
 
From Table 5.7  the technical prescribing errors can be divided into those that 
represented failures to transcribe from a previous prescription (1582) and failures to 
include relevant details or check parameters in a reference text such as the BNF 
(1084). 
 
The transcription errors comprised 779 errors detected by POD technicians where the 
whole drug was omitted and 803 where details (such as dose and frequency) did not 
match. There were also the ‘whole drug omission’ errors found by the pharmacist. 
The 1084 errors of inaccurate details comprised 729 ‘failure to check details’ and 355 
doses outside the normal range. Transcription failures were 30.7% (1582/5151) of all 
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PEs;  21% (1084/5151) of the prescribing errors were represented by poor attention to 
detail  
 
Transcription errors occurred on admission or discharge whereas ‘failure to check 
dose or details’ occurred mainly during the inpatient phase. This reflects poor 
attention to detail in transcription. It appears that when new drugs were added, PEs 
occurred where the doctor prescribed a medicine but guessed details such as dose, or 
recalled from memory rather than checking it in the BNF. In the author’s opinion, 
doctors and pharmacists approach prescribing from different philosophical 
perspectives. Doctors work under an expectation that they should know how to 
prescribe (despite little formal training) and pharmacists are taught to check details if 
there is any doubt. 
 
The next category was a combination of technical and clinical prescribing errors;  
22.7%(1168/5151) of these were where the pharmacist detected a drug  discrepancy 
(on admission or discharge) or where the drug or combination chosen was 
inappropriate for a particular patient (caution or contra-indication). This was the 
largest category of all PEs and 81%(946/1168) occurred during admission. 
 
5.4.2.3 Clinical prescribing errors 
A small proportion of clinical prescribing errors (1.9 %; 96/5151) were drug 
interactions and could be combined with the previous category of drug combinations 
that were inappropriate. They have been separately identified because, in the author’s 
experience, doctors are often unaware of interactions whereas pharmacists often 
detect them and advise on how to manage the situations that arise. A large proportion 
of these (87/96; 90.6%) occurred during the inpatient phase where new drugs were 
added. 
 
A larger proportion of PEs (16.5%; 850/5151) were failures to complete a clinical 
guideline or procedure, or review progress when the condition changed; for example, 
dose escalation of beta blockers and ACE inhibitors post-MI. In the author’s opinion 
this could have reflected a lack of time but often it appeared to be a lack of knowledge 
about when a review was appropriate, or what patient parameters were relevant to 
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particular drugs;  717/850 (84.3%) of these occurred during the inpatient phase. It 
could be that better access to guidelines or training on their use would decrease these 
errors 
 
Just 3.1% (161/5151) of clinical  prescribing errors related to adjusting doses due to 
renal or liver dysfunction. It also included organising the appropriate timing of blood 
samples and interpreting the results for drugs that required TDM). A large proportion 
137/161 (85.1%) occurred during the inpatient phase. This was not only where new 
medicines were added but also where the patient’s condition may have been rapidly 
changing due to the nature of the disease or the result of surgery or treatments. 
Changes could be negative, as the condition deteriorated, or positive, as the patient 
recovered. In the author’s opinion, this appears to be knowledge that the pharmacist 
possessed but the doctor often lacked. An example was an omission to change 
allopurinol dosage in response to changing renal function. 
 
A small proportion of events (4.1%; 210/5151) related to the prescribing of 
prophylactic agents (including prevention of venous thromboembolism).These 
guidelines are now widely available; however during 2001 to 2005 this may not have 
been the case. Venous thromboembolism guidelines were significantly developed 
during 2005 and 2006. It also related to peri-operative antibiotics and stress ulcer 
prophylaxis. It is not surprising that 187/210 (89.0%) occurred during the inpatient 
phase. 
 
Summarising, this analysis has shown when, during the hospital episode, the different 
prescribing errors occurred. It offers some insight into both technical and clinical 
prescribing errors. 
 
5.4.2.4 Errors of omission and commission 
Prescribing errors were largely 67.1% (3457/5151) errors of omission (OPEs); things 
that had not been done; 81% (1442/1777) of all OPEs that occurred during the 
admission phase, were the omission of regular medication producing incomplete first 
prescriptions. 
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In terms of clinical errors, this reflects a lack of completion of tasks or finishing a 
process. It was things that should have happened rather than things that were actively 
done incorrectly. This also shows that pharmacists had an enhanced understanding of 
what should happen to patients and their medicines, and a comprehension of 
therapeutics not just pharmacology. Is this something that just pharmacists have seen 
or do medical consultants also observe this? If consultants also correct these OPEs, 
the incidence could be much greater than that found by the author. Alternatively it 
may be that pharmacists’ knowledge of therapeutics enables them to make more pro-
active interventions to correct these omissions before a medical consultant ward round 
occurs. This is something that merits further study. 
 
Errors of commission occurred mainly during the inpatient phase whereas errors of 
omission occurred during the admission phase. To understand this we need to 
examine in more detail a breakdown of CPEs and OPEs; this is done in Sections 
5.4.2.5 and 5.4.2.6. 
 
5.4.2.5 Prescribing errors of commission (CPEs) 
Over half (54.1%; 916/1694) of CPEs occurred during the inpatient phase of the 
hospital episode. This shows that active prescribing errors (doing something wrong) 
occurred more frequently after admission and before discharge.  
 
Inpatient CPEs were further sorted into nine categories; the top three representing 
78.3% (717/916) of the total derived from: 
• dose or frequency inappropriate;  
• route or formulation incorrect; or 
• drug choice or combination inappropriate or risk of drug interactions. 
 
These are active errors rather than things that have not been done. This suggests that 
doctors prescribed a dose that was wrong (or a dose that did not match the drug) 
without checking it or they prescribed a route or formulation that was inappropriate 
(without checking in the BNF) or they prescribed a drug, inappropriate combination 
or interaction, without checking for a problem. This was a combination of technical 
and clinical prescribing errors (the proportion could not be determined). 
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It is not clear why this situation would arise. Was this over-confidence on their 
accuracy, or was the reference text inaccessible or did the doctors lack the volition to 
check their work? Maybe they viewed prescribing as a minor task and allocated 
insufficient time and attention to it. Perhaps doctors were unaware of the 
consequences of an error in their prescribing or assumed they did not make errors. 
 
The high proportion of these errors (30.6%;280/916) suggests that the pharmacist 
focussed on dosage as an expert in posology. It also reflects a failure of doctors to 
retrieve doses from the BNF, preferring to recall them from memory. Does this reflect 
a poor layout of the BNF or a more generalised poor access to dosing information or 
preference of doctors for memory recall rather than checking doses in reference texts? 
The present study could not answer this, but illustrates that every effort must be made 
to make dosing data readily available to minimise risk. Further research might 
investigate doctor’s preferred methods for retrieving dose information and once 
known, pharmacy may play a part in optimising these methods. Pharmacists are 
trained to check doses in the BNF rather than guess.  
 
Over one quarter (29.9%; 274/916) of inpatient CPEs concerned incorrect route or 
formulation. These were where the drug or dose was correct but the further details 
were inconsistent; for example, metronidazole IV is 500mg whereas the oral dose is 
400mg (either the dose or the route were incorrect). These were not a desire to give a 
licensed drug via an unlicensed route (e.g. Tazocin orally was not the intention). They 
were a very concerning group of active prescribing errors. So, Adalat was prescribed 
as a special slow release formulation for administration down a nasogastric tube, by a 
route that was not safe. Is it that the doctors did not understand that the LA suffix 
denotes ‘long acting’ or did they consider that slow release products were suitable by 
this route? Electronic prescribing will force the correct route, which will be good for 
the Tazocin example. However with the metronidazole case, was the oral route or the 
IV 500mg the intention? Pharmacists will not be prompted to challenge these with 
electronic prescribing, to determine the true intention.  
 
A proportion (17.8 %; 163/916) of inpatient CPEs concerned choice of drug or choice 
of drug combination. These were challenged by the pharmacist because they were 
clinical or planning errors. This means the doctor actively chose a contra-indicated or 
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sub-optimal wrong drug for a particular patient. These were about optimising drug 
choice within a therapeutic group. These were not interactions, because straight 
interactions were coded separately. These were drug choices and combinations of a 
therapeutic nature. Some of these errors were difficult to evaluate. For example, 
prescribing a beta blocker and salbutamol seems intrinsically wrong. However there 
was a case where bisoprolol was prescribed in a patient with cardiac wheeze. This 
was to determine if the problem was pulmonary oedema (caused by cardiac failure) or 
respiratory wheeze caused by lung inflammation. However most of these CPEs were 
choosing a drug that was contraindicated or cautioned in a particular patient. This was 
a failure to check details or the details unavailable when the prescription was written. 
 
CPEs during the admission phase represented a third (32.9%) of the total PEs made. 
The predominant error (72.7%) was writing the wrong dose or frequency (or other 
detail) which did not match what the patient was consuming prior to admission. The 
wrong drug was less frequently prescribed but the details written were often wrong. 
To the author, it appears that the doctor thought that the task was complete when the 
drug name was recorded and further details were unimportant. However to the 
pharmacist and nurse, these details must be correct for them to act appropriately. For 
effective patient care all these details are important. It must be remembered that an act 
of commission means these errors are actively undertaken even though they are 
wrong. 
 
CPEs were least likely to arise during the discharge phase, representing only 13% of 
the total. These CPEs were mainly dose mismatches between the inpatient chart and 
the discharge prescription; the next most significant category was an unusual drug 
selection. All of these CPEs involved incorrect details that, whilst seemingly trivial to 
the prescriber, could be very important for effective patient care. Without the 
pharmacist’s investigation and correction, communication with the general 
practitioner and future care could be compromised.  
 
Anecdotally, this correction process adds significantly to the delay of discharges and 
therefore by inference, the availability of beds for new admissions. Pharmacists have 
focussed on getting the discharge correct, but it may be that a bigger impact could be 
made by getting the admission process right first time.  
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 5.4.2.6 Prescribing errors of omission (OPEs) 
OPEs represented 67.1% (3457/5151) of all prescribing errors detected. The 
proportion varied between phases: 76.1% (1777/2334) on admission, 58.5% 
(1291/2207) as inpatients, and 63.8% (389/610) on discharge. 
 
Just over half (51.4%;1777/ 3457) of OPEs occurred during the admission phase of 
the hospital episode. This differs from CPEs where the most frequent occurrence was 
during the inpatient phase; intuitively, this would be expected;  but what was not 
expected was the magnitude of these errors.  
 
The main categories where admission OPEs occurred were:  81.1% (1442/1777) of 
admission OPEs were the complete omission of a drug; 48.9% (870/1777) were 
detected and corrected by the pharmacist and 32.2% (572/1777) were detected by a 
pharmacy technician who reported this to the pharmacist for correction or subsequent 
dialogue with the doctor. A further12.6% (224/1777) was where the admission dose, 
frequency or details did not match what was written on the first prescription. 
 
So altogether 93.8 % (1666/1777) of admission OPEs were a failure to get the first 
hospital prescription correct. This could represent a potentially important contribution 
for the pharmacist if they could write the first prescription themselves with perhaps 
greater attention to detail. 
 
The main category where inpatient OPEs occurred was a failure to review medication 
(43.3 %; 559/1291). This category related to the doctor omitting to return to the 
patient and review their medication as the hospital journey progressed. Examples 
were, adjusting the allopurinol dose post-operation, when the renal function had 
deteriorated, or not changing from intravenous flucloxacillin to oral when the patient 
could eat normally; or stopping Augmentin when a seven day course was complete. 
A proportion of OPEs (26.3 %; 340/1291) were omitted details in the inpatient phase; 
these were mainly technical prescribing errors. Many of these would have caused 
significant delays or gaps in therapy until they were added; for example, an omitted 
prescribed dose was a ‘show stopper’ until it was added. A second example was 
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enoxaparin prescribed as 1mg/kg BD, which could not be given until the patient was 
weighed and the dose written in milligrams on the chart. This was for acute coronary 
syndrome where delays were critical. These errors were common.  Alternatively it 
could be an omitted date and signature, which, whilst legal requirements, may not 
delay therapy to the patient. However it would put the administering nurse at an 
unnecessary risk professionally. Nurses were advised that if a signature was not on the 
prescription they could refuse to administer, which would then have caused delay or 
omission of therapy to the patient. 
 
A proportion of OPEs (9.5 %; 123/1291) were a failure to complete a procedure or 
plan. This is similar to the failure to review except from initiation there is a clear 
ongoing pathway or guideline to follow and it has not happened. For example dose 
escalation of beta blockers or ACEIs following admission for heart failure. 
 
The top three categories described above accounted for 78% (1022/1291) of the 
inpatient OPEs and related to not completing or reviewing the prescribing process. It 
was not clear if this was a lack of awareness, lack of time to review or poor attention 
to detail. These omissions represented a potentially important delay to the care being 
provided and might have been addressed by a supplementary prescriber. 
 
The important  OPEs on discharge (53.2 %; 207/389) were regular medicines omitted. 
This relates to medicines consumed by the patient prior to, or during the hospital 
episode, that were not written on the ‘medicines for discharge’ or TTO form. It was 
unusual for these to be deliberate omissions. It was common for the pharmacist to be 
asked to add these medications to the discharge prescription and to supply them. A 
proportion of  discharge OPEs (15.7 %; 61/389) were dose mismatches between 
inpatient chart and TTO. These were where the dose had been omitted or a reducing 
dose schedule had not been updated. A small proportion of discharge OPEs (11.1 %; 
43/389) were classed as omitted duration. This was a failure to indicate when a course 
of antibiotics, steroids or antiplatelet therapy should be stopped.  
These top three categories described above represented 80 %( 311/389) of the OPEs 
on discharge. If they had not been intercepted they would have produced poor 
communication to the GP and patient about what should be continued or stopped after 
the hospital episode. Anecdotally, they contributed to a perception in primary care, of 
233 
 
poor practice within hospitals. They were the source of complaints and queries and 
significantly impacted on time and reputation. A major contributory factor was the 
urgency of a new admission (trying to create a bed) or a lack of interest in completing 
the task. They were essentially poor attention to detail. There was a significant risk 
that if uncorrected, they could have caused confusion or readmission. 
5.4.2.7 Non- prescribing errors (NPEs) 
This category was essentially what remains when the prescribing errors were removed 
from the intervention dataset. 
 
Almost a third of NPEs (31.3%;578/1849) related to choice of drug or need for a 
drug. As these were not prescribing errors, they related to discussions between 
pharmacist and doctor on what could (or should) be prescribed. In the author’s 
opinion, this is a positive statement on collaborative inter-professional working. Inter-
professional learning has been reported as useful but lacking in many medical 
schools.72 They were examples of doctors and pharmacists working together, each 
contributing their own expertise, to benefit patients. NPE interventions did not relate 
to a written prescription; they were a discussion about future prescribing, or sharing of 
knowledge. One of the most important roles of the pharmacists was to act as a source 
of accurate drug information; another was as an educator. 
 
A NPE classified as ‘choice of drug’ was an intervention that referred to compliance 
with a hospital formulary; but also the choice of individual drugs within a therapeutic 
group, or the need for a prophylactic agent. Junior doctors frequently asked the 
clinical pharmacist for advice regarding pharmacology and therapeutic drug choices. 
There were also many NPE interventions made to standardise drug choices to match 
local guidelines or optimise choices to safer alternatives. Sometimes this was also to 
minimise the likelihood of technical prescribing errors. These were not prescribing 
errors as they occurred before prescribing; so they represented active advice, 
recommendations or optimisation by the pharmacist. 
 
From Table 5.16, Section 5.3.2.4, it can be seen that NPEs contained an appreciable 
proportion (19.4%) of interventions related to dosage and dose modification in liver 
or renal dysfunction. Often this was where what was originally prescribed was 
234 
 
appropriate but as the patient’s condition changed, the doctor sought advice about the 
dose or frequency that should be used. 
 
A small proportion of NPEs (8.6%;159/1849) reflected the pharmacist warning the 
doctor about potential side-effects, ADRs or interactions so they were either avoided 
or suitably monitored to avoid harm. Awareness of potential problems ensured any 
adverse signs were quickly detected and patient harm minimised. Anecdotally, junior 
doctors really appreciated this function of the pharmacist as it avoided them getting 
into trouble and protected their patients. There was clearly no blame to be attributed 
because nothing adverse had been initiated.  
 
Table 5.19 combines the 2005-9 intervention data set, Table 3.1 (Section 3.3.3) and 
the NPE data from this chapter. This composite table shows the proportions of each 
type of intervention and illustrates which category is larger in the two data sets.  
 
Table 5.19 Comparison of intervention data with NPE data for 2005-9 
 
A* B (n=1849) C (n=6966) D 
PE predominate NPE % Intervention % NPE predominate 
Choice of 
dose/frequency 
19.4 22.4  
 31.3 18.6 Choice of , or need for drug 
TTO/IP discrepancy 
or IP drug omission 
0 24.2  
 8.6 6.1 Drug interaction/ADR/SE 
 6.4 6.3 Choice of form/strength/route 
Drug duration 4.3 5.6  
Documentation 5.5 6.2  
 5.5 2.5 Pharmacokinetics/TDM 
 6.9 2.3 Drug admin/incompat./calc 
 3.8 2.1 Other drug information 
 4 1.3 Drug supply/storage 
Therapeutic 
substitution 
0 1.4  
 4.3 1.1 Nutrition 
*Columns A and D contain the category descriptors used in Chapter 3. Column B 
(NPE %) is the percentage of non-prescribing errors distributed across the categories 
in columns A and D. Column C is the percentage of interventions distributed across 
the categories in columns A and D. 
 
The data categories on the left (column A) were where the proportion of interventions 
was greater than NPE. This suggests that these categories contained a 
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disproportionately larger number of prescribing errors. In other words, prescribing 
errors predominated in choice of dose or frequency. The doctor made an error more 
frequently than the pharmacist offered advice or recommendations. 
 
So ‘Choice of dose/frequency’ was larger (22.4% vs. 19.4%) in the intervention data. 
If the PEs were removed from the data, the NPE proportion decreases to 19.4%, 
therefore PEs predominated in that category. In other words, pharmacists detected 
more PEs in choice of dose/frequency than answered questions or offered advice 
about dose or frequency. 
 
The data categories in column D are where the proportion of interventions was greater 
than NPE. This suggests that these categories contained a disproportionately larger 
number of interventions. In other words, interventions predominated in choice of, or 
need for a drug. The pharmacist offered advice or made a recommendation more 
frequently than the doctor made an error.  
 
So from this we can see where prescribing errors were most abundant. We can also 
see areas where the pharmacist tried to optimise treatment where no prescribing error 
had apparently occurred. No-one would doubt that pharmacists have greater 
knowledge and experience with drug interactions, or of improving documentation 
(how to prescribe more safely). It might be surprising that pharmacists offered 
frequent advice on TDM and nutrition. This might be a good area for pharmacist 
prescribers to practice in. Increasingly, pharmacist recommendations on TDM were 
written in the notes as a plan for the doctors and nurses to follow. During the study, 
pharmacists prescribed the majority of all parenteral nutrition (PN) at Southampton.  
 
Summarising, the data in this chapter have shown the magnitude of the problem of 
PEs that were detected by the pharmacist. The pharmacist had a clear role in 
preventing these errors from reaching the patient. In those cases where this had 
happened already, the pharmacist quickly identified the cause to mitigate any harm 
done. There are signs that the skills and the contribution of pharmacists have been 
recognised and  pharmacists are now commissioned to teach pharmacology and 
therapeutics at the local medical school. Pharmacists have also been commissioned to 
provide teaching to junior doctors on safer prescribing techniques in a formal course. 
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Pharmacists routinely advise informally on improvements to doctors’ prescribing 
decisions. 
5.4.3 EQUIP study 
Why do doctors omit or inaccurately replicate dosage? Is it lack of knowledge about 
doses and consequences? As discussed in the EQUIP study report72, the answer is 
multi-factorial72 and lack of drug knowledge may not be the single causative factor in 
any incident.27 Although a particular action or omission may be the immediate cause 
of an incident (described as an active failure or error), closer analysis usually reveals a 
series of events and departures from safe practice, known as an error chain. 
 
Is it because it is a detail that they consider less important to moving onto diagnostic 
questions? It has been reported72 in interviews with doctors that they perceive the task 
of prescribing as quite tedious and that writing discharge prescriptions and 
transcribing drug charts were particularly boring tasks. It has been reported27 that 
when a senior doctor gives an instruction it is assumed to be correct, should not be 
challenged and need not be checked against a guideline. In addition, is it something 
they consider they will complete later, or is it a form of ‘moral hazard’ where they 
consider that the pharmacist will check it out– a reliance on the’ safety net’? This 
cannot be answered from this author’s research but could have been elucidated in a 
follow up interview as was conducted in the EQUIP study.  
 
The EQUIP study72 was a research project commissioned by the GMC to determine 
the prevalence and causes of prescribing errors made by first year foundation trainee 
(FY1) doctors. Pharmacists detected prescribing errors on seven census days across 
19 acute hospital trusts in North-West England. Almost all of the 11,000 errors were 
intercepted by pharmacists before they could affect patients. Doctors were then 
interviewed about the causes of errors they had made to identify the reasons behind 
why they occurred. 
 
Routine violations of prescribing rules were reported as understandable adaptations to 
a busy and stressful environment. Other explanations offered were that junior doctors 
could not adapt the theoretical concepts they had been taught into the practical clinical 
setting. Alternatively, the doctors did not understand the factors in the clinical 
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situation that were relevant to prescribing. The study reported that there was a lack of 
evidence about the causes of prescribing errors. 
 
 The report recommended that further research should look at educating doctors so 
they did not make mistakes. This seems inconsistent with the error theories reviewed 
in Chapter 1 where organisational and process changes are recommended including 
barriers (such as pharmacists) to trap and deflect errors from reaching the patient. 
Indeed, to the author, the report appeared to play down the fact that pharmacists 
prevented patient harm from the errors that arose. There was an identified need to 
provide knowledge about medicines at the point of prescribing, but this was not 
apparently linked to the role of the pharmacist. 
 
The active failure most frequently cited was a mistake due to inadequate knowledge 
of the drug or the patient. Skills-based slips and memory lapses were also common. 
Where error-provoking conditions were reported, there was at least one per error, 
including lack of training or experience. Latent conditions included reluctance to 
question senior colleagues and inadequate provision of training. 
 
In reviewing the literature, the report found no evidence about the impact of basic 
medical education on prescribing errors but found that continuing professional 
development was more effective at changing physicians’ behaviour. Particularly 
important was ‘at elbow’ advice or advice provided when it was needed for 
prescribing. The report claimed that information technology was the answer. However 
in Section 1.7,  the author has discussed how the implementation of CPOE and CDS 
can introduce new errors (such as juxtaposition selection errors). The EQUIP report72
appeared to overlook the fact that the research was only possible by using the routine 
identification of prescribing errors by pharmacists. 
 
The EQUIP report72 recognised pharmacists as a hospital safety mechanism and their 
vigilance prevented rule-based mistakes from causing harm to patients. Doctors were 
unaware of their ignorance about rule-based mistakes. They were also unaware of the 
support provided by pharmacy – such as a medicines information service. 
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The EQUIP study did identify that some repeated errors occurred because the doctors 
never resolved their lack of knowledge, particularly when they believed their errors 
would be corrected further down the line of the prescription process. Maybe if the 
findings of the author’s research was presented to junior doctors, this might stimulate 
CPD such that repeated errors diminish. 
 
The report identified doctors’ concerns that if they admitted their lack of prescribing 
knowledge, this would have a negative impact on their image. The strong hierarchical 
structure of doctors led to prescribing instructions from senior doctors being followed 
without question. Pharmacists were discussed a safety net by all interviewees. They 
were commonly approached for advice about prescribing and many doctors felt they 
were a valuable resource.  
 
5.5 Limitations of this study 
This research shows a prescribing error rate of 5.5 per 100 items which is less than the 
8.9% found in the EQUIP study.72 This probably reflects an underreporting with this 
methodology. This dataset was achieved by encouraging pharmacists to report the 
interventions made. It was often seen as work that was additional to routine activities. 
Whilst some were motivated to report all the interventions made, and therefore 
prescribing errors detected, others were not. This explains some of the variability of 
the results. There was no team of motivated researchers supporting the study and 
reminding pharmacists of the importance of this work. There was no implied contract 
to achieve results in response to a research grant. 
 
The EQUIP study72 was externally funded and motivated pharmacists were co-
ordinating the reporting of errors as part of a big project. It is likely that this achieved 
better data capture than the author’s longitudinal study. The EQUIP study was 
conducted across many hospitals whereas the author’s study was only in one hospital 
trust. There may have been many local factors that introduced a bias, although that 
bias should have been consistent over the period of study. For example, there may 
have been a predominance of junior doctors from Southampton school of medicine. 
The EQUIP study included junior doctors who had been educated in many different 
schools of medicine, although there were none from Southampton University.  
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 Clinical pharmacy practice may have geographical influences and pharmacists at 
Southampton may have failed to detect a whole cluster of errors, leading to under-
detection of prescribing errors. 
 
Whilst every effort was made to avoid double-counting it is possible that there was 
overlap between errors reported by PODtechs and pharmacists. This would over-
inflate the denominator in the prescribing error rate per item. The error rate per patient 
was 0.468 in this research and this is consistent with the EQUIP study error rate of 
50% of hospital admissions. 
5.6 Recommendations 
CPEs concerned incorrect route or formulation. These were not a desire to give a 
licensed drug via an unlicensed route. They were a very concerning group of active 
prescribing errors. More training on technical prescribing errors could resolve them 
and a series of ‘safer prescribing’ lectures with a workbook has been delivered at 
Southampton. This is to ensure that the doctors know how to prescribe correctly.  
 
However it is more difficult to instil a culture of self-checking what has just been 
written on the prescription. If junior doctors know that pharmacists are checking their 
prescriptions for errors this might introduce a competitive incentive to not make 
errors. However the EQUIP study72 suggested that doctors were inappropriately 
confident that they did not make mistakes. Perhaps sharing the data in this research 
might raise awareness that errors are made frequently. It might be helpful to illustrate 
the consequences that flow from a lack of self-checking and the subsequent events in 
the process. An example from EQUIP72 was the consultant looking up a dose in the 
BNF and therefore demonstrating that it was acceptable for all doctors to do this. 
 
As with intervention data, pharmacists are providing more and more 
recommendations and advice on need for a drug or choice of drug. Is this pharmacists 
being bolder to share expertise on drug choice or is this a lack of knowledge in junior 
doctors on pharmacology and therapeutics? We cannot tell from the present study but 
it suggests a growth area for pharmacists to exploit in the interests of patient care. 
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Clinical errors reflect poor knowledge about medicines and a lack of completion of 
clinical guidelines or following a process. These errors relate to things that should 
have happened but did not, rather than things that were actively done incorrectly. This 
also shows that pharmacists have an increased understanding of what should happen 
to patients and their medicines, and a real comprehension of therapeutics. Is this 
something that just pharmacists have seen or do medical consultants also observe 
this? Alternatively it may be that pharmacists’ knowledge of therapeutics enables 
them to make more pro-active interventions to correct these omissions before a 
medical consultant ward round occurs. This is something that merits further study. 
 
5.7 Conclusions 
 
• Pharmacists in the dispensary can detect technical prescribing errors where the 
prescription is written incorrectly. Pharmacists on the wards can also detect 
clinical prescribing errors where the drug is being prescribed inappropriately. 
 
• These data were week-long point-prevalence studies conducted over 8 years. 
They have demonstrated that an average of 73.9 % (5151/6966) of pharmacist 
interventions were triggered by prescribing errors. 
 
• Pharmacists’ intervention studies are a useful source of data for prescribing 
errors; this has not been described before. 
 
• Combining with the activity data from Chapter 2 gives a prescribing error rate 
of 644 PE per week, or 6.2 PEs for each 100 items prescribed (644/10391). 
 
• By comparison, the Trust submits an average of 910 medication errors each 
year to the NPSA. 
 
• 67.1% (3457/5151) of prescribing errors detected by this methodology were 
errors of omission - things that had not been done which should have been. 
This was only possible because guidelines (national and local) now exist to 
describe what should be happen.  
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• Overall the largest proportion 45.3% (2334/5151) of prescribing errors 
occurred during the admission phase of the hospital episode. This is 
noteworthy because prior to 2005, this phase of the patient’s journey was 
largely ignored and had little or no pharmacy involvement. 
 
• Prescribing errors of commission occurred mainly during the inpatient phase 
and errors of omission during the admission phase. 
 
• 54.1% (916/1694) of prescribing errors of commission occurred during the 
inpatient phase of the hospital episode. This shows that active prescribing 
(doing something) produces more errors after admission and before discharge. 
• 30.6% (280/916) of errors of commission related to selection of dosage. A 
further 29.9% (274/916) of inpatient CPEs concerned incorrect route of 
formulation; 17.8 %( 163/916) of inpatient CPEs concerned choice of drug or 
combination. These were technical details of prescribing that were incorrect. 
This might be something that pharmacists should formally teach doctors. 
 
• 17.8 %( 163/916) of inpatient CPEs concerned choice of drug or combination. 
These are planning errors and show the input of pharmacists into therapeutics. 
 
• 51.4% (1777/ 3457) of prescribing errors of omission (OPE) occurred during 
the admission phase of the hospital episode.   
 
• 81.1% (1442/1777) of prescribing errors of omission that occurred during the 
admission phase were the complete omission of a drug. This was a failure of 
the doctor to either elucidate the full drug history or to record this on the drug 
chart. 
 
• 53.2 %( 207/389) of prescribing errors of omission that occurred during the 
discharge phase were the complete omission of regular medicines. These were 
a failure to have transcribed an inpatient medication into a discharge 
prescription. 
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• 43.3 %( 559/1291) of prescribing errors of omission that occurred during the 
inpatient phase were a failure to review medication that had been prescribed. 
Pharmacists encouraged this review but perhaps prescribers should have had a 
culture of constant review. 
 
• Transcription failures occurred on admission and discharge and were 21% 
(1084/5151) of all prescribing errors detected; 30.7% (1582/5151) of the 
prescribing errors were represented by poor attention to detail. A failure to 
have accurately undertaken a prescribing task. 
 
• 25.6 %( 1317/5151) of prescribing errors were purely clinical and occurred 
85.6% (1128/1317) during the inpatient phase. These were failures to follow 
guidelines, failures to review, manage interactions, and dosage adjustments in 
liver or renal failure or in response to TDM. 
 
• The largest category of prescribing errors was a combination of technical and 
clinical errors where the pharmacist detected a drug discrepancy (on admission 
or discharge) or where the drug or combination chosen was inappropriate for a 
particular patient; 81 %( 946/1168) occurred during the admission phase. It is 
not clear if this was a lack of knowledge, poor attention to detail or a failure to 
review the patient’s condition. 
 
• Looking at what remains from this dataset when prescribing errors have been 
removed, it can be seen that 31.3% (578/1849) of the interventions related to 
choice of drug or need for a drug. This described the discussions between 
pharmacist and doctor on what could (or should) have been prescribed. These 
were occasions where the pharmacist was informally educating the doctor 
about the need for medicines or how to distinguish between medicines. It 
demonstrated collaborative inter-professional working. These represent active 
advice, recommendations or contributions by the pharmacist to optimise the 
use of medicines for the benefit of patient care.  
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Key finding 
73.9% (5151/6966) of pharmacist interventions were triggered by prescribing errors. 
This translates into a prescribing error rate of 644 PE per week or 6.2 PEs for each 
100 items prescribed (644/10391). By comparison the Trust submits an average of 
910 medication errors each year to the NPSA. The implications of this are that 
prescribing errors are a significant problem and that official data under-represents the 
size of this important problem. Pharmacists’ interventions represent a significant 
contribution to the reduction in patient risk from harm as a result of the prescribing 
errors that occur. 
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Chapter 6 Research Summary and suggestions for 
future work.  
6.1 Introduction 
Healthcare is more complex than the public imagines and errors are ubiquitous; 
however thankfully, few reach the patient and the majority of those that do cause 
minimal harm. This said, every incidence of harm is a tragedy for the patient and their 
relatives.  
 
Within healthcare, complaints and litigation consume significant staff time and 
resources that have been deflected from patient care. Errors require management 
effort to resolve the problem and prevent future harm. The costs are therefore large. 
This can be seen in the American report to congress ‘To err is human’4and the UK 
response ‘Organisation with a memory’.23
 
These reports emphasised the need for a culture change where errors were openly 
reported and these data informed the redesign of processes that reduced the chance of 
reoccurrence. These reports called for more research and this prompted the 
investigations described in this thesis.  
 
The DOH claimed that by 2005, the number of serious errors in the use of prescribed 
drugs would be reduced by 40%.21 At that time, there were no baseline data. This 
thesis provides the data for Southampton University Hospitals NHS Trust collected 
under the author’s direct supervision.  
 
The voluntary reporting system set up by the NPSA had a bias at Southampton 
towards nurse reporting (61.1%) that might be assumed to be related to administration 
errors. Medication related adverse event forms submitted to the NPSA from 2004 
2009 gave an average number of total reports per year of 918. This was about the 
same as the number of interventions reported in the annual pharmacy survey over one 
week. 
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Pharmacists made numerous interventions, yet were apparently reluctant to report 
using the NPSA system. Interventions were surveyed each year at Southampton and 
there was an opportunity to capture and analyse these data to inform the debate on 
errors - their generation, prevalence and possible solutions – to inform attempts to 
design them out. 
 
Healthcare is a highly humane interaction and therefore errors should be expected. 
Error theory describes two types of errors and in this thesis the author has discussed 
errors that involve the details or technicalities of writing a prescription as an example 
of an execution error, where a planned action fails to be completed as intended. This 
thesis has also explored the growing trend of challenging the clinical aspects of 
prescribing; choosing what to write on the prescription as an example of a planning 
error, where the wrong plan is chosen to achieve an aim.  
 
These errors were captured in the main study of Chapter Four where a new process 
was tested for its impact on medicines reconciliation and the generation of errors 
throughout the temporary secondary care loop.  
 
Chapters Two and Three explored the trends in risk management activities of 
pharmacists and quantified the interventions that they made. Chapter Five focused on 
prescribing errors and their extraction from the intervention dataset. 
 
The following sections summarise what the author has learnt from these studies. 
 
6.2 Summary of Chapter 2 
In the 1980s, pharmacists moved out of the dispensary and into the clinical areas. This 
early ward pharmacy service was focussed on improving the supply role and an 
earlier trapping of technical prescribing errors. Pharmacists were increasingly exposed 
to clinical practice throughout the late 1980s and early 1990s. This increased the 
pharmacist’s understanding about how medicines were actually being used and 
stimulated them to offer their professional advice on how to maximise the benefits 
and minimise the harm from medicines. Clinical pharmacists learnt from the adverse 
drug events that they observed. This experience improved their ability to identify and 
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trap the clinical prescribing errors. It also generated ideas to redesign the medicines 
usage process to make errors less likely to occur. Some of these initiatives are 
described in Chapter 2. 
 
The data in Chapter 2 show the overall, dramatic increase in the number of patients 
whose care was reviewed each week from an initial 200 to 600 patients in the 1990s 
to over 1,000 since the year 2000. The number of items screened increased from 
1,500 to approximately 8,000. This was a period of rapid expansion of the clinical 
pharmacy service at Southampton and a move to understand and focus on risk in drug 
usage rather than risk in supply. The amount of clinical use review increased and the 
frequency of intervention increased from an average of once every 5.8 patients (40 
items) to every 1.3 patients (8.2 items). 
 
New services emerged monitoring the effects of drugs and monitoring drug levels 
themselves. There was also an increasing emphasis on getting an accurate discharge 
prescription, and developing an advance dispending of discharge medication service. 
A policy of therapeutic substitution emerged to facilitate compliance with the 
formulary before becoming a prelude to pharmacist prescribing. In the late 1990s, 
there was a drive to improving the accuracy of drug histories. There was an 
appreciable increase in both the range and quantity of risk management activities. 
 
6.3 Summary of Chapter 3  
6.3.1 Numbers and severity scores 
The annual survey on clinical pharmacy activities was accompanied by an 
intervention survey. These data describe what pharmacists did -their ‘outputs’ - which 
and are analysed in Chapter 3. This chapter focussed on the period 1999-2009. 
 
There was a statistically significant increase in the average number of interventions 
each week from the surveys in 1999-2001 compared to those during 2005-9. In 
addition there was a trend to increase the proportion of the more serious interventions 
(4, 5, and 6). In the period 2005-2009 the average number was 973 per week 
including 30.9% with serious (4,5 and 6) severity scores.  
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Analysis of the most serious interventions shows the potential for preventing between 
nine and 47 patients a week from serious harm (score level 5) and preventing between 
one and five patients a week from death (score level 6). This was a significant patient 
benefit that was an almost invisible role of pharmacists. The human value is not 
measurable but the potential litigation cost avoided would be many times the annual 
cost of the clinical pharmacy service. 
 
6.3.2 Types of intervention 
Interventions made at the interface between primary and secondary care represented 
the largest category at nearly a quarter (24.2%) of interventions. The data were 
categorised so that transcription errors at the interface were grouped together. This did 
not allow differentiation between drugs omitted on entering secondary care and those 
on return to primary care. The majority of discrepancies on admission were largely 
slips and not positive decisions to omit these drugs. The role of PODtechs was 
relatively new and further investigation of their role may in future allow separation 
and depth of analysis into these errors during admission. 
 
The second most frequent interventions (22.4%) for pharmacists concerned the dose 
or frequency of medicines. This was a fundamental role of pharmacists and remains a 
consistent contribution to avoiding patient harm as well as facilitating the efficient 
completion of the drug usage process. 
  
The third most frequent intervention (18.6%) was concerned with the choice of drug 
and need for drug. Encouraging formulary compliance was part of this category but 
some of these interventions were concerned with the choice of drug within the 
formulary for a particular patient. National guidelines now play a part in identifying 
the need to start new drugs and this forms part of this category. From this dataset it 
was not possible to differentiate between these components, although that might prove 
an interesting subject for further study. 
 
In 1999, interventions on documentation represented 13% out of a total of 613. In 
2006 to 2009 this type averaged 4.7%. This shows that this type of intervention is 
decreasing. However many interventions were initiated from documentation 
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anomalies but then developed into further, more serious interventions. Computer 
prescribing should eliminate many of the documentation anomalies which were 
classed as technical prescribing errors. This might make it more difficult to detect the 
secondary but more serious errors, stemming from documentation failures. 
 
6.3.3 Outcomes 
Around 90% of pharmacist interventions were focussed on patient benefit and less 
than 10% were to save money. This has been a reasonably stable proportion over the 
years, despite a perception that the primary role of pharmacists was to reduce the 
costs of medicines. Safe use of medicines should decrease patient harm and 
consequential complaints and litigation costs. The effective use of medicines should 
decrease the total resource used by decreasing length of stay and reduced 
readmissions. 
 
The contributions that pharmacists made were readily accepted by other healthcare 
staff increasing to an average of 86.8% in the 2005-9 cohort. Today the role of the 
pharmacist is more widely accepted and integrated into the work of clinical teams. 
 
The pharmacists were known for their knowledge of the supply chain and choice of 
available products and different formulations. The analysis of interventions has shown 
their involvement in managing interactions and incompatibilities. The pharmacist’s 
knowledge of where and how errors arise in the use of medicines has been illustrated 
by this dataset. 
 
6.3.4 High severity interventions 
During 2006-9 more than half (52.5%) of the interventions, with score 5 and 6 
involved two types of intervention. The first concerned the choice of, or need for, a 
drug and the second concerned interactions, side-effects and adverse reactions. The 
drug choice category could be further divided into: the need to start a drug, the need 
to stop a drug and the poor choice of a drug for the particular patient. These 
represented the most frequently occurring, serious, medication related interventions in 
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terms of potential consequences to patients. The intervention reports show that 
pharmacists prevented this harm from reaching patients. 
 
6.3.5 Medicines education for other healthcare workers 
The interventions showed that the pharmacists’ contribution to patient care made 
them a valued resource. As the medicines expert, the pharmacist’s knowledge was 
shared with other members of the team and ensured that nurses, and other healthcare 
staff, were kept informed and up-to-date about the medicines commonly used on the 
ward. However this sharing of knowledge was so embedded in clinical practice that 
pharmacists may not have perceived this educational role as an intervention at all and 
did not report interventions that were purely educational. 
 
The reporting, analysis and discussion of pharmacist interventions had not really 
occurred outside of pharmacy before about the year 2000, because of a fear of 
damaging the relationship between pharmacist and doctor. The dataset had only been 
used to educate junior pharmacists on the meaning of clinical pharmacy. The free text 
on intervention reports described specific examples of the application of the 
pharmacist’s knowledge. The new culture should enable the data to be used to inform 
educational training sessions for junior doctors on how to prescribe with greater 
safety. In the last five years, the pharmacy induction of junior doctors at SUHT has 
included examples of prescribing errors. More recently, pharmacists have been 
involved in formally teaching junior doctors safer prescribing techniques.  
 
The interventions were often a correction of errors and raised the principle of 
continuous quality improvement or ‘getting it right first time’.  This forms the basis of 
the experimental intervention in Chapter 4. 
 
6.4 Summary of Chapter 4 
The third strand of the author’s research was to test an intervention where a 
pharmacist obtained an accurate medication history and drafted the first inpatient 
prescription. The A&E setting was chosen because this was the earliest opportunity in 
the hospital episode. The reduction in errors was to be assessed over the whole of the 
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temporary secondary care loop as it was hypothesised that errors on admission create 
further cumulative errors later in the hospital episode and possibly impact on the 
length of stay. 
 
A nurse administered questionnaire was incorporated into the recruitment and consent 
process to assess the proportion of patients who brought in their own medicines, and 
their understanding of why they were prescribed. It was hoped the questionnaire 
would increase patient involvement, benefit all participants and produce some 
qualitative findings about patient perceptions around likely areas of error such as 
allergy, analgesics, and antibiotics. 
 
The main study was designed to detect medication related admissions (MRAs). These 
might be related to side-effects or adverse reactions (AMRARs) or a more indirect 
medication related adverse event (AMRAEs); for example, a vasodilator produced 
postural hypotension as an adverse reaction and which then produced a fall as an 
adverse event. Incomplete drug histories made it difficult to detect AMRARs and 
AMRAEs, so the starting point was to ensure that the drug history was complete and 
accurate. It seemed a logical step to transcribe this onto the drug chart. The 
pharmacist’s knowledge of formulary products and available formulations improved 
the technical aspects of writing the first prescription.  
 
The project concept and design were compromised by logistical and workload 
concerns. It was hoped that by investigating patients with three or more medicines, 
this would increase the chance of detected errors, interactions and medication related 
admissions. It was also important to ensure blinding of the A&E doctors to the 
parallel process in order to avoid a Hawthorne effect. Yet at the same time, 
participants should have been adequately informed to give valid consent to the 
research. A few senior doctors raised concerns about whether the research could be 
conducted safely without interfering with the normal admission process. 
 
Whilst the randomisation worked well, the logistics produced a much larger drop-out 
rate than had originally been expected and so recruitment was less than required from 
the power calculations. One hundred and forty-nine patients were recruited to the 
main A&E study over five months in 2004, but only 115 were able to be analysed. 
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Implementation of the intervention by a Band 7 pharmacist was designed to improve 
the generalisability of the findings to other hospitals. 
 
From the questionnaire it was found that many patients were ill informed and lacked 
knowledge about the medicines they took. There is potential here for community 
pharmacists to conducting MURs before elective admissions and provide more 
information to patients. This might also improve the accuracy of drug histories and 
facilitate transcription onto hospital prescriptions. There is also potential for 
developing information leaflets for patients who might be admitted to hospital to 
recommend that they bring their own medicines with them, to improve data on 
medication histories. Only 42% of patients brought in their medicines and a further 
12.4% brought in a list or GP repeat printout. 
 
The questionnaire produced useful information on the distribution of the number of 
medicines being consumed. The change to two, rather than three medicines or more 
had very little impact on recruitment to the study. Many patients entered hospital on 
multiple medications; almost two thirds (64%) reported taking five or more medicines 
from a range of two to 14. It was not clear how this might compare to a national 
average but it is probable that patients admitted to hospital consume more medicines 
than those in the community. 
 
Over one quarter of patients (45/177; 25.4%) declared they had allergies to drugs. 
However some of the ‘allergic’ symptoms described drug side-effects or symptoms of 
their illness. There is clearly more work to be done in educating the public about the 
meaning of true drug allergy and differentiating this from intolerance due to side 
effects. 
 
Over one fifth of patients (25/115; 21.71%) had events or symptoms that contributed 
to the admission that could be explained by the medicines they were consuming 
(AMRAEs and AMRARs). Over half of these were potentially avoidable by better 
monitoring or product selection. 
 
There was a noticeable lack of records of the actions of pharmacists in the medical 
notes, so more events may have occurred but were not detectable by the time the notes 
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were reviewed. In future it may be helpful if pharmacists were to record in the notes 
more details of what they have done. 
 
In addition to any medication-related events, during the admission phase alone, 14 of 
59 patients (23.7%) in the control group had 22 prescribing anomalies. This contrasts 
to the pharmacist (intervention) cohort where only four out of 56 patients (7.1%) had 
7 prescribing anomalies in the admission phase. Drug histories conducted by 
pharmacists contained fewer omissions and errors than those conducted by junior 
doctors but this did not reach statistical significance. If more patients had been 
recruited in the study then this might have achieved statistical significance with 
adequate power. 
 
A similar pattern was seen during the inpatient phase where there were nine events in 
the doctor cohort and none in the intervention cohort. During the discharge phase 
there were 14 events in the control cohort and 11 in the intervention cohort. 
 
Overall, during all three phases of the hospital episode (admission, inpatient and 
discharge) 34 patients in the control (doctor) cohort of 59 patients experienced a total 
of 45 medication anomalies. Twenty-five patients in the intervention (pharmacist) 
cohort of 56 experienced a total of 18 medication anomalies during their hospital stay. 
Across the whole episode the reduction seen in the intervention cohort did reach 
statistical significance. 
 
The pharmacists’ interventions included not just taking a drug history but also getting 
the pharmacist to transcribe this data onto the first hospital prescription, ready for the 
doctor to sign. In this study, it was shown it was logistically feasible for a pharmacist 
working in the A&E department to do this. However, several of the pharmacist’s first 
prescriptions were re-written by the doctor on the ward. It was not clear whether this 
was a lack of information about the project or a rejection of the concept. Anecdotal 
feedback was that the doctors welcomed the pharmacist contribution as it helped their 
workload.  
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It would require more than one pharmacist to provide sufficient input to review the 
majority of patients admitted. A pharmacist prescriber attached to the clinical team 
may have been able to take this further. 
 
This study was conducted before 2007 when NICE and the NPSA recommended that 
medicines reconciliation should be conducted in the first 24 hours of an admission 
and that pharmacists should be involved. It would be interesting to survey current 
junior doctors’ opinions about whether the first chart should be reconciled with 
primary care before amendments are made relating to this admission. At the time of 
this study it was clear that doctors were combining these two stages and apparently 
not recording in the notes the reason for their changes on admission. 
 
SUHT protocols have changed over time. Today there is greater familiarity with the 
role of PODtechs and two pharmacists are now employed in the medical admissions 
unit (MAU) and participate in a consultant-led, post-take ward round. The MAU was 
created to facilitate reducing A&E waiting times to less than four hours and it was 
sited adjacent to A&E. Today there is greater visibility and acceptance of the 
pharmacist’s role in this area so it is likely that a pharmacist writing first inpatient 
prescriptions would be accepted. 
 
6.5 Summary of Chapter 5 
6.5.1 Overview 
Prescribing errors can either be acts of commission or acts of omission. A hospital 
prescription is a primary communication device that translates the prescriber’s 
thoughts into what they want the pharmacist to supply and what they want the nurse 
to administer. 
 
Pharmacists’ interventions have detected many technical prescribing errors where 
what was intended to be prescribed was not exactly what was written. Historically 
clinical or planning prescribing errors were more difficult to detect. Experienced 
pharmacists knew the expected pathway that patients should follow and were able to 
detect when standard therapeutic additions had not been made. This has been further 
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clarified in some specialities by the construction of national guidelines. Since about 
2005 there have been more interventions that relate to the need for a drug – a clinical 
or planning error. Prior to 2005, the only planning errors detected by pharmacists 
would occur if the doctor’s choice of treatment was inappropriate, or did not take 
account of all relevant patient factors. 
 
In Chapter 5, the intervention dataset captured over the period 2001-2009 was re-
evaluated and coded to see if the cause could be attributed to a prescribing error. Note 
that the 2002-2004 data were unavailable. Chapter 5 reports a specific investigation 
for 2007 and a review of the 2001-2009 dataset that had been recoded for prescribing 
errors. 
 
Non-prescribing errors focused on optimisation or improving the planning part of 
prescribing; so Chapter 5 looked at prescribing errors of commission, PEs of omission 
and non-prescribing error (NPE) minimisation. It also looked at events that occurred 
during the admission, inpatient and discharge phases of the hospital episode. 
 
6.5.2 Phase of secondary care loop 
Overall the discharge phase represented 8.8% of all events (PEs plus NPEs); inpatient 
events were 55.8% of all events and admissions represented 35.4% events. However 
this conceals a change from the early years (2001-2005) where admission events were 
27.5 % of the total compared to latter years where admission events increased to 
43.2%. This relative increase of 15.7 percentage points in admissions events reflects 
the deployment of extra pharmacy staff in the acute admissions / assessment units. 
Pharmacy staff intensified their focus on obtaining an accurate drug history and 
ensuring the first prescriptions were complete and a true reflection of medicines 
consumed prior to admission to hospital. This was partly from the expanding role of 
technicians taking drug histories from patients, assessing PODS and informing 
pharmacists about any anomalies. It is only after 2007 that this became linked to the 
NPSA medicines reconciliation guidance.153 So by adding in the detection of PEs 
during admission, the pharmacists had nearly doubled (2817 to 5151) the number of 
detected PEs. 
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6.5.3 Changing the culture 
The call from the GMC for research proposals on prescribing errors in 2007 started a 
year of collaboration between doctors and pharmacists. It revealed that senior medics 
were interested in finding out from pharmacists where prescribing errors occurred. 
This was in itself a cultural shift and demonstrated an important change in medical 
attitudes to the role of the pharmacist. 
 
6.5.4 All prescribing errors 
The data presented in Chapter 5 demonstrated that an average of 73.9 % (5151/6966) 
of pharmacists’ interventions was triggered by prescribing errors. It also showed that 
pharmacists’ intervention studies could be a useful source of data for prescribing 
errors; this has not been extensively described before. The errors were collected over 
an extended period of time, (2001-2009) which was unusual.  
 
Over two thirds of prescribing errors (67.1%; 3457/5151) detected by this 
methodology were errors of omission- things that had not been done. This was only 
possible because guidelines (national and local) emerged to describe what should 
have happened. Such errors were planning errors and would have occurred in addition 
to the often reported technical or execution errors such as missing strengths, doses and 
signatures. 
 
Overall the largest portion of prescribing errors (45.3%; 2334/5151) occurred during 
the admission phase of the hospital episode. This is noteworthy because prior to 2005, 
this phase of the patient’s journey was largely ignored and had little or no pharmacy 
involvement.  
 
Prescribing errors of commission occurred mainly during the inpatient phase and 
errors of omission during the admission phase. 
6.5.5 Prescribing errors of commission (CPEs) 
Over half of CPEs (54.1%; 916/1694) occurred during the inpatient phase of the 
hospital episode. This showed that active prescribing (doing something) produced 
more errors after admission and before discharge. 
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 Just under one third of CPEs (30.6%; 280/916) occurring during the inpatient phase 
were related to the selection of a correct dose. A further 29.9% (274/916) of inpatient 
CPEs concerned incorrect route or formulation; 17.8 % (163/916) of inpatient CPEs 
concerned choice of drug or combination. These were execution errors - technical 
details of prescribing that were incorrect. This might be something that pharmacists 
should formally teach doctors. 
 
6.5.6 Prescribing errors of omission (OPEs) 
About a half of OPEs (51.4%; 1777/ 3457) occurred during the admission phase of 
the hospital episode; 81.1% (1442/1777) of OPEs that occurred during the admission 
phase were the complete omission of at least one drug. These were the failure of the 
doctor to either elucidate the full drug history or to have recorded this on the drug 
chart. 
 
Two fifths of OPEs (43.3 %; 559/1291) that occurred during the inpatient phase were 
the failure to review medication that had been prescribed. Pharmacists encouraged 
this review but perhaps prescribers should have had instilled in them, a culture of 
constant review. 
 
About a half of OPEs (53.2 %; 207/389) that occurred during the discharge phase 
were the complete omissions of regular medicines. These were the failure to have 
transcribed an inpatient medication onto a discharge prescription. 
 
6.5.7 Transcription errors 
Transcription failures occurred on admission and discharge and were about one fifth 
(21%; 1084/5151) of all prescribing errors detected; 30.7% (1582/5151) of the 
prescribing errors were reflected by poor attention to detail. This was a failure to have 
accurately undertaken a prescribing task - an execution error. 
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6.5.8 Technical and clinical PEs 
One quarter of PEs (25.6 %; 1317/5151) and 85.6% (1128/1317) of these occurred 
during the inpatient phase. These were failures to follow guidelines, failures to 
review, manage interactions, and adjust dosage in liver or renal failure or in response 
to TDM - all planning errors. 
 
The largest category of prescribing errors was a combination of technical and clinical 
errors where the pharmacist detected a drug discrepancy (on admission or discharge) 
or where the drug or combination chosen was inappropriate for a particular patient. 
81% (946/1168) occurred during the admission phase. It was not clear if this was a 
lack of knowledge, poor attention to detail or a failure to review the patient’s 
condition. 
 
6.5.9 Non-prescribing errors 
Looking at what remains from this dataset when prescribing errors have been 
removed, it can be seen that 31.3% (578/1849) of the interventions related to choice 
of drug or need for a drug. This described the discussions between the pharmacist and 
doctor on what could (or should) have been prescribed. These were occasions where 
the pharmacist was informally educating the doctor about the need for medicines or 
how to distinguish between medicines. It demonstrated collaborative inter-
professional working. These represent active advice, treatment recommendations or 
contributions by the pharmacist to optimise the use of medicines for the benefit of 
patient care.  
 
6.5.10 Summary comparison with the EQUIP study 
In EQUIP, the majority of errors were deemed potentially significant (53%) or 
potentially minor (40%). Potentially serious errors were less common (5%) and 
potentially lethal errors were found in fewer than 2% of erroneous medication orders. 
As with the author’s study, it is important to stress that those figures were a measure 
of potential severity and not actual severity because pharmacists detected most errors 
before they affected patients.72
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Some doctors, in hindsight, reported a lack of expertise in dosing, drug-drug 
interactions, formulations, contra-indications, controlled drug regulations and drug 
indications.72 This was also reflected in the interventions reported in this thesis. 
 
The EQUIP study showed that medication orders issued at the time of hospital 
admission were 70% more likely to be associated with a prescribing error (adjusted 
OR 1.70 95% CI 1.61 – 1.80) in comparison to medication orders issued during the 
hospital stay.72 Regression analyses showed that junior doctors were twice as likely as 
consultants to make a prescribing error. EQUIP also revealed that new prescribers 
(i.e. nurses and pharmacists) had similar error rates to consultants. This was not 
studied in the author’s research, but would make an interesting investigation at SUHT. 
 
The author of this thesis is not aware of any interventions made on prescriptions 
written by non-medical prescribers; but again, a study comparing non-medical and 
medical prescribing errors might prove informative. 
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Chapter 7 Overall Conclusions 
 
This thesis has examined the role of pharmacists in the capture of medication errors 
and the prevention of harm reaching patients from errors. Pharmacist intervention 
surveys have been shown to be a useful tool in identifying medication errors and 
specifically, prescribing errors. 
 
The studies have shown sampling of interventions made by pharmacists and indicate 
the true extent of the number of serious errors in the use of prescribed drugs. 
Detection and interpretation of errors related to prescribing broadened and intensified 
over the study period.  This dataset was however different from that reported to the 
NPSA both in number and the type of medication errors reported. 
 
In the period 2005-2009, the average number of interventions was 973 per week 
including 30.9% with serious (4, 5 and 6) severity scores. On average 73.9 % 
(5151/6966) of pharmacist’s interventions were triggered by prescribing errors. In the 
period 2004-2009 the average number of reports to the NPSA was 918 per year; 
61.1% were reported by nurses and might be assumed to be related to administration 
errors. 
 
The number of interventions made per week increased from 200, in the early 1990s, 
through 600 in the late 1990s, to over 1000 since the year 2000. The rate of 
interventions also increased from between one per every five and seven patients (31 to 
45 items) to one per every one to two patients (8 to 20 items). The severity of 
interventions also increased, with between one a five deaths avoided each week. 
These data translate into a prescribing error rate of 644 PEs per week, or 6.2 per 100 
items. 
 
A quarter of interventions were transcription errors at the interface between primary 
and secondary care. A fifth of interventions involved the dose or dose frequency of 
medicines. The third most frequent interventions (18.6%) were concerned with the 
choice or need of drug. 
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A third (31.3%) of the interventions related to discussions between pharmacists and 
doctors on optimising the choice of drug or identifying the need for a drug. Nearly 
nine tenths of interventions were positively accepted by other healthcare staff; the 
majority were not initiated simply to save money. 
 
New risk management activities have been developed. ADDM facilitates an accurate 
and early discharge prescription. Therapeutic substitution facilitates formulary 
compliance and corrects simple errors. Pharmacist prescribing is developing as a tool 
to correct errors and develop specialist prescribing services such as TPN, pre-
admission clinics and clinics for complex drugs. 
 
Despite challenges with recruitment, the project in A&E showed that 25/115 
(21.71%) of the patients had events or symptoms that contributed to the admission 
that could be explained by the medicines they were consuming. Over half of these 
were potentially avoidable by better monitoring or product selection. 
 
A pharmacist working in A&E to obtain complete and accurate drug histories, then 
transferring the data by writing the first prescription, was proven to be successful. 
There was a statistically significant reduction in the generation of errors throughout 
the whole hospital episode.  
 
Over half of all interventions (related to prescribing and non-prescribing errors) were 
made during the inpatient phase, a third during admission and the remainder during 
discharge. Nearly three quarters (73.9 %) of pharmacists’ interventions were triggered 
by prescribing errors. 
 
This thesis has shown that pharmacists’ intervention studies provide useful data on 
prescribing errors. Trends in prescribing errors have been analysed over an extended 
period of time, (2001-2009) from a single organisation and medicines usage process. 
 
Nearly half (45.3%) of all prescribing errors detected by recoding pharmacist 
interventions, occurred during the admission phase of the hospital episode. Two thirds 
(67.1%) of prescribing errors detected by this methodology were errors of omission - 
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things that had not been done. Prescribing errors of commission occurred mainly 
during the inpatient phase and errors of omission during the admission phase. 
 
Four fifths (81.1%) of the prescribing errors of omission that occurred during the 
admission phase were the complete omission of at least one drug. A quarter of 
prescribing errors were planning errors. These were failures to follow guidelines, 
failures to review, manage interactions, and adjust dosage in liver or renal failure or in 
response to TDM, all planning errors. 
 
In previous chapters, the author has suggested ways in which the clinical pharmacist 
can and does, contribute to minimising these errors for the ultimate benefit of patients. 
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Recommendations for future research and future 
practice developments 
 
 
1. To continue the annual activity and intervention surveys 
 
These surveys should be continued with some modifications. Future surveys could 
include the further division of some categories. For example, the transcription of the 
drug history into the first prescription could be separated from the transcription of the 
inpatient chart into the discharge prescription. Also the need to start a drug could be 
separated from the need to stop a drug and from a poor initial choice. There could also 
be clearer recording of whether the intervention occurs during admission, discharge or 
during the inpatient phase. There could be clearer data capture or OPE, CPE and NPE. 
The paper system could be converted into an electronic database to facilitate analysis. 
 
2. Research into the impact of electronic prescribing 
Research questions will be generated as this transition is made such as: 
Will is decrease mismatches between drug, dose and frequency? 
How much pharmacist time does it release? 
Can E-prescribing facilitate transcription of inpatient to discharge medicines? 
 
3. Explore impact of pharmacist prescribers 
Prepare a business case for a pharmacist prescriber to write the first hospital 
prescriptions for elective cardiac surgery. Draft a research protocol to analyse the 
impact of this and the conversion into a prescriber role. Prepare and draft a guideline 
for post-operative cardiac surgery in terms of compliance with MINAP data. Conduct 
research pharmacist prescribers’ role in delivering this guideline. 
 
4. Writing in medical records 
Investigate what pharmacists write in medical notes and why? This could facilitate the 
preparation of a detailed policy that could then be audited. It could also be determined 
if pharmacist prescribers write more frequently in the notes than other pharmacists. 
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5. Attitudes to first hospital prescriptions 
Organise a project to look at 5th year medical student attitudes to the drafting of the 
first hospital prescription. In particular this is to question whether the first prescription 
chart should it be a duplication of the drug history? Follow up with a repeat survey of 
junior doctors in the first year of prescribing.  A parallel project could be conducted to 
assess pre-registration hospital pharmacists and Band 6 and 7 hospital pharmacists’ 
attitudes to first prescriptions and a separate drug history. 
 
6. Wider collaboration 
Collaborate with community pharmacists in a research project to establish the impact 
of pre- and post- hospital MURs. 
 
7. Reporting of medication errors 
Analyse the proportion of different staff groups employed and compare these to the 
staff who complete forms for the NPSA. 
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Appendix 1 
 
Data collection form used in point prevalence activity studies.
 
  
Clinical Activity data collection form 
 
Ward 
Name    Pharm/tech     Date    
 
Number of beds on this ward 
Patient Name Number 
of charts 
seen 
Number of 
newly prescribed 
items 
Annotations Interventions 
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
 
 
  
Appendix 2 
Data collection form used in the intervention studies (2006 
version) 
 
 
  
INTERVENTION DETAILS 
Please tick  
Pharmacist’s name…………….. 
 
Dispensary  Ward Pharmacist           POD Technician  
 
Date…………………………….. 
 
Ward……………………………. 
Patients Name/Hospital Number…………………………………………. 
Age………………………………. 
 
INTERVENTION FOR SCORING 
 
1    Negative i.e. detrimental to patient 
2    Information provision only 
3    Minor intervention 
4    Major intervention 
5    Save a major organ/serious 
6    Save a life 
 
Please give brief details of intervention: 
 
 
 
 
Drug with narrow therapeutic index                                                                  31   
INTERVENTION MADE ON WARD ROUND  29    
More than 24 hours before action 30   
PTO FOR INTERVENTION CODING 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 CLINICAL PHARMACY INTERVENTION REPORT FORM 
             Only tick one box in each section 
INTERVENTION RECORDING 
DOCUMENTATION – Prescription  
                                        Illegible, ambiguous 
                                        Illegal, incomplete  
 
 
07   
- TTO/IP discrepancy or  
IP drug omission  08    
- Choice of  / need for drug 09   
- Choice of dose/frequency/timing 10   
- Choice of form/strength/route 11   
- Drug duration 12   
- Pharmacokinetics/TDM 13   
- Drug admin/incompatibility/calc 14   
- Drug interaction/ADR/SE/monitoring 15   
- Drug supply/storage 16   
- Other drug information 17   
CLINICAL 
- Nutrition 18   
THERAPEUTIC SUBSTITUTION 19   
- Cost information/analysis 20   
- Formulary compliance 21   
- Attempt to decrease costs 22   
FINANCIAL 
- Non financial 23   
- Positive  Treatment altered/actioned 24   
 Chart altered 25   
 Information accepted 26   
- Information Known/problem not pursued 27   
OUTCOME 
- Negative Treatment unaltered 28   
See thesis, Table 3.3 for intervention severity scoring 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Appendix 3 
 
Patient information and consent forms for controlled study.
 
  
 Ref: version 2 
Pharmacy 
B Level, West Wing 7 November 2003  
  
  
  
Clinical Support Services 
 
A&E Medication Research - Patient Information Sheet 
 
‘You are being invited to take part in a research study.  Before you decide it is important for you to understand why 
the research is being done and what it will involve.  Please take time to read the following information carefully 
and discuss it with others if you wish.  Ask us if there is anything that is not clear or if you would like more 
information.  Take time to decide whether or not you wish to take part. 
 
Thank you for reading this. 
What is the purpose of this study? 
The purpose of this study is to find out how many patients admitted into hospital through the Emergency 
department (A&E) have had problems with their medicines. It is also to find out if a pharmacist based in 
the Emergency department can improve the way we look after you in hospital by asking you about all 
medicines you have taken in the last 6 months. This is to build up a detailed picture of the medicines you 
have taken in order to more fully understand the health reasons that have brought you into hospital. 
Why have I been chosen? 
You have been given this information sheet because you have recently taken 3 or more medicines. You 
will only enter the research project if you also need to be admitted into the hospital. This research will not 
alter whether or not you are admitted. 
Do I have to take part? 
It is up to you to decide whether or not to take part.  If you do decide to take part you will be given this 
information sheet to keep and be asked to sign a consent form. If you decide to take part you are still free 
to withdraw at any time and without giving a reason.  A decision to withdraw at any time, or a decision 
not to take part, will not affect the standard of care you receive. 
What will happen to me if I take part? 
Sometimes because we do not know the best pathway for patients, we try to explore new ways of working 
and then make comparisons with the historical approach.  People will be put into groups and then 
compared.  The groups are selected by a computer which has no information about the individual – i.e. by 
chance.  Patients in each group then have a different way of being treated and these are compared. In this 
case the new way of working (a chat with a pharmacist) is being compared with the current system. You 
will have an equal chance of being in either group. 
In a blind trial you will not know which group you are in. This is a double blind trial in the emergency 
department as the A&E doctor will be unaware that the recording of you medication is different, as it will 
occur after he has spoken to you. However the doctors and nurses on the ward will be able to see the 
additional records made by the pharmacist. 
If you agree to take part in this project the research nurse will ask all patients some general questions 
about taking medicines. This should take no more than 5 minutes to complete. 
The research nurse will then randomly put you into one of two groups. If you are in the control group the 
doctor will ask you about the medicines you take and prescribe them in the normal way. The doctors and 
 
 nurses will not know you are part of this research project. A pharmacist will review your medicines 
during your hospital stay, although you may not be aware of this. 
If you are in the active group the research nurse will introduce you to a pharmacist who will talk to you 
about the medicines you have recently taken. They will ask you about any problems, side effects or 
changes in your medicines. These will be recorded in your notes and seen by the doctor on the admission 
ward. Unless you are experiencing any difficulties with your medicines the junior doctors in the 
Emergency department will not know you are part of a research project. 
The interview with the pharmacist should take about 15 minutes and will take place whilst the other 
preparations are made for you to be admitted to hospital. Therefore the interview should not alter or delay 
the way you are admitted into a hospital bed. After this interview you will probably be unaware that you 
are part of this project, which will end when you leave hospital. The success of this new way of working 
will probably not be known until months after you have left the hospital and most doctors and nurses 
looking after you will not know you are part of this research project. 
What do I have to do? 
The only thing you have to do is talk to the pharmacist honestly and openly about the medicines you have 
been prescribed or bought from a pharmacy or supermarket, including nutritional supplements (such as 
vitamins and minerals), herbal medicines, homeopathic preparations or recreational substances that you 
have consumed recently. The purpose of knowing about non-prescribed medication is only because they 
may be relevant to treatments we may give you. 
What is the drug or procedure that is being tested? 
There is no new drug or treatment being tested. It is only the way in which the hospital obtains 
information and records the medicines you have taken. It is a new way of working with you, but should 
not otherwise affect the way we care for you. 
What are the alternatives for diagnosis or treatment? 
Doctors and nurses will continue to diagnose or treat your medical condition in the usual way. This 
research only tests if the information obtained and recorded by the pharmacist assists the speed with 
which we find out what is wrong with you and provide your treatment.  
 
What are the possible benefits of taking part? 
We hope to be able to record more detailed data about the medicines you take and any problems you have 
had. If this information allows a more rapid or fuller understanding of your problems, then we plan to 
treat yourself and future patients more rapidly by introducing this new way of working. We do not know 
if the interview with a pharmacist will help and it may be no better than current practice. 
What if new information becomes available? 
This study is only about obtaining information and a new way of doing this – no treatment is involved. 
Once entered into this study it will not be possible to withdraw the information that was available.  
Will my taking part in this study be kept confidential? 
‘All information which is collected about you during the course of the research will be kept strictly 
confidential.  Any information about you which leaves the hospital/surgery will have your name and 
address removed so that you cannot be recognised from it.’ 
The senior hospital doctors looking after you will be aware of this research project and the entries in the 
notes.  
Sometimes we phone general practitioners about the medicines you take. This is normal practice, when 
we need to clarify details of what has been prescribed. If we do this we will send a letter to them 
confirming what we have recorded about the medicines you take. You are fully at liberty to discuss this 
with them after your hospital admission is completed 
What will happen to the results of the research study? 
It is anticipated that the results of this will be published in professional healthcare journals. No patient 
will be identified in any report or publication. This work will also be reported in a PhD thesis on 
medication problems by the chief investigator 
 
 Who is organising and funding the research? 
Southampton University Hospitals NHS Trust funds this research. There is no payment for patients taking 
part. 
Who has reviewed the study? 
The Southampton and South West Hampshire Research Ethics Committee have reviewed this study 
Contact for further Information. 
If you wish to contact someone about this study please talk to Mark Tomlin, Chief Investigator on 023 80 
795117 
version 2 
You will be given a copy of this Patient Information Sheet and a signed consent form to keep. 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Study Number: 
Patient Identification Number for this trial: 
 
CONSENT FORM 
Title of Project: 
A&E Medication Project 
Name of Researcher: 
Jennifer Irving 
Mark Tomlin 
Mike Clancy 
Rob Crouch 
 
                                                  Please initial box 
1. I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet dated 27/9/2003...................  ?
 (version 1............) for the above study and have had the opportunity to ask questions. 
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time,  ?
 without giving any reason, without my medical care or legal rights being affected. 
3. I understand that sections of any of my medical notes may be looked at by responsible ? 
 individuals from [company name] or from regulatory authorities where it is relevant to my taking 
part in research.  I give permission for these individuals to have access to my 
 records. 
4. I agree to take part in the short nurse survey about medicines generally.   ? 
5.    I agree to take part in the pharmacist interview about my medicines.    ? 
________________________ ________________ ____________________ 
Name of Patient Date Signature 
_________________________ ________________ ____________________ 
Name of Person taking consent Date  Signature 
(if different from researcher) 
_________________________ ________________ ____________________ 
Researcher Date  Signature 
 1 for patient;  1 for researcher;  1 to be kept with hospital notes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Appendix 4 
 
Process map for the controlled study. 
 
 A&E Medication Research Protocol
Patient attends 
A&E
Patient enters
triage
Research nurse 
Identifies  those taking 
3 or more medicines
Patient given research 
information sheet
Doctor sees patient 
and notes medicines as part 
of routine clerking
Patient waits
to see doctor
Patient 
discharged Attender excluded 
from research
Doctor decides 
to admit Patient Admission 
process begins
Research nurse 
Obtains patient consent
Research nurse allocates
patients into groups
Research nurse introduces 
pharmacist to relevant patients
Brief nurse 
survey
 
Admission 
Process
continues
Research pharmacist records medication
in medical notes and writes out 
inpatient prescription chart
Research pharmacist conducts
medication history review
Admission 
Process
in A&E ends
Patient transfers to 
admission ward
Urgent problems identified
to A&E doctor
Medication related problems written 
in notes and communicated to 
clinical team on admission ward
Patient arrives on admission
ward and seen by nursing team
Patient waits 
to see doctor
Admitting Doctor sees patient
and prescribes medication
Admitting Doctor sees patient and 
signs prescription, or amends it
Common pathway from here
 
 
 
  
 
 
Appendix 5 
 
A&E side­study questionnaire.
 
 Resolution of medication related problems by a pharmacist in the 
emergency department 
Questionnaire sub-study by research nurse: 
 
An exploration of patient experience and understanding of medication related matters for patients 
attending the emergency department . 
 
Structured Medication Questionnaire – interview schedule 
 
1. How many different prescribed/non-prescribed medicines do you take?  
and how many tablets per day? 
2. At what times do you find it easier to take your medicines? 
 
3. Which medicines, if any, do you most frequently forget to take? 
 
4. Does taking medicines disrupt your daily routine?  
 
5. Can you remember the names of any prescribed medication that you take? 
 
6. Do you know what they are for? 
 
7. Have you taken any medication such as painkillers before coming here today (particularly if injury 
related)? If not why? 
 
8. Do you have any allergies to drugs (if yes, what happened)? 
 
9. If you have taken antibiotics before, have you ever had any form of reaction to them? If so what 
happened? 
 
10. Do you often take antibiotics? If so why? 
 
11. If you take medication regularly have you brought them with you? 
 
12. Have you ever used somebody else’s prescribed medication because you have a similar problem? 
 
 
 Appendix 6 
Definitions of prescribing errors. 
 
 
 
 Definitions of prescribing errors 
1. Pharmacist interventions that are Not a prescribing error (NPE) 
 
When the prescription was safe, but not in accordance with hospital policy or the hospital formulary (for 
example Gaviscon instead of Gaviscon advance); or the venous thrombo-embolic risk assessment form 
had not been completed, or the doctor sought advice about how to do something before initiating the 
process; or the prescription was intrinsically safe but the pharmacist made it safer (IV to oral conversion 
or addition of a maximum dose); or more effective (changing from oral tablets to liquids); or cheaper; or 
the detection of a nurse administration error. 
2. Prescribing errors of Omission (OPE) 
 
A prescribing error arose when the doctor omitted to undertake a clinically important action or omitted to 
include essential technical prescribing details. 
A Technical prescribing detail was the signature, date, dose, frequency, route, allergy status, or controlled 
drug requirements. This included illegible or ambiguous details, such as writing a dose as 1mg/kg with no 
weight on the chart so that nothing was given. It includes the unintentional omission of medicines from 
the patient’s drug history. 
A clinical prescribing error includes not initiating anticoagulants for an appropriate indication at a 
suitable time after diagnosis or operation; or prophylactic agents for deep vein thrombosis or stress 
ulceration. This included failing to review medication when the patient’s condition changes (such as 
altered renal function). It also included failure to initiate beta-blockers or anti-platelet agents in line with a 
national guideline such as secondary prevention of myocardial infarction. 
3. Prescribing errors of Commission (CPE) 
 
A prescribing error arose when the doctor wrote something that was incorrect such as prescribing a 
penicillin antibiotic for a patient who was allergic to this.  
Technical errors would be to have prescribed a drug detail, such as the dose, that was inconsistent with 
the drug or other details (for example flucloxacillin 200mg three times a day) 
Clinical errors would be to have prescribed an interacting pair of drugs, or failed to follow a guideline 
accurately such as choosing the wrong dose of enoxaparin (1.5mg/kg daily for unstable angina).  
 
 Appendix 7 
Data collection form (post 2007) – not used. 
 
 
  
 
 INTERVENTION DETAILS 
 Please tick  
Pharmacist’s name…………….. 
 
Dispensary  Ward Pharmacist            POD Technician  
 
 Name Dr/bleep/G MC 
 Date…………………………….. 
 
Ward……………………………. Grade doctor - F1 F2 Reg Cons 
Patients Name/Hospital Number…………………………………………. 
Age………………………………. Intervention/prescribing error 
state local/national Guideline if applicable 
INTERVENTION FOR SCORING 
 
1    Negative i.e. detrimental to patient 
2    Information provision only 
3    Minor intervention 
4    Major intervention 
5    Save a major organ/serious 
6    Save a life 
 
Please give brief details of intervention: (please list drug names) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Drug with narrow therapeutic index                                                   33   
  
INTERVENTION MADE ON WARD ROUND  31    
More than 24 hours before action 32   
PTO FOR INTERVENTION CODING 
 
 
 CLINICAL PHARMACY INTERVENTION REPORT FORM 
             Only tick one box in each section 
 
INTERVENTION RECORDING 
 
DOCUMENTATION – Prescription  
                                        Illegible, ambiguous 
                                        Illegal, incomplete  
 
 
07   
- First prescription error 08    
- Choice of  / need for drug 09   
- Choice of dose/frequency/timing 10   
- Choice of form/strength/route 11   
- Drug duration 12   
- Pharmacokinetics/T.D.M. 13   
- Drug admin/incompatibility/calc 14   
- Drug interaction/ADR/SE/monitoring 15   
- Drug supply/storage 16   
- Other drug information 17   
- Nutrition 18   
CLINICAL 
- IP/TTO discrepancy 
19   
 - TTO error 
20   
THERAPEUTIC SUBSTITUTION 
 
21   
- Cost information/analysis 22   
- Formulary compliance 23   
- Attempt to decrease costs 24   
FINANCIAL 
- Non financial 25   
- Positive  Treatment altered/actioned 26   
 Chart altered 27   
 Information accepted 28   
- Information Known/problem not pursued 29   
- Negative Treatment unaltered 30   
OUTCOME 
   
PTO FOR INTERVENTION DETAILS AND SCORING
 
 
